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Using the Uwai Kakuken nikki, a diary kept by the middle-ranking warrior Uwai 
Kakuken from 1574 to 1586, this dissertation examines some fundamental factors that 
contributed to the political decision-making process of the Shimazu family in late sixteenth 
century Japan. In order to achieve this, this dissertation focuses on the Shimazu family’s 
communication system responsible for the gathering and delivery of information and military 
intelligence, and the management of rumours circulating within the entire Shimazu 
administration. Through the close reading and analysis of several key events in the Uwai 
Kakuken nikki, this dissertation argues that some of the primary factors affecting the decision-
making process of the Shimazu family included the personal interests of the individual warriors 
involved in each instance and the perceived will of the deities as divined through lottery. Rather 
than acting in adherence to abstract notions of morality, loyalty, or truth, warriors often exploited 
the shortcomings of the communication system and the ambiguity of factual information in order 
to further their individual agendas. In the administration’s decision-making process, many 
warriors were interested in boosting their legitimacy, but at the same time, they were also 
concerned about protecting their siblings and children from harm. The argument pushes back 
against the language of loyalty appearing in and promoted by law codes and military tales of 
premodern Japan. Beyond the pursuit of one’s immediate interests, warriors also made decisions 
based heavily on their spiritual beliefs. Spiritual acts like the kuji played an important role in 
influencing the way the Shimazu administration made military decisions in this period. Through 
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the exploration of the Uwai Kakuken nikki, the findings of this dissertation show that the samurai 
often prioritized their individual interests as a way to manage the volatile social and political 
situation of sixteenth century Japan. To that end, decisions were made with the aim of balancing 
the many variables and limited resources a warrior had access to at any given time, while also 








 When the head of the Shimazu family, Shimazu Yoshihisa (1533 – 1611), was petitioned 
by one of his retainers in Tenshō 2 (1574), Yoshihisa denied his retainer’s request without 
hesitation or even asking for more details. The content of the petition itself was actually nothing 
special. It was a simple request for a land transfer, the kind of request that frequently appeared in 
front of Yoshihisa, and one that he has granted and denied numerous times in the past. But there 
was something different this time. Rumours circulating at the time stated that this retainer’s 
father tried to poison and kill the previous ruler of the Shimazu family and the father of 
Yoshihisa. Did Yoshihisa allow himself to be affected by such unsubstantiated rumours or was 
he reasonable enough to understand that rumours cannot be equated to truth? Unfortunately for 
this particular retainer, Yoshihisa decided in the end to reject this petition. But what was the 
justification for this rejection? What were the factors that influenced Yoshihisa’s decision-
making process, not just in this particular instance, but in the making of the many other decisions 
that defined the very existence of his administration? 
 Using the Shimazu regime during the late sixteenth century as a case study, the current 
project aims to examine some of the possible reasons and justifications behind the decisions 
made by the medieval warlords and their warriors, specifically decisions pertaining to military, 
administrative, or diplomatic affairs. Over the course of four chapters, we will closely scrutinize 





1589), a middle-ranking Shimazu retainer. Through our exploration and analysis of some of the 
key events found in this diary, we will see that the warriors of the Sengoku period were 
frequently concerned with their goals vis-a-vis the larger political and military situation at play. 
The attainment of abstract concepts such as honor, morality, or loyalty only mattered in so far as 
they would affect the carefully constructed façade of each individual warrior. Both the retainers 
and the warlords seemed to be more concerned with improving their own station within the 
world instead. Whether it was to protect their own reputation amongst their peers, or to reinforce 
their authority in the eyes of their retainers, the samurai of the Sengoku period seemed more than 
willing to act in defiance toward their superior’s will and truth itself. This stood in direct 
opposition to the concerns of honor, loyalty, morality, and order found in premodern Japanese 
law codes and military tales.1 
 Our investigation of the possible factors affecting warrior decisions during this time 
fundamentally challenges some stereotyped notions of the samurai and what it means to be 
“Japanese.” Specifically, our analysis illustrates that the medieval samurai were willing to 
sacrifice the wellbeing of the collective or their lord in favor of securing their individual goals. 
This runs counter to not only the idea of the samurai as constructed by modern media, but also to 
the samurai ideal espoused by Japanese thinkers of the early modern period as well.  
Furthermore, my research also illuminates the insecure nature of the regional warlords’ power 
even within their own administration. While it is easy for us to see these warlords, or daimyo, as 
the embodiment and personification of the political and military structures under their control, 
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 For a more nuanced discussion on the impact of idealized concepts such as loyalty and order evident in the 
Sengoku law codes and their long-term impact, see Eason, “The Culture of Disputes in Early Modern Japan, 1550 – 
1700,” pp. 121 – 72. For how such abstractions are intertwined with the popular understanding of what it meant to 
be a samurai, see Hurst, “Death, Honor, and Loyality: the Bushidō Ideal,” pp. 514 – 9. As for the appeals to morality 





this was not in fact the case. The following chapters will illustrate that the daimyo only had 
limited access and control over a large part of his administration. The daimyo’s control was the 
result of a careful balancing of various possibilities and uncertainties prevalent in the daily 
operations of his domain. Though he maintained the ultimate control over any decisions made by 
his government, the daimyo had little involvement over most decisions that were made on a daily 
basis. Instead, he delegated a lot of this work to his senior retainer council. This council in turn 
held the power to both make decisions in the daimyo’s name and determined what information 
required the daimyo’s attention.  
 While this may not seem like a novel discovery, my work is able to trace the fragmented 
structure of authority transmission within this powerful daimyo house at the height of Sengoku 
Japan. Furthermore, my in-depth and meticulous analysis of words, passages, and rhythm of 
communication and rumours appearing in the Uwai Kakuken nikki reveals the prevalence of 
crucial inferences and even silences. The textual and intertextual expressions point to the 
instability and vulnerability that characterized the warrior organizations built on the constantly 
shifting interests of individual warriors. 
 Below, we will first introduce the historical background of our discussion, including the 
Sengoku period, the Shimazu family and their lineage, the Shimazu’s relationship with the 
aristocracy, and the geography and climate of southern Kyushu. Next, we describe our primary 
source, Uwai Kakuken’s diary, the Uwai Kakuken nikki, which illuminates the daimyo’s mode of 
governance through personal voices of the diarist and those around him. This will be followed by 







I. The Historical Backdrop 
I.a. The Historical Moment of Sengoku Japan 
 The Japanese polity’s transition into the medieval era can be defined by the decline of 
imperial and aristocratic authority centred upon modern Kyoto on the one hand, and the rise of 
the warrior class on the other. While the initial warrior government, established at the end of the 
twelfth century, markedly coruled with the imperial government, by the fifteenth century, the 
balance had definitively tipped toward the military class. The so-called Japan’s “samurai age” 
covers more than seven hundred years from approximately 1185 to 1868. During that time, 
medieval Japan (to 1600) featured a polity with two centres of authority stemming from both the 
imperial court and the warrior government, or the bakufu, under the control of a shogun.2  
 With the rise of the first bakufu in Kamakura, there came the reorganization of warrior 
socioeconomic organizations into the governmental structure, and along with it came a new role 
for the warriors. Once considered merely local enforcers, some of the samurai class men, who 
had fought on the side of Minamoto no Yoritomo (1147 – 1199), the winner in the Genpei War 
(c. 1180 – 1185), became a crucial part of the new bakufu. These were mostly eastern warriors, 
and received special dispensation from the bakufu to manage the polity’s estate system as far 
away as Kyushu. The samurai became the local managers of the various landholdings and estates 
for the aristocratic elites, in charge of both the daily management of said estates, and most 
importantly, the collection and delivery of taxes from the various provinces to the capital. Their 
direct involvement and the control over the revenue of the aristocrats eventually led to the 
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 There was no shogun between 1573, marking the last Ashikaga shogun, and 1603, the year the Tokugawa shogun 
was appointed. The establishment of the Tokugawa shogun ushered in a new period historians call the “early 
modern.” For a concise summary of the transition from the Sengoku period to the Tokugawa period, see Bulter, 





erosion of the imperial court’s political relevance as the samurai continued to accumulate wealth 
and power at the aristocracy’s expense. 
 The court did not immediately accept the establishment of the warrior government nor, a 
century later, the apparent growth of warrior authority. In 1221, Retired Emperor Go-Toba (1180 
– 1239) unsuccessfully sought to overthrow the bakufu. A century later in 1333, Emperor Go-
Daigo (1288 – 1339) assembled non-bakufu warriors and disgruntled bakufu retainers to thwart 
the government. A violent struggle ensued and the Kamakura bakufu was destroyed. Although 
the impetus for the attack had been Go-Daigo’s grievance regarding the system of enthronement 
that alternated between two fraternal lines, he blamed this system on the Kamakura bakufu’s 
mediation. While the imperial family at the time possessed the largest portfolio of estates in the 
archipelago, the subsequent centuries would see gradual but certain deterioration of property 
rights among imperial and all aristocratic families as warriors encroached into them legally and 
illegally. 
 The destruction of the Kamakura bakufu was followed by a short, three-year reign of 
Emperor Go-Daigo. Despite the short-lived success of the court, it merely led to the rise of a new 
warrior government to replace their overthrown predecessor. This new Muromachi bakufu 
further weakened the court’s authority over the provinces. Whereas before, the warriors and 
aristocrats shared some level of jurisdictional control over the many landholdings, during the 
Muromachi era (1336 – 1573), warriors seized almost all authority over local administrations and 
the revenue it generated from the hands of the aristocracy. Prior to the Muromachi period, 
property-holders, including aristocrats and warriors, held rights over many estates scattered 
across the archipelago. But this trend gradually died out during the Muromachi period as 





landholdings for similarly sized ones closer to home. The process of consolidating land rights 
into one region led to the growth of powerful local warlords, who came to be called the daimyo, 
or “big name.” During and after the Ōnin War (1467 – 1477), daimyo increased their 
independent authority over the region they controlled. The Ōnin War, initially a succession 
dispute concerning the shogun’s house, erupted into a civil war that engaged nearly all major 
warriors in the country. The war, which was mostly fought in Kyoto, significantly weakened the 
authority of the Muromachi bakufu, whose headquarters was located in Kyoto. With the 
diminishing control exerted by both the court and the bakufu, daimyo all over the archipelago 
capitalized on this opportunity and became rulers in their own right. Unsurprisingly, when the 
civil war finally ended in 1477, the daimyo relinquished none of their newfound freedoms back 
to the bakufu. With the central warrior government losing most of its authority over the 
provinces, Japan entered the Sengoku, or warring states, period, where local daimyo competed 
with their rivals for domination and power. 
 The fragmentation of the Muromachi bakufu’s authority lasted until a daimyo, Oda 
Nobunaga (1534 – 1582), ousted the last Muromachi shogun from Kyoto in 1573 and put an end 
to the Muromachi period. Nobunaga gradually expanded his military control over the 
archipelago, but Nobunaga’s reign ended in 1582 when one of his retainers betrayed Nobunaga 
and drove him to his death. Without a clear line of succession, Nobunaga’s retainers and allies 
competed among themselves to seize as much of Nobunaga’s empire as possible. This conflict 
led to the rise of Toyotomi Hideyoshi (1558 – 1598), who became the primary military and 
political force of Japan from 1583 onwards. 3 
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 The demise of the central warrior government in Kyoto in 1573 did not negate Kyoto of 
all political relevance. Although the imperial court depended heavily on the patronage and 
economic sustenance from their military counterpart, the Muromachi bakufu, the court 
nevertheless managed to weather the storm of political turmoil. It did so by making use of its 
cultural capital. Many aristocrats replaced the bakufu with new supporters from among the 
powerful daimyo located across the archipelago. Many warlords held tremendous political, 
military, and financial power, but lacked the cultural fluency needed to garner prestige and 
respect. In return for monetary support, aristocrats and courtiers would transmit closely guarded 
knowledge on cultural activities such as poetry composition and literary analysis to their samurai 
patrons, while petitioning the court for imperial titles and ranks in the warlords’ stead. In other 
words, while much of the sixteenth century was a period of degrading political and military 
influence from Kyoto, it was also a time of intense cultural expansion as Kyoto culture 
penetrated every corner of the country. 
 This was the political landscape in which the Uwai Kakuken nikki came to be written. The 
diary covers a period of twelve years from Tenshō 2 (1574) to Tenshō 14 (1586). This was a 
time of possibly the greatest cumulative violence in premodern Japanese history, yet it was also a 
time of momentous shift from fragmentation to unification. This was a time when centralized 
political control emanating from Kyoto had lost all meaning in the daimyo’s home provinces as 
intense political and military tension flared up into open conflict with increasing frequency 
between regional rivals. The Shimazu, the daimyo whom Uwai Kakuken served, were largely 
unaffected by the activities of Nobunaga and Hideyoshi for most of the sixteenth century. By 
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Tenshō 14 (1586) however, the Shimazu could no longer ignore the developments in central 
Japan, as Tenshō 14 marked the final year of Shimazu independence before their surrender to 
Hideyoshi. Yet, the Shimazu was one of the last to capitulate to the central unifying powers. This 
prolonged independence enjoyed by the Shimazu was further reinforced by the distance 
separating them from central Japan. This renders the Shimazu into a unique example of a 
successful late Sengoku daimyo free from the influence of central figures like Nobunaga and 
Hideyoshi. This distinguished the Shimazu from most of their Sengoku counterparts. The 
systems and infrastructures of the Shimazu represented a successful parallel structure to those 
prominent in central Japan, the examination of which will serve to enrich our understanding of 
the key factors necessary for effective administration of a domain during the Sengoku period. 
  
I.b. The Shimazu Family Lineage 
 The Shimazu family, like many of its peers throughout the medieval era, consisted of 
many different branches. For the most part, this work will be focused around the administrative 
and military structures of the primary branch of the Shimazu family which was ruled by Shimazu 
Yoshihisa and his three brothers, Yoshihiro, Toshihisa, and Iehisa.4 While other secondary 
branches of the family controlled various landholdings across the archipelago, the three 
provinces of southern Kyushu, Satsuma, Ōsumi, and Hyūga, had the longest association with the 
Shimazu’s main branch in general. This can be traced to the very beginnings of the Shimazu 
family itself. 
 The primary branch of the Shimazu family traced its origins to the Kamakura period 
retainer, Koremune Tadahisa (d. 1227), who served under the first shogun, Minamoto no 
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Yoritomo. Extant documents show that Yoritomo did in fact appoint Koremune Tadahisa to 
various posts associated with different estates (shōen) throughout the archipelago. Most 
importantly for our purposes here, Tadahisa was assigned the post of resident estate manager 
(geshi-shiki) of the Shimazu estate in Satsuma, or modern day Kagoshima.5 Following a 
common practice at the time, the Koremune family changed its name from Koremune to that of 
the estate under their management, thus adopting the surname of Shimazu. 
 The Shimazu however, saw themselves as more than just the descendants of some 
retainer from the Kamakura era. The theory that the Shimazu were the descendants of Koremune 
Tadahisa is one that is supported by solid documentary evidence, but the Shimazu themselves 
believed another theory to be true during the late sixteenth century. This theory directly impacted 
the Shimazu’s self-image, which in turn would affect the decision-making process of the 
Shimazu. After all, each decision the Shimazu made would in some way affect their image in the 
eyes of both their retainers and their rivals. As the origins of the Shimazu was inseparable from 
the legitimacy of their rule over southern Kyushu, the Shimazu’s maintenance of their image had 
significant implications for their domain’s stability. 
 The most prominent theory that the Shimazu espoused was as follows: the Shimazu 
actually descended from the shogun himself, and that their progenitor, Koremune Tadahisa, was 
an illegitimate child of Yoritomo. While the origins of this theory cannot be confirmed, Shimazu 
genealogies citing this theory as fact first started to appear sometime during 1394 – 1428.6 
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 For the earliest documents issued by Minamoto no Yoritomo to Koremune Tadahisa, see “Minamoto no Yoritomo 
kudashibumi,” Genryaku 2 (1185). 6.15, Shimazu-ke monjo, DNK Iewake 1 (pp. 1 – 2). See also, 1185/06/15 
“Minamoto no Yoritomo kudashibumi,” Genryaku 2 (1185). 6.15, Shimazu-ke monjo, DNK Iewake 2 (p. 2). For the 
appointment of Kuremune Tadahisa to the resident estate manager of Shimazu estate, see 1185/08/17 “Minamoto no 
Yoritomo kudashibumi,” Genryaku 2 (1185). 8.17, Shimazu-ke monjo, DNK Iewake 3 (pp. 2 – 3). 
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Subsequently, the Shimazu genealogies composed based upon such documents continued to 
portray the Shimazu as direct descendants of Yoritomo up until around the early modern era.7  
 As we might imagine, the existence of these genealogies had tremendous implications for 
the Shimazu’s sense of identity. The continued use of documents characterizing Koremune 
Tadahisa as the son of Yoritomo hints at the enormous value the Shimazu attached to their 
connection to the first shogun. This is understandable as it granted them the prestige to exert 
their military and political influence without the need to seek outside approval as so many 
daimyo did. At the same time, the claim to being the direct descendants of the first shogun also 
granted the Shimazu a certain level of arrogance befitting those of a noble lineage.8  
 Beyond this claim to warrior nobility, the Shimazu also sought to acquire the prestige 
derived from the aristocracy through their use of the surname of Fujiwara in documents. The 
Fujiwara and their descendants served as imperial regents since the late tenth century and were 
indisputably the highest ranked aristocrats with the greatest prestige and influence. This 
association between the Shimazu and the Fujiwara surname was not something new. Like their 
association with Yoritomo, usage of the Fujiwara name can also be traced back to the time of 
Koremune Tadahisa. In a bakufu order issued in Jōkyū 3 (1221), Koremune Tadahisa was 
referred to as “left division lieutenant of the outer palace guards, Fujiwara Tadahisa,”9 
suggesting that not only did he claim association with the Fujiwara, but that said association was 
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 Mizuno, “Shimazu-shi no jiko ninshiki to shisei,” p. 162. 
8
 The Shimazu’s claims to a long and noble lineage were by no means unique. For an example of another Sengoku 
daimyo who traced their family history to the Kamakura period, see Matsuoka and Arnesen, “The Sengoku Daimyo 
of Western Japan: the Case of the Ōuchi,” pp. 64 – 65. An in-depth analysis of the Ōuchi family can be found in 
Arnesen’s monograph, the Medieval Japanese Daimyo: the Ōuchi Family’s Rule of Suō and Nagato. For an 
alternative look at the Ōuchi and their fall from power see Conlan, “The Failed Attempt to Move the Emperor to 
Yamaguchi and the Fall of the Ōuchi,” pp. 185 – 203. 
9
 “Kantō gechijō,” Jōkyū 3 (1221). 7.12, Shimazu-ke monjo, DNK Iewake 17 (p. 13). See also Miki, Satsuma 





recognized in an official capacity. It is important to keep in mind that the use of the Fujiwara 
family name did not in any way signify a familial link between the Shimazu and the Fujiwara. 
The only real connection between the two families during the time of Tadahisa was that he was 
the manager of the Shimazu estate, the main estate rights of which were held by the Konoe 
family, one of many branch families of the Fujiwara.10  
 This portrait of the Shimazu, that dared to see themselves as nobility, illuminates the 
arrogant streak in their family identity. This sense of pride directly influenced the way that the 
Shimazu daimyo handled their political interactions in the sixteenth century. On the twenty-third 
day of the first month of Tenshō 14 (1586), the Shimazu attempted to formulate a response to the 
regent Toyotomi Hideyoshi. The Shimazu were offended by Hideyoshi’s demands as they saw 
themselves as inherently more prestigious than the newly minted regent.11 According to the diary 
of Uwai Kakuken, their meeting proceeded in the following manner: 
Item: Twenty-third day. I attended court as usual. Today was also spent entirely in 
conference.  
 
After he was appointed regent last year, a letter arrived from Lord Hashiba [Hideyoshi] 
last winter along with supporting letters from the Hosokawa Heibu-taisuke (Fujitaka) 
Novice Genshi and the tea-master (Sen no) Sōeki. The content of the letter is as follows: 
 
In accordance with the imperial will, I write to you with regards to the state of affairs in 
Kyushu. As I am tasked with bringing all provinces under heaven, from the Kantō area 
to the ends of Ōshū, to an age of peace by imperial decree, I find the continuing military 
activities in Kyushu simply unacceptable. With regards to the disagreements 
surrounding provincial borders, arguments from both sides of the conflict shall be 
submitted for consideration, after which a final decision will be rendered. Before this 
can be done however, it is decided that both sides must first cease all military actions 
immediately. Of course, those who refuse to comply with this order will be severely 
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 Takeuchi Rizō, as quoted in Mizuno, “Shimazu-shi no jiko ninshiki to shisei,” p. 154. For a more in-depth look at 
the holdings of the Konoe family, see Yoshimura, “Konoe-keryō kenkyū josetsu,” pp. 47 – 80. 
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 The original letter sent by Toyotomi Hideyoshi was marked as being sent by Hashiba Hideyoshi. Hashiba 
Hideyoshi changed his family name to Toyotomi after he was given the imperial permission to do so on the ninth 
day of the ninth month of Tenshō 13 (1585). For the sake of simplicity, I will be referring to him as Toyotomi 





punished. As such, a response to this order must be submitted as soon as you arrive at a 
decision – this is of utmost importance for all parties involved. 
The second day of the tenth month (Seal [of Hideyoshi]12, no signature) 
Sent to Lord Shimazu (Yoshihisa), Urgent letter. 
 
If we send a reply to the regent in response to his demands, we will of course need to do 
so properly, following the correct protocols. That being said, the Hashiba has no 
respectable ancestry or history in the world. In contrast to them, the Shimazu is of a 
loyal ancestry, dating back to the time of Yoritomo. As such, it is absurd that we are 
required to treat Hashiba with the respect of a regent in our response. He was appointed 
regent for no reason, yet he casually invoked the imperial will in his letter. All of this is 
truly ridiculous…13 
 
The Shimazu’s response to Hideyoshi’s order clearly illustrates how they saw itself vis-à-vis 
Hideyoshi. Especially enlightening is the Shimazu’s disdain for Hideyoshi and for treating him 
with the proper protocols as demanded by Hideyoshi’s station. Whether or not the displeasure 
the Shimazu felt toward Hideyoshi was converted into action is irrelevant. The way that the 
Shimazu saw their own prestige had a demonstrable impact from the very fact that this issue was 
brought up as a matter worthy of administrative debate.  
 The unpleasantness of treating Hideyoshi with any degree of respect befitting his station 
was indicative of the value the Shimazu placed upon their own lineage. This was evident even 
before Hideyoshi’s orders for the cessation of violence arrived. Upon initially hearing news of 
Hideyoshi’s promotion to regent, the Shimazu were obliged to send a congratulatory message to 
Hideyoshi. The way that the Shimazu expressed this message to him did not show any real sign 
of approval toward Hideyoshi’s appointment to regent. According to Miki Yasushi, despite their 
willingness to congratulate Hideyoshi, the message the Shimazu sent did not employ any words 
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that expressed happiness or joy, but rather simply presented the appropriate gift to Hideyoshi for 
his promotion.14 Since it was an accepted custom to send gifts to those being appointed to high 
positions, this act in itself cannot be considered as an expression of joy or happiness at the state 
of affairs.15 In other words, the Shimazu did the bare minimum in accordance with proper 
etiquette. Their willingness to follow through with proper protocols was not a sign of approval of 
Hideyoshi being named the regent, but rather an act to maintain their own stature and keep up 
with appearances.   
 Important for our understanding of the Shimazu’s sentiments towards Hideyoshi is the 
lack of information the Shimazu had with regards to Hideyoshi’s relationship with the Fujiwara. 
While the Shimazu claimed that the lack of ancestry and history should preclude Hideyoshi from 
the position of regent, we know for a fact that Hideyoshi was not made a regent on the basis of 
his Hashiba lineage. In getting himself appointed as regent, Hideyoshi was in fact making use of 
his adoption into the Konoe family as leverage.16 As the Konoe traced its lineage back to the 
Fujiwara, Hideyoshi essentially borrowed the strength of the Fujiwara to attain his own political 
aspirations. Evidence shows however that the Shimazu was likely unaware of Hideyoshi’s 
adoption by the Konoe until the third month of Tenshō 14 (1586), two months after the meeting 
where the Shimazu claimed that Hideyoshi was appointed regent without reason. Nevertheless, 
despite their criticism leveled against Hideyoshi, the Shimazu adopted a method similar to the 
one taken by Hideyoshi in promoting themselves to court titles throughout the Sengoku period. 
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I.c. The Shimazu and the Konoe 
 The Shimazu’s Fujiwara identity was also intrinsically tied to their relationship with the 
Konoe. While the Konoe and the Shimazu did not always have an amicable relationship, from 
the moment Koremune Tadahisa was appointed as manager of the Shimazu estate these two 
families were bounded to each other in the vertical structure of hierarchy that defined the estate 
system.17 As the patron of the estate, the Konoe provided the Shimazu with imperial prestige 
through the bestowal of court titles, made possible by the Shimazu’s approved use of the 
Fujiwara name.  
 The Shimazu’s relationship with the Konoe formed the foundation upon which Yoshihisa 
managed to solidify his hold upon the primary branch of the Shimazu family. Control that 
Yoshihisa had over the Shimazu administration was not nearly as tight as one might assume and 
this only further reinforced the Shimazu’s need for imperial titles. This unstable foundation of 
Yoshihisa’s rule can be seen from the way that he came into power over the Shimazu family 
during the Sengoku period. 
 Similar to many families with centuries of history, the Shimazu had fractured into several 
branch families by the Sengoku period and control over the primary branch was hotly contested. 
Yoshihisa’s hold over the primary branch of the Shimazu family was a relatively recent 
phenomenon. The rule over the main Shimazu branch was actually seized by Yoshihisa’s father 
and grandfather, Shimazu Takahisa (1514 – 1571) and Shimazu Tadayoshi (1492 – 1568) 
respectively, when they exiled the previous leader of the primary branch in 1535 after several 
years of civil war. As a result of this, neither Takahisa nor Tadayoshi was widely recognized by 
the many Shimazu retainers as the legitimate ruler of the family until 1545. In other words, 
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Yoshihisa’s particular branch of the Shimazu family had only been recognized as the legitimate 
rulers of the Shimazu for roughly forty years by the late sixteenth century. Having inherited the 
control of the Shimazu family from his father in 1564, Yoshihisa’s rule was hardly stable. The 
relatively frequent rumours of rebellion in addition to outside forces actively working to 
undermine Yoshihisa’s rule constantly tested Yoshihisa’s control over the Shimazu family. The 
legitimacy of Yoshihisa and his immediate family’s rule was seen as a significant weakness 
throughout the reign of both Yoshihisa and his father.18 
 This relatively unstable foundation contributed to the Shimazu’s concern over legitimacy 
and was at least partially the reason for their intimate connections to the Konoe. As part of their 
efforts to solidify themselves as the rightful rulers of the Shimazu family, Shimazu Takahisa 
cultivated his relationship with the Konoe regents in order to get both himself and Yoshihisa to 
be officially appointed to the position of the Governor of Mutsu (mutsu-no-kami) and Director of 
Upkeep (shūri no daibu) respectively in 1564. The significance of these imperial titles reached 
beyond simply garnering political legitimacy through courtly titles. These two particular court 
ranks had traditionally been held by every ruler of the main Shimazu branch for many 
generations. The title of “Governor of Mutsu” was the entire reason why the Shimazu branch that 
traditionally held control over the primary Shimazu family was known as the Ōshū branch, Ōshū 
being an alternate term for Mutsu. By having these ranks bestowed upon them through imperial 
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decree, Yoshihisa and his father had seized for themselves recognition from the imperial court, 
which granted them some of the much needed prestige necessary for their position as the rulers 
of the Shimazu family.19  
 The Shimazu thus saw themselves as more than common warriors, and instead, the very 
elite of the samurai class with a strong history dating to the first shogun of Japan. The Shimazu 
were also constantly reinforcing their ties with the aristocracy to secure more cultural and 
political leverage. This overall agenda of expanding their prestige and reputation will carry 
through to influence Yoshihisa’s decisions as he ruled the Shimazu throughout the late sixteenth 
century. 
 
I.d. The Geography and Climate of Southern Kyushu 
 The southern provinces of Kyushu provided the Shimazu with some important natural 
resources for war and trade. Two of the most important resources available in the region are 
horses and sulphur. Satsuma horses had been famous historically, and the Shimazu had 
capitalized on and improved upon this resource consistently.20 Despite the importance of horses 
as a resource however, it was sulphur from Iōjima that became a major trade commodity for the 
Shimazu.  
In fact, sulphur was such a large part of foreign trade that it was mentioned in the 
Haedong jegukki, a guidebook written and submitted by Sin Sukju in 1471 to the Joseon 
throne.21 The Haedong jegukki is a text created as a guide for those in the government of Joseon 
Korea (1392 – 1897) to deal with and travel to Japan and the Ryukyu kingdom (modern day 
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Okinawa). Maps detailing the various provinces and major maritime routes as well as a 
vocabulary and pronunciation guide for Japanese common phrases transliterated into Hangul 
suggests that the text served a practical function for its readers.22  
The presence of sulphur within the Shimazu’s jurisdiction would provide them with a 
significant military advantage upon the introduction of guns into the Japanese archipelago in 
1543.23 Unsurprisingly, the necessity of sulphur for the creation of gunpowder meant that 
sulphur became a prized commodity across Japan. From a military perspective, relatively easy 
access to sulphur likely contributed to the Shimazu becoming one of the earliest adopters of guns 
amongst the daimyo. As early as 1549, the Shimazu already incorporated rifles into their military 
campaigns.24 From an economic perspective, sulphur was a valuable trade commodity. In fact, 
the demand of sulphur stretched beyond Japan and into Ming China during this period.25 By 
utilizing their trade relations with Ming China, the Shimazu was able to capitalize on the sulphur 
in their domain and turn this resource into a valuable asset for domestic economic expansion.26 
This was at least partly responsible for the Shimazu’s economic wellbeing until their 
confrontation with the Ōtomo in the 1580s.27 
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As far as luxury resources were concerned, gold was readily available in the southern 
Kyushu region as well, though it was a relatively late discovery by medieval standards.28 The 
abundance of resources such as gold and sulphur would mean little however if the Shimazu 
could not efficiently move these goods outwards toward the Shimazu’s neighbour. Luckily for 
the Shimazu, one of the key defining features of the southern Kyushu region is its extensive 
coastline and its close proximity to Korea, China, and the Ryukyu kingdom. In fact, the 
traditional stronghold of the Shimazu, the Satsuma province, was closer to Korea, China, and the 
Ryukyu kingdom than to Kyoto and central Japan.29 As the Shimazu expanded their control over 
the southern Kyushu provinces of Satsuma, Ōsumi, and Hyūga, the Shimazu only further 
expanded their access to the maritime trade routes along the coast.30  
The significance of the coastline as a defining feature of these provinces dates all the way 
back to the seventh and eighth centuries and continues to this day.31 The three provinces of 
Satsuma, Ōsumi, and Hyūga were combined to make the modern prefectures of Kagoshima and 
Miyazaki when Japan transitioned into the modern era in the late nineteenth century. The modern 
official prefectural history of Kagoshima defines the prefecture of Kagoshima through its 
coastlines. It states that, 
[t]his prefecture, being on the southern part of Kyushu, hugs Kagoshima Bay with the 
two peninsulas of Ōsumi and Satsuma. Controlling the numerous islands to the 
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southwest, facing the Pacific to its east and looking out towards the East China Sea to its 
west, this prefecture forms the southern gate of old Japan. With such a geographical 
location, it naturally became the key transportation point with China and the various 
countries of Southeast Asia, and historically, it has always occupied a prominent place 
with regards to foreign exchange.32  
 
The association between Kagoshima, and by extension the provinces of Satsuma and Ōsumi, and 
the bodies of water surrounding it is immediately apparent. This description highlights the 
maritime nature of this region and the importance of the coastline as a key component of these 
provinces’ economy. This is the reason why landholdings with direct access to the coast became 
a prized possession for many Shimazu retainers, and why the Shimazu centred their 
administration on Kagoshima while maintaining direct control over the port of Bonotsu. Both 
Kagoshima and Bonotsu were major commercial centres of southern Kyushu, with Bonotsu 
directly being tied to the commercial activities in Fujian as well as the Ryukyu kingdom.33 
 Despite the robust maritime trade made possible by the coastline of southern Kyushu, the 
area was not without its geographical issues that demanded the Shimazu’s attention. Beyond the 
coastal regions of the area, southern Kyushu was also defined by the numerous mountains in the 
region. The vast majority of Satsuma’s inland area consists of either mountains or hills.34 The 
largest mountain range in Satsuma is Mt. Shibi in the north. This along with the Mt. Yahazudake 
and its associated peaks along the same mountain range formed a clear boundary that separated 
the Satsuma province from its northern neighbours.35  These mountain ranges became a natural 
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barrier between the Shimazu and their rivals to the north. Mt. Shibi and Mt. Yahazudake are not 
the only mountains in the area however. In fact, the region is filled with less prominent mountain 
ranges, with the only major plains forming along the western coast of the Satsuma peninsula. 
The abundance of mountains meant relatively little flatlands, necessary for productive 
agriculture, were available to the Shimazu. To make matters worst, many of the region’s 
mountains included relatively active volcanoes as well.  
There are three major volcanoes within just Satsuma province. The first of these is Mt. 
Kirishima located on the northeastern border between Satsuma and Ōsumi, which last erupted in 
1971.36 More famous than Mt. Kirishima, and closer to Satsuma proper are the other two 
volcanoes: Mt. Sakurajima and Mt. Kaimondake, located in Kagoshima Bay and the southern tip 
of Satsuma respectively. Mt Sakurajima is one of the most dangerous volcanoes in Satsuma, its 
last eruption dating to 1978.37 While there were many abnormal activities and actual eruptions 
sighted on Mt. Kirishima, the most severe of which took place on 1566, activities associated with 
Mt. Sakurajima were far more devastating.38 The records of Mt. Sakurajima’s eruptions on both 
1475 and 1476 describe in detail the impact these two particular incidents had on the surrounding 
area. In 1475, the eruption resulted in the raining down of volcanic ash for five days, resulting in 
a death-toll of people and horses beyond calculation. A year later, in 1476, the burning embers 
and dust from the eruption buried local settlements, resulting in mass deaths for both humans and 
life-stocks.39  
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 As for Mt. Kaimondake, this volcano had a much smaller impact upon the history of 
Satsuma and its neighbours during the medieval era. The last major eruption of Mt. Kaimondake 
dates all the way back to 885.40 While there was a series of earthquakes associated with this 
volcano in 1967, it now rests mostly as a geographical attraction for travellers with little threat of 
eruptions.41 This also means that, in contrast to Mt. Kirishima and Mt. Sakurajima, Mt. 
Kaimondake had a much smaller impact upon the inhabitants and the history of southern 
Kyushu. 
 The presence of these volcanoes had significant long-term implications for the 
agricultural development of the area. Eruption events and the resulting fallout were of course 
devastating for everyone in the vicinity. Beyond the immediate costs in human lives, the 
particulates launched into the atmosphere as a result eruption events dramatically reduced 
sunlight, which in turn directly impacted the growing of crops in the area and beyond.42 But the 
volcanic activities of the region had more significant impacts beyond the loss of crops that 
resulted from eruptions. The high amount of volcanic activity within the area altered the long-
term geological makeup of the region. As a result of these volcanoes, the entire area was covered 
by a white, thick layer of pumiceous rock called shirasu. This shirasu layer stretches across the 
entire region and was the result of a massive eruption of the Aira caldera 22,000 years ago. This 
created one hundred and fifty cubic kilometres worth of shirasu that effectively sealed off the 
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natural layer of topsoil. This eruption caused the Aira caldera to collapse and created Mt 
Sakurajima as it exists today.43  
 The shirasu rocks are composed mostly of volcanic glass and other inorganic materials. 
In its natural state, the shirasu is 80% volcanic glass. Chemically speaking shirasu is 70% silicic 
acid. Neither of these qualities make the shirasu layer of southern Kyushu conducive to 
agriculture.44 The problem is further compounded by the massive amount of gas that is released 
by the heated volcanic glass as it cools, which leaves huge empty holes and pockets within the 
shirasu rock layer.45 This meant that, in addition to the shirasu layer being poor for agriculture 
chemically, it also lacks the ability to retain water and nutrients. Water simply drains through the 
holes of the shirasu layer created by these air pockets. This rendered paddy field agriculture to 
be almost impossible.46 This shirasu rock layer ranges from tens to hundreds of meters thick as 
well. For medieval agriculturalists, this was not something they can simply dig through to get to 
the much more productive soil layers buried underneath.47 Luckily, shirasu rocks are very 
susceptible to water erosion likely caused by the structural weakness created by the air pockets 
within the rocks.48 While this significantly increased the risks of rockslides in the region, it also 
means that riverbeds were amongst the most common regions to be naturally opened up for 
agriculture.49 This provided some relief for the commoners living in southern Kyushu in terms of 
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their agricultural production. Nevertheless, the presence of this shirasu layer across the region 
will continue to limit the overall agricultural capabilities of southern Kyushu. 
 The climate of southern Kyushu presented yet more problems to the agricultural 
development of the region. Being located in the subtropical zone, the area has ample supply of 
both sun and rain.50 With an average annual temperature of 17.6 degrees celsius and 2,200 
millimetres of rainfall, Satsuma’s climate is considerably warmer and wetter than the average 
climate across the archipelago.51 This warm temperature and ample rainfall is not solely due to 
southern Kyushu being within the subtropical zone, as it is also the result of the Kuroshio 
Current that passes over the area from the southwest, bringing with it all the warm and moist air 
from Southeast Asia.52 Despite this however, agricultural production did not thrive in this region. 
While the overall average rainfall was higher than the rest of Japan, the vast majority of it comes 
in concentrated bursts during the summer as part of the annual rain season (tsuyu) and 
typhoons.53 The frequency of typhoons were particularly devastating to agricultural production 
as they tend to coincide directly with the first rice harvesting season of the year, dramatically 
damaging agricultural output. 
 All of this meant that the Shimazu’s domain was cursed with less than ideal agricultural 
production throughout the medieval period. This lack of agricultural productivity in southern 
Kyushu during the medieval period can be seen from the Iriki documents as they are presented 
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by Asakawa Kan'ichi. This set of documents includes specifically a cadastral report of Satsuma, 
Ōsumi, and Hyūga from which we can get a sense of the overall agricultural production of 
Satsuma during the late thirteenth to mid fourteenth century.54 By comparing the total acres of 
arable land within the region as noted in these cadastral surveys, conducted in 1276, 1285, and 
1336, Asakawa concludes that the region had already reached its maximum agricultural 
productivity given the available technology at the time by the late twelfth century.55 There was 
very little room for growth when it came to the agricultural productivity of southern Kyushu. 
A more comparative perspective can be garnered from Sin Sukju’s Haedong jegukki, the 
primary source from Joseon Korea previously alluded to. According to Sin Sukju’s account, the 
Shimazu could not solely depend on agriculture to provide them a competitive revenue stream 
despite their control over all three provinces of southern Kyushu. In Sin Sukju's entry on 
Satsuma, he notes that there were thirteen major paddy fields which together consists of 4,630 
chō56 of land.57 Relative to the other provinces in southern Kyushu that were under the 
jurisdiction of the Shimazu family, this amount left much to be desired. With eight major paddy 
fields covering only 673 chō in Ōsumi and five major paddy fields encompassing 7,236 chō in 
Hyuga, the amount of land under cultivation by the Shimazu totals to 12,539 chō.58 As a point of 
comparison, the Chikuzen province alone had fifteen paddy fields covering 18,328 chō, while the 
Chikugo, Buzen, Hizen, and Higo provinces all individually had at least 13,000 chō under 
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cultivation.59 Assuming that the rate of production remains fairly consistent across all these 
provinces, it is clear that the Shimazu controlled an area that must rely on other means of 
economic development beyond agriculture if they were to maintain a competitive level of 
income relative to their neighbours.  
Given that the Sengoku era was defined by intense competition among rival daimyo, 
generating enough food and resources in preparation for warfare would have been a pressing 
concern for the Shimazu. The unproductive nature of the land decreased the value of 
landholdings that were entirely land-locked, and in contrast further bolstering the value of coastal 
landholdings in the region for the Shimazu retainers. In other words, as a response to the lack of 
agriculture production, the Shimazu and their retainers relied instead on the natural resources of 
the area and maritime trade as their primary means of economic development.60 This reliance on 
maritime trade will continue to affect the diplomatic policies of the Shimazu well into the 
seventeenth century. 
 
II. Diaries in Japanese History and the Uwai Kakuken nikki 
II.a. Diaries in Japanese History 
 The practice of diary writing was a fairly common phenomenon throughout much of 
Japan’s history. Within the confines of the academic field, diary (nikki) could broadly be defined 
as any kind of records including but not limited to memoirs, legal documents, and even witness 
testimonies.61 According to this definition, any kind of historical documents could technically be 
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called a nikki, and indeed there were a quite few instances where the term nikki was used to 
describe such records.62 For the purposes of this project, we adopt a narrower definition of nikki 
typically used by historians of Japan: a record of the daily occurrences continuously updated by 
the author over a prolonged period of time.63 A key reason why the term nikki was used to 
describe common records was that many of these records were originally organized in the exact 
same manner as one would a diary.64 As the term nikki translates literally into “daily record,” it is 
unsurprising that this term would be used interchangeably between actual administrative records 
and what we would call diary in the Western tradition.  
 In the strictest sense, a nikki is a series of personal experiences kept as a form of note 
keeping, especially with regards to infrequent events or special occasions.65 Unlike other forms 
of historical records, nikki had the added advantage of telling a continuous narrative over time 
and thus grant historians a more thorough understanding of specific events as they developed.66 
Furthermore, the personal nature of nikki meant that they were often kept by individuals who 
were not being commissioned by an outside source. The lack of involvement from authority 
figures often recorded in the diary also served to limit the possible biases that might exist in the 
nikki’s pages. This provided the diarists the opportunity to write about anything they wanted. 
From daily or mundane happenings to proper protocols for marriages and funerals, or from 
cultural events and religion to medical issues and entertainment, the diarists were free to discuss 
any of these topics in their nikki with relatively low risks for offending anyone.67  
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 In its purest state, nikki should theoretically provide an unbiased, subjective view on any 
given event less prone to exaggerations or lies relative to many other types of historical 
records.68 However, it would be incorrect for us to assume that nikki and their contents are free 
from external biases. Even personal diaries served a very specific purpose for the courtiers who 
were among the first to keep consistent nikki as part of their daily routine. The idea of privacy is 
distinctly absent from the writing of nikki. Courtiers kept diaries and passed them on to their 
children for pedagogical purposes. These diaries provided the younger generations of courtiers 
with real life examples of how to handle various cases and occurrences in their inherited 
positions.69 As this practice of using diaries as pseudo-textbooks proliferated, diaries kept by 
prominent courtiers were heavily sought after by aristocrats seeking to improve their stations 
within the court.70 Monks also kept nikki for the same purposes as the courtiers, and over time 
these nikki also became a popular commodity by monks, courtiers, and warriors alike. During the 
decline of aristocratic power in the Muromachi and Sengoku period, the courtier nikki became a 
part of the cultural currency transferred from the court to the provincial warriors all across the 
archipelago.71 The continued propagation of these nikki across time and space also led to various 
changes, edits, and even forgeries to appear.72 The possibility of such alterations being made to 
extant versions of nikki is something to be aware of when making use of such a resource.  
 As the practice of nikki keeping proliferated among the aristocracy, the medieval warriors 
followed in their footsteps. As the samurai became more involved in the administration of the 
Japanese polity throughout the medieval period, they began keeping their own nikki for similar 
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purposes. Scholars such as Saiki Kazuma notes that it is highly unlikely that Kamakura bakufu 
retainers kept no daily records of their activities, and the lack of any extant copies of these 
diaries is likely due to them being lost to time.73 Nikki was thus copied and transmitted 
throughout the medieval period.74 Meanwhile, warriors of various ranks also kept personal nikki 
during this time like their aristocratic counterparts.75 The Uwai Kakuken nikki is merely one of 
many such diaries kept by a provincial warrior of the Sengoku period. 
  
II.b. Uwai Kakuken and the Uwai Kakuken nikki 
  Uwai Kakuken (1545 – 1589) represented the third generation of the Uwai family that 
served the Shimazu. It was Kakuken’s grandfather, Suwa Tameaki, who first surrendered to the 
Shimazu and betrayed his previous lord in Tenbun 17 (1548). Tameaki secured a position for 
himself and his descendents in the Shimazu administration through the military support of the 
Shimazu during this early phase of their expansion in Kyushu. Kakuken’s father, Uwai Kunken, 
also served the Shimazu and was granted jitō rights76 over the Nagayoshi landholding in Satsuma 
province in Tenbun 22 (1553).  
 Uwai Kakuken officially came of age around Eiroku 2 (1559), and began his service 
under the Shimazu at that point of his life. During his tenure under Shimazu Takahisa, Kakuken 
frequented the battlefield and served in multiple campaigns over the years. By Tenshō 1 (1573), 
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Kakuken transitioned into the position of mediator under Shimazu Yoshihisa, and as a result 
relocated to Kagoshima while maintaining his jitō rights over Nagayoshi. Kakuken continued his 
service as mediator for Yoshihisa until Tenshō 4 (1576), after which Kakuken was officially 
promoted to senior retainer. He would remain in Kagoshima until Tenshō 8 (1580), at which 
point he was granted jitō rights over Miyazaki and was transferred over to Miyazaki castle. After 
his move to Miyazaki, Kakuken acted mostly in a supporting role to Shimazu Iehisa (1547 – 
1587), the youngest brother of Yoshihisa, while continuing to act in a military capacity for the 
Shimazu in general. Kakuken would march alongside the Shimazu against Toyotomi Hideyoshi’s 
invasion of Kyushu in Tenshō 15 (1587), and together with Iehisa, surrendered to Hideyoshi in 
the third month of the following year. Kakuken died on the twelfth day of the sixth month, 
Tenshō 17 (1589), due to illness, at the age of forty-five. 
 Though the exact year in which the extant version of the Uwai Kakuken nikki was copied 
remains unknown, it likely dates at least to the early years of the Meiji period (1868 – 1912), and 
is currently kept at the Historiographical Institute at the University of Tokyo. When Kakuken 
wrote his diary, he simply titled his work as Nikki, or “diary.” The extant version of the diary 
was archived by the Shimazu family under the title Ise-no-kami nikki, or the Diary of the 
Governor of Ise, referencing the court title Kakuken held prior to his death. This work was 
frequently referenced by historians throughout the early modern and modern periods, but they 
did not cite Kakuken’s diary in a consistent manner. This led to a variety of different titles being 
used when referring to Kakuken’s diary, the most popular of which were Kakuken nikki 
(Kakuken’s Diary), Kakuken nicchō (Kakuken’s Daily Records), and Kakuken nisshi (Kakuken’s 





Uwai Kakuken nikki (Uwai Kakuken’s Diary), when they officially published this primary source 
in 1954.  
 The version of the Uwai Kakuken nikki that we examine here starts on the first of the 
eighth month of Tenshō 2 (1574) and ends on the fifteenth of the tenth month, Tenshō 14 (1586). 
The significance of these twelve years for the Shimazu could not be overstated. As Tenshō 14 
was the last year that the Shimazu would operate as an independent daimyo, Kakuken’s diary 
captured the final years of the Shimazu’s struggle as they simultaneously sought to oust their 
rival, the Ōtomo, from Kyushu, while gambling against the possibility of Hideyoshi’s 
intervention. The tension and the urgency with which the Shimazu acted became increasingly 
palpable with each entry towards the end of Kakuken’s diary. Cumulating in a final entry that 
simply states that on the fifteenth day of the tenth month of Tenshō 14, Kakuken marched to the 
frontlines with his troops. 
 Structurally, the nikki itself can be separated into two major sections. The first and by far 
the larger section of the work is the actual diary itself where Kakuken recorded the daily events 
happening around him from Tenshō 2 to Tenshō 14. Though the diary itself nominally covers a 
span of twelve years, entries from around six of those years are no longer extant. Fortunately for 
us, entries from Kakuken’s tenure as a mediator and as a senior retainer both exist in the current 
version of the nikki, allowing us to garner a strong understanding of Kakuken and how different 
administrative positions within the Shimazu affected the daily duties of a retainer.  
 The second section of the Uwai Kakuken nikki is what separates this specific nikki from 
many of its contemporary counterparts. In addition to the diary proper, an essay titled “Ise-no-
kami kokoro-e sho,” authored by Uwai Kakuken was kept as part of the nikki and passed down 





Note on the Knowledge of the Governor of Ise,” was originally written on Tenshō 9 (1581), and 
served as a semi-autobiographical account on what Kakuken considered the proper behaviours 
suited for retainers.77 The majority of this essay discusses various cultural and literary practices, 
military exercises, and even games that Kakuken deemed appropriate and necessary for samurai 
to participate in. In Kakuken’s own words, “though a person might surpass all others in one 
particular thing, if that person is incompetent in other tasks, then I should think such a person to 
be inferior.”78 Most importantly for our purposes here, the presence of this essay illustrates for us 
the identity of Kakuken’s target audience in general. In the opening lines to the “Ise-no-kami 
kokoro-e sho,” Kakuken explicitly states that he wrote this essay in response to all the questions 
he received regarding the proper etiquettes, protocols, and tastes fitting for an ideal retainer.79 In 
other words, Kakuken composed this essay for pedagogical purposes. In addition to what we 
know of nikki writing in general throughout the medieval period in Japan, the inclusion of this 
essay allows us to assume that Kakuken wrote his nikki for an educational purpose. 
 While the Uwai Kakuken nikki was not the only warrior diary extant from the Sengoku 
period, it has become a staple primary source for the study of Sengoku culture among medieval 
Japanese historians.80 Other extant warrior nikki dating to the Sengoku period include but are not 
limited to ones kept by Matsudaira Ietada, Komai Shigekatsu, Ōwada Shigekiyo, Umezu 
Masakage, and the daimyo Date Terumune.81 The Uwai Kakuken nikki stands out for historians 
due to its accessibility amongst the lot. The Uwai Kakuken nikki is widely available in print and 
in general considered easier to read than the others. In addition to this, Uwai Kakuken is 
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considered by historians to be a fairly typical middle-ranking retainer of the Sengoku period.82 
Being the Sengoku equivalent of a middle manager, Kakuken’s perspective and experiences 
during this era can be taken to be representative of many other warriors across the archipelago 
whose voices were lost to time. The unremarkable life of Uwai Kakuken is what renders his 
diary into a particularly valuable primary source for historians. 
 With all that being said however, research based on warrior diaries from the Sengoku 
period is somewhat lacking in contrast to their aristocratic counterparts.83 Part of this is due to 
the general lack of research interest for this particular period of Japanese history. While warrior 
diaries, like the Uwai Kakuken nikki, are extremely useful resources, they mostly speak to the 
history and culture of very specific regions of Japan during the Sengoku period. Due to the 
fragmented political landscape of this period of Japanese history, many primary sources from 
this era failed to be archived or were simply lost to time and war. As for the sources that 
remained, they tend to be much less centralized than those from other periods of Japanese 
history. All of this means research on the Sengoku period tend to have a higher barrier of entry 
for historians, especially foreign researchers who might not have the same level of access and 
connections as their Japanese counterparts.  
 This project thus serves as a starting point for those interested in Sengoku history. As 
stated above, a lot of information regarding the Sengoku samurai’s experience can be 
extrapolated from Kakuken’s diary. While the current work is focused solely upon Uwai 
Kakuken and the Shimazu family, many of the points made here can be extended to situations 
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and concerns of other daimyo and samurai families of this time period. Part of the goal of this 
project therefore is to bring to the forefront the information encapsulated by the Uwai Kakuken 
nikki alongside some research being done by Japanese scholars on this particular work. This 
project will expand our understanding of how Sengoku daimyo like Shimazu Yoshihisa operated 
and complicate our perception of the various local warlords of the Sengoku Japan. 
 
III. Chapter Overview 
 This dissertation examines some of the key considerations behind the political decision-
making process of the Shimazu administration and their daimyo, Shimazu Yoshihisa, primarily 
through their communication pattern. The current project will be broken into four major 
chapters. The first chapter, “On Communication,” introduces the fundamental workings of the 
Shimazu communication infrastructure and the role played by the mediators who were critical to 
the operation of this system. In this section, we discuss the weaknesses of the Shimazu’s system 
and how it opened up opportunities for exploitation by cunning retainers. These weaknesses did 
not escape the scrutiny of the daimyo and his senior retainer council, and in response to this they 
implemented countermeasures to protect against potential abuses of power. As a way to illustrate 
how mediators exploited their position as they operated within the communication system, we 
will look specifically at an interaction between Uwai Kakuken and the Nyūta family, and the 
possible reasons behind Kakuken’s choice to disobey Shimazu Yoshihisa. 
 In the second chapter, “On Rumours,” we will turn our attention toward the nature of 
medieval rumours, and the way that the Shimazu administration resolved them in a manner that 
maximized what Yoshihisa stood to gain. Specifically, we will be looking at two cases of 





work with. Through these two cases, we will see how the somewhat indifferent relationship 
between the daimyo and the truth behind the rumours allowed Yoshihisa to utilize these rumours 
in a way beneficial to himself. In both instances, Yoshihisa took advantage of the ambiguity 
inherent in each situation to render decisions that were advantageous to himself. Yoshihisa did 
this at the expense of any potential abstract or moral obligations he might have to the larger 
entity that was the Shimazu administration or to his retainers. 
 The third chapter, “On Familial Forces,” further explores the Shimazu’s decision-making 
process by examining how the involvement of key family members of the Shimazu family 
affected Yoshihisa’s decisions in various situations. Here, we will revisit the Shimazu’s 
interaction with the Nyūta but from the perspective of Shimazu Iehisa. We will also look at two 
other cases of rumours in this chapter. The first deals with another potentially rebellious faction 
within the Shimazu administration not dissimilar to one of the cases explored in the previous 
chapter. What makes this particular instance different however is the way in which Yoshihisa’s 
father, Takahisa, and brother, Yoshihiro, were directly involved with these rumours, resulting in 
a much more aggressive response from Yoshihisa. The second case explores the impact of 
Yoshihisa’s daughter in altering and ultimately softening the Shimazu administration’s response 
to rumours surrounding her husband through her indirect intervention. In all three instances, the 
involvement of Yoshihisa’s family members significantly impacted the administrative decisions 
made by the Shimazu, suggesting that the wellbeing of Yoshihisa’s family likely played a role in 
determining how decisions were made. 
 Finally, the last chapter, “On Spirituality,” will be on the impact that the spiritual 
worldview of the Shimazu had upon their decision-making process. Using the kuji, divination 





and religion altered the decisions rendered by Yoshihisa and his government. Rather than 
considering spiritual acts like the kuji as a tool controlled and manipulated by the daimyo in 
order to suppress potential dissent amongst his senior retainers, such acts need to be viewed 
through the lens of faith and spirituality. The Shimazu were not unique in Sengoku society when 
it came to their religious worldview. As such, when considering the real impact of spiritual acts 
like the kuji upon the decision-making process, we must take into account the underlying 
spirituality of the people conducting the divinations. This chapter will illustrate how the 
Shimazu’s faith defined many aspects of their lives and was fundamental to the way their entire 








The successful management of one’s domain is predicated on one’s access to the correct 
information. For Shimazu Yoshihisa and other daimyos like him, this meant ready access to 
formal reports and petitions, as well as rumours and whispers circulating in all levels of his 
administration. It was through these channels that Yoshihisa and his senior retainer council 
learned the information they needed in order to make the most informed political decisions. The 
administration’s political process was thus intrinsically bound to their communication and 
information infrastructure. As such, an understanding of this infrastructure is critical to our 
exploration of some of the fundamental factors affecting the political decision-making process of 
the Shimazu administration during the late Sengoku period.  
This chapter examines the foundational communication system of the Shimazu 
administration, in particular the nature of communication exchange that gave shape to the 
operation of the daimyo’s domain in the period often characterized by violent warfare. Crucial to 
this examination are the considerations of the retainers who exploited the communication system 
toward their personal advantages. Truth and reliability of information were certainly critical to a 
daimyo’s survival during the Sengoku era especially when it came to crucial military 
engagements, but such engagements only formed a small part of the daily management of a 
domain. Truth and accuracy mattered for war, but war was a means to an end. As this chapter 





were many ways through which warriors could seek their own goals, which in turn drove the 
political decisions they made. An examination of the communication system will show the 
miniscule control the daimyo had over the truthfulness of the information they received on a 
daily basis. This lack of control helps to explain why daimyo and retainers alike forfeited 
complicated political calculations and the enforcement of established rules often in favour of 
maximizing personal benefits in their decision-making process. After all, by considering only 
individual survival and personal gain, they could eliminate many of the variables in any given 
situation. This concern over individual reputation can be seen from how Uwai Kakuken chose to 
affirm or deny the communication protocols on different occasions. Kakuken’s actions 
exemplified the importance warriors placed on their reputation in making their political 
decisions. Loyalty, military discipline, politics, and other such considerations were frequently 
subsumed by their needs to reinforce their personal gains and benefits. Inside this worldview, 
even the most overt acts of disobedience toward a daimyo’s orders were seen as a personal 
challenge to the daimyo’s authority as a ruler, hindering his path to attaining his agenda. As the 
system itself was designed to reinforce the needs and wants of those in power, when retainers 
acted against the established norms of said system, they were also acting to deny their superiors 
the ability to achieving their own agendas. Unsurprisingly, disobedience towards the system was 
thus seen as a slight against the daimyo himself.  
This chapter will be broken down into three sections. The first section investigates the 
inner workings of the Shimazu communication system, by identifying who worked and operated 
within the domain’s boundaries, and exploring the failsafe measures installed by the Shimazu in 
order to ensure the accuracy of the information being transferred. Crucial to these operations 





diplomacy. It may seem that they would have a disproportionate amount of power through their 
control over the flow and content of information and military intelligence. But this potential 
power was curtailed and was rarely detrimental to the management of the domain. The measures 
the Shimazu instituted prevented the mediators from exploiting and solidifying their positions 
through their control over the information flow. During cases of inter-daimyo diplomacy, 
retainers were frequently assigned the role of temporary mediators almost on an ad hoc basis, 
dependent upon the personal connections and ties any particular retainer under consideration 
could bring to the table. The difference between the normal mediators and those in charge of 
inter-daimyo diplomacy was not the mode of control over the information flow but the scale of 
that control. However, as the daimyo had control over the final decisions in all matters should 
they wish to intervene, the balance of power between the daimyo and his retainers, including the 
mediators, was mostly maintained. For no matter how much control the mediators had over 
information, they had no sway over the daimyo’s actions should the daimyo placed their personal 
wellbeing above all else. 
The second section of this chapter will be focused on the unofficial channels of 
communication used in the Shimazu administration. Specifically, this section will be focused on 
communication initiated by people who were not warriors. While the official channels of 
communication were controlled by the Shimazu retainers, unofficial channels were dominated by 
people like courtiers, poets, and monks, whose non-martial expertise granted them significant 
diplomatic access to various daimyo across the archipelago. One of these non-warriors’ 
prominent mediums of communication was poetry. Through these non-warriors’ communication 
with the warriors, poetry slowly permeated into the warriors’ daily communicative lexicon. 





ways of poetry from courtiers and poets, warriors themselves used it as a tool for the purposes of 
communication, an exercise to enhance mental discipline of the samurai, and even as reward for 
warriors deemed worth by the daimyo. Poetry possessed immense utility as a communication 
tool. For this reason, courtiers and other poetically talented individuals had ready access to 
daimyo and could wield tremendous influence over them. The power of poetry also explains why 
poetically talented men, despite their lack of connections to the warrior regime, were highly 
valued as mediators. Moreover, whatever their medium of communication and their particular 
social stations, as unofficial mediators, courtiers and poets were in a position to control the 
accuracy of the information and military intelligence that were being transmitted to the daimyo. 
In their non-warrior status, they were more easily able to transfer information without needing to 
answer to any particular daimyo. This dimension of the communication network highlights the 
perilousness of any communication that the daimyo received. Accuracy and truthfulness could 
never be assured.  
The third and final section of the chapter will discuss a case study from the Uwai 
Kakuken nikki that shows how information could be withheld or controlled by the mediators, and 
how far retainers could go to affect the political decisions of their daimyo for their personal 
benefits. In this particular instance, Uwai Kakuken was one of the most valuable mediators 
serving the Shimazu. Having placed his own reputation on the line in negotiating with a potential 
defector, he went above and beyond what was acceptable for his station to try and convince 
Yoshihisa to send Shimazu troops to aid this retainer. While Kakuken’s efforts ended up in 
failure, this case illuminates how mediators’ control over information was a possible means by 
which to influence the making of political decision at a high level, and how personal benefits 





the information they were delivering contained accurate and truthful content. But their ultimate 
concern was not with the truthfulness of the information. Rather, in the age of fragile loyalty, 
mediators were likely looking out for their own benefit, and the information they conveyed was a 
potential means by which they can influence their daimyo to their advantage. This was yet 
another dimension of the age of fraught communication that threatened the security of the 
daimyo. 
 
I. The Communication System of the Shimazu 
 Perhaps unsurprisingly, for daimyo like the Shimazu, access to information was reliant 
upon an established bureaucratic framework. This framework was designed to filter out 
uncritical information from crucial and urgent matters, and in this way allows the daimyo to 
concentrate on things most important to him. The following excerpt from Uwai Kakuken’s diary 
entry dating to the seventeenth day of the tenth month, Tenshō 2 (1574) gives us an idea of how 
this framework functioned. 
Item. Seventeenth day. I attended court as usual. Today, the various jitō of Sendai, 
including Kamata Masamune, Nomura Hidetsuna, Yamada Arinobu, and the 
representative of Shōōsai (Hishijima Kunizane), the jitō of Kumanojō, Matsumoto 
Gagaku-no-suke gathered here for the inquiry into the dispute at Nitta Shrine.84  
 
When asked about this dispute, they replied, “There is not much for us to say on this. 
However, since we have gathered here, we suggest that perhaps Gonshū-in should be 
summoned here by himself, and be compelled by Dangisho [Daijō-in Morihisa] to submit 
a pledge (shinhan) of loyalty to the Shimazu. We can then officially recognize the 
adoption. Will this not convince the others who previously opposed this decision as 
well?” Shirahama Suo-no-suke and myself received this message, and submitted it to our 
lord.  
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Our lord stated, “Since we summoned the various jitō specifically for this matter, their 
proposed solution should be considered appropriate.” He continues, “This matter is not 
something that should concern me, but rather be resolved by the senior retainers.”…85 
 
From this brief excerpt, we can identify several features of the Shimazu’s internal 
communication framework. First, while the jitō served the Shimazu as retainers and answered 
the Shimazu’s summons, they did not actively participate in the daily operations of the daimyo’s 
court. In the above excerpt we see the jitō functioned as a temporary consulting body called to 
court for the purposes of resolving a specific dispute. It is interesting to note that despite having 
the authority to override these jitō, Yoshihisa chose to respect the jitō by following through with 
their suggestions. His reasoning for doing so was not that the advice was particularly insightful, 
but simply because the jitō were summoned here at all and so the proper course of action would 
be to affirm their proposal, perhaps as a way to respect the efforts of the jitō. 
 Second, we see from this diary entry that the daimyo and his senior retainers (rōjū, or 
otona) were two separate and distinct decision-making bodies within the political structure of the 
domain. According to Fukushima Kaneharu, the senior retainers were the first level of the 
decision-making hierarchy, and it was only when the decisions rendered by the senior retainers 
were too difficult to enforce or when the senior retainers’ decisions were met with non-
compliance that a given issue would be presented to the daimyo.86 The senior retainers, being the 
top level administrative officials within the daimyo’s polity, thus partially embodied the 
authority of the daimyo when it came to the daily administrative process.87 What is particularly 
interesting here however, is the way in which Yoshihisa operated as a strictly separate and 
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superior authority to his senior retainers with regards to the making of political and 
administrative decisions. In the quoted passage above, we see Yoshihisa explicitly stating that 
the decision they were asking him to make should not merit his attention. Instead, it should have 
been dealt with by the senior retainers. That Yoshihisa was consulted in this matter at all presents 
us with a particular instance where such a framework could and did fail. In the end, despite being 
designed to prevent trivial matters from reaching the daimyo and unnecessarily occupying his 
time, we see that particularly tenacious retainers could force the daimyo to give his personal 
attention to them.  
 Lastly, we see from the above passage that the different parts of the same administration 
were not in direct contact with one another. In this particular instance, we see that the advice 
given by the jitō was not received directly by the daimyo, but rather by Shirahama Suo-no-suke 
and Kakuken, and it was only through them that Yoshihisa received the jitō’s advice.88 While the 
quoted passage does not make this explicit, the protocols for communication between the senior 
retainers and Yoshihisa were exactly the same. Another short passage from Kakuken’s diary 
illustrates this clearly: 
Item. Eighteenth day. I attended court as usual. Regarding the resignation of Nomura 
from yesterday, I presented the matter to the senior retainers by myself. Since the senior 
retainers decided that this matter will require our lord’s approval, I then submitted this to 
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our lord. He said, “I do not understand why he wished to resign. If he is harbouring any 
concerns in his heart, he should present them plainly at the senior retainers’ meetings. If 
this is not the case, then I shall continue to count on his services.”89 
 
Here we see that even when the senior retainers deemed an issue to be beyond their jurisdiction, 
they could only present their decisions to Yoshihisa through a mediator like Kakuken. The 
separation between the council of senior retainers on the one hand and the daimyo on the other, 
and the necessity for mediators to operate between to the two, defined the Shimazu’s two-tiered 
system of decision-making. The importance of the mediators in facilitating the communication 
between the daimyo and his senior retainer council meant that the mediators played a critical role 
in the daimyo’s administration. In fact, the mediators were involved in every step of the 
communication process as dictated by their role as the official channels for transmitting 
information and military intelligence. Their ability to do so was predicated on the mediators’ 
lack of input in the actual decision-making process itself. The mediators represented a fluid 
element of the Shimazu communication: one that had no official bearing on the decision-making, 
but was nevertheless a critical part of the entire infrastructure. Next, let us turn our attention 
towards these mediators. 
 While the quoted passages above illustrate for us only the internal flow of information 
between the daimyo and his senior retainers, it is important to note that the mediators were 
intimately involved with the message delivery from outside of daimyo’s administration as well. 
According to Yamaguchi Ken’ichi, both the process of petitioning the daimyo by the jitō, and the 
subsequent proclamations rendered by either the daimyo or the senior retainers were conducted 
exclusively by the mediators.90 In other words, the mediators were the sole transmitters of 
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information in between every level of the daimyo’s administration. Whether it was the jitō, the 
kokujin, lower level retainers, or even the servants of these retainers, all petitions to the daimyo 
were delivered by the mediators to the senior retainers, and it was up to the senior retainers to 
decide which petitions needed the daimyo’s attention.91 The mediators thus embodied the official 
pipeline of communication. While there existed other methods for servants and retainers to 
petition the daimyo, for now let us concentrate on examining the mediators’ function within the 
Shimazu administration. 
 The responsibility for accurately and efficiently transmitting the various messages both to 
and from the daimyo rested solely upon the shoulders of the mediators. Given the significant 
impact that mediators had upon the administration, certain mechanisms were installed to prevent 
them from meddling with information and military intelligence for personal gain or otherwise 
make use of their position to amass political power. While the effectiveness of these measures 
was ultimately questionable, they do represent the Shimazu’s efforts to control the reliability of 
their communication apparatus. First and foremost was the simple idea of redundancy. The 
Shimazu had a tendency to assign more than one mediator to a particular task, proportional to the 
importance of the message being delivered. If we return to the two examples from the Uwai 
Kakuken nikki cited above, we can get a sense of how this played out in reality. In the former 
instance, the advice given by the jitō in an attempt to end the conflict in Nitta Shrine was 
delivered by two mediators, Shirahama Suo-no-suke and Uwai Kakuken. In contrast to this, the 
resignation attempt by Nomura was transmitted only by Kakuken. From the perspective of the 
                                                           
91
 Yamaguchi, “Sengoku-ki Shimazu-shi no kashin-dan hensei: ‘Uwai Kakuken nikki’ ni miru ‘toritsugi’ katei,” p. 
122. It is important to note that while these various groups could petition the daimyo through the employment of the 
toritsugi, the act of petitioning itself was by no means a common occurrence. More often than not, when dealing 
with their own internal or domestic issues, they would simply invoke the authority of their individual family and 
resolve any issues independently. See also Yamaguchi “Sengoku-ki Shimazu-shi no kashin-dan hensei: ‘Uwai 





Shimazu administration, these two issues were significantly different in both urgency and risk. In 
the case of the Nitta Shrine, it was an issue that took place over three months and involved 
multiple parties with conflicting interests. Furthermore, the people involved in this incident were 
managers and servants of a shrine complex that the Shimazu did not have direct control over. All 
this would suggest that a certain amount of caution must be exercised when resolving such a 
conflict. 
 In contrast to the Nitta situation, the case of Nomura’s resignation was, for the Shimazu, 
an extremely low-risk affair. Despite requiring the personal attention of Yoshihisa, a retainer’s 
resignation was an entirely domestic affair, and whatever the final decision might be, only those 
directly serving the Shimazu will be affected. Unlike the Nitta case, there was no real conflict to 
be resolved beyond the wants of an individual retainer, which the daimyo could grant or deny at 
his own leisure with no need for arguments or evidence to be evaluated. The overall simplicity of 
this issue and the low-stakes nature of the request meant that a single mediator tasked with this 
petition would have sufficed.  
 To further illustrate this correlation between the number of mediators assigned to 
delivering information and the importance of the message itself, let us turn to another example 
from Kakuken’s diary. On the tenth day of the twelve month of Tenshō 2 (1574), Kakuken 
wrote, 
Item. Today a dispute between Daiōji and Jōkyō-in regarding the post of head priest of 
Kedō-in’s Daiganji was brought to our attention. This news was received by Ijū-in 
Uemonhyōe-no-jō [Hisaharu], Uehara Chōshū [Naochika], and myself. Since this matter 
is not yet resolved, we asked the representatives from Daiōji and Jōkyō-in to first return 
to their lodgings.92 
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Here we have another example of a dispute involving a religious institution, much like our 
previous example involving Nitta Shrine. But whereas the case of the Nitta Shrine involved only 
the internal debate in that particular shrine, the case of Daiganji involved various opinions from 
other associated temples, most prominent of which were Daiōji and Jōkyō-in, the former being a 
branch temple of Daiganji and the latter an affiliated temple of the same. Given their historical 
association with Daiganji, whoever becomes the head priest of that temple would have 
tremendous amount of power and influence upon both Daiōji and Jōkyō-in, thus both of these 
temples had high stakes on this decision. This rendered the Shimazu’s decision to be 
significantly more important relative to previous examples cited above. It is thus unsurprising 
that three mediators were assigned to this case as opposed to the two for the Nitta case.  
 The second mechanism in place preventing mediators from amassing political power 
through personal connections was the tight control over the physical locations assigned to each 
mediator. Because they represented the only official means of communication between the 
daimyo’s central administration and the various local warriors scattered about the domain, an 
effort was made to ensure that the mediators were responsible for locations that were different 
from their jitō posts and landholdings.93 For example, when Uwai Kakuken served as a mediator 
for Yoshihisa, he was the jitō of Nagayoshi district, tasked as the mediator of Sendai, and forced 
to relocate to a temporary residence in Kagoshima.94 This system was, according to Yamaguchi, 
designed to hinder mediators from acting freely by embedding them into a system of multiple 
and competing layers of authority.95 This system would have also stymied any potential attempts 
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by mediators to accumulate political power through their position. By assigning retainers to areas 
where they do not have any holdings or claims, connections built by these retainers during their 
tenure as mediators will be of limited utility once they graduate from being a mediator.  
 The conflict of interest from assigning retainers to serve as mediators for their own 
landholdings could have significant consequences for the Shimazu’s power structure. This was 
especially the case when we consider the role of the jitō, whose primary duty was to control the 
local warriors within their jurisdiction and to harness the military power of these warriors during 
times of war.96 Mediators could trade prioritization of petitions from his own landholdings for 
personal favours from the local warriors. The mediators could also just as easily silence any 
petitions from local warriors if such petitions would undermine his domestic political wellbeing. 
In either case, assigning mediators to their own jurisdictions would further enhance their ability 
to cultivate personal relationships with local warriors. The creation of such ties was already 
common due to the nature of the mediators’ work, and to allow retainers to be both jitō and 
mediator of the same area would only increase the risk to the long term stability of the Shimazu 
administration.97  
These measures placed upon the system of information and intelligence transference were 
critical to the proper functioning of the daimyo’s domain, especially when we consider the 
mediators’ role beyond the internal operations of a given polity. Indeed, many mediators were 
personally involved in the diplomatic dealings between various daimyo. While control over 
inter-daimyo communication was by no means monopolized by the mediators already operating 
within the administration at any given time, we cannot deny the important role they played in 
                                                           
96
 Kuwahada, “Sengoku daimyō Shimazu-shi no gunji soshiki nit suite: jitō to shuchū,” p. 169. 
97
 For more on the connection between the nature of the messengers’ work and the cultivation of personal 





facilitating such communication.98 We need to keep in mind however, that when dealing with 
inter-daimyo diplomacy, the role of mediator tends to fall on the shoulders of those who were in 
the upper echelon of the daimyo’s administration as opposed to the newly promoted or those 
already assigned the task of mediator domestically. This was likely due to the importance and 
specificity of diplomatic exchanges, as well as the relatively sporadic frequency of inter-daimyo 
negotiations. As such, mediators for this task tended to be assigned only when the need arose. In 
turn, these mediators in charge of diplomatic negotiations also had their own microcosm of 
mediators working for them to relay information to and from the people they were negotiating 
with, as well as between themselves and the daimyo they served. That the senior retainers of the 
Shimazu, with the exception of those who inherited their positions, were selected exclusively 
from previous mediators ensured that whomever was assigned this task would have had the 
necessary experience to effectively deal with information transfers.99 
In her examination of the peace process in central Honshu, Endō Yuriko analyzed the 
important role played by the mediators of both the Hōjō and the Uesugi in their negotiations of 
1569. She notes that, due to the state of prolonged warfare between these two families, the 
formal communication channels operated by the mediators of each respective daimyo had broken 
down.100 A new set of mediators was therefore needed for the official channels of 
communication to resume its original function. While the case of the Hōjō and the Uesugi is not 
directly related to the Shimazu, it does illustrate two important things. First, the use of mediators 
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for communication was not an anomaly unique to the Shimazu administration. Second, it shows 
how mediators were selected in general by the warrior class during the Sengoku period at large. 
Of particular interest to our investigation are the factors considered by the daimyo when 
appointing mediators for their inter-daimyo negotiations. The Hōjō selected two representatives 
for this negotiation, they were Kitajō Takahiro and Yura Narishige (1506 – 1578), the former 
was a retainer of the Hōjō and the latter a local warrior. Of the two, Narishige being a local 
warrior operated more independently than Takahiro. Both the nominated Hōjō mediators 
previously served under the rule of the Uesugi, the daimyo they were tasked to negotiate with. In 
the case of Takahiro, Endō explains that despite his earlier betrayal of the Uesugi, he was a good 
candidate because Takahiro’s family was still employed by the Uesugi, thus providing him with 
exclusive access to the Uesugi court.101 Takahiro’s ability to serve the Hōjō in this task therefore 
stemmed from his own personal network established while serving a different master. Indeed, a 
warrior’s value as a retainer existed apart from his role in the administration that he served, and 
warriors with extensive personal connections were considered valuable assets for any daimyo 
regardless of the warriors’ past history. As for Yura Narishige, his value as mediator for the Hōjō 
lies within their relative independence as a local warrior and their ties with the other local 
warrior groups within Uesugi jurisdiction. This allowed Narishige more flexibility in negotiating 
with the Uesugi while also providing the Hōjō an alternative pathway into the Uesugi court.102 
Beyond the assigning of these two mediators, the Hōjō also made use of non-warrior groups such 
as monks and courtiers in order to utilize all possible avenues to ensure a successful 
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negotiation.103 The key here is the importance of selecting the right person for the right job. The 
significant role played by mediators in the diplomatic negotiations between daimyo meant that 
this selection process was likely made after thorough considerations. After all, mediators 
represented the authority of their daimyo on the negotiating table and thus controlled the amount 
of leverage their daimyo had upon his rivals.104 
The Hōjō’s use of non-warrior groups for the purposes of negotiation also illustrates for 
us how unofficial channels of communication were used by daimyo. Here we see such channels 
used through the employment of non-warrior groups, such as monks, poets, and courtiers in 
negotiations. The use of people like poets and courtiers as mediators, especially when dealing 
with inter-daimyo politics, was by no means a rare occurrence. Similarly monks and other 
religious officials shared this role as the poets and courtiers and acted as diplomatic agents on 
many occasions. As many warriors were deeply concerned with Buddhism, many powerful 
warriors were keen to speak with prominent monks. This gave monks a degree of access that 
allowed them to act as mediators for negotiations, while also letting these monks maintain some 
nominal notions of political detachment.105  
                                                           
103
 Endō, “Etsusō-dōmei ni miru heiwa no sōzō to iji: Sengoku daimyō no uen-sei to muen-sei,” pp. 94 – 96. 
104
 Marushima, Sengoku daimyō Takeda-shi no kenryoku kōzō, pp. 114 – 5. 
105
 Endō Yuriko argues that, at least in the case of the Hōjō, the effective use of monks as mediators relied upon their 
theoretical separation from the secular world. Since the monk in question, Ten’yōin, was not a retainer of the Hōjō, 
this meant that he existed outside of the immediate retainer unit (ie sōshiki). Furthermore, because the vows taken to 
become a monk necessitated a ritual separation from the secular world, this granted the monk a “detached” (muen) 
existence, one that was fitting for his task as negotiator as it afforded him the ability to navigate himself politically 
between the various daimyo without being practically involved in their disputes. The validity of this claim is 
contested however when we consider the realistic political links between monks, temples, and the daimyo in whose 
domain the monks operated in. Examples from this very chapter highlighted both the ability of and the necessity for 
a daimyo to intervene during conflicts and disputes that were internal to a given religious institution. Despite the 
possible philosophical and spiritual understanding that a monk should theoretically be detached from secular affairs, 
it might be premature to suggest that this meant the various parties dealing with the given monk would be ignorant 
of his political ties to his patron daimyo, in this case, the Hōjō. It has also been suggested that, at least in the 
particular case of Ten’yōin, in addition to the muen aspects of his existence, it was the personal virtue of Ten’yōin 
that made him the ideal messenger for the Hōjō. This was used as an explanation for his successful negotiation 
despite his identity as the younger brother of the Hōjō retainer Ishimaki Yasumasa. Yet this very familial tie to the 





The use of monks as mediator is one example of the active use of private communication 
channels as something completely distinct from the official channels sanctioned by the daimyo. 
This one involving individuals tightly associated with various temples and shrines.106 Beyond the 
diplomatic exchanges between warring daimyo, warriors who have lost favour with their lord 
often relied on monks and other non-warrior mediators to plead their case. This made sense as 
such individuals were denied access to the sanctioned means of communication due to the loss of 
their lord’s favour.107 They were thus left with few options if they wished to petition the daimyo 
for a reinstatement of their station. Having a prominent monk intervene on these retainers’ behalf 
allowed them to bypass the system and appeal their case directly to the daimyo. That monks had 
a tremendous amount of access and sway in negotiations made them into the ideal candidate for 
such a task.108  
Another option for individuals without officially sanctioned access to the daimyo was to 
appeal to friends and family members who still served the daimyo. We saw a similar pattern at 
work in the Hōjō’s selection of mediators and how they favored retainers who had family 
members serving their Uesugi rivals. As Yamaguchi points out, disgraced individuals were the 
most common utilizers of private communication channels. For those in service of the Shimazu, 
this meant reaching out to family members who were either part of the senior retainer council or 
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an attendant of Yoshihisa.109 The family member would then speak directly to the daimyo on 
behalf of his disgraced relative, thus allowing for the possibility of forgiveness from the daimyo 
himself.110  
 
II. The Courtiers and Poets as Mediators 
Beside monks and family members, another group of individuals that can be utilized as 
mediators for those without access to official channels of information and communication were 
the courtiers and the poets. Like the monks employed in negotiations and general 
communications, courtiers and poets were frequently used by powerful daimyo for these 
purposes as well. They were, like the aforementioned monks, part of a larger network of non-
warrior mediators. The courtiers and poets’ function as non-warrior mediators was intrinsically 
tied to the place poetry had within warrior culture and its utility in society at large.111 This was 
certainly the case for the Shimazu despite, or perhaps because of, their distance from Kyoto. The 
amount of utility Yoshihisa and the Shimazu administration derived from poetry was astounding. 
By understanding the function poetry had on the Shimazu, we can understand why courtiers and 
poets were such an important part of the information and military intelligence system of the 
Shimazu. 
 In the “Ise-no-kami kokoro-e sho,” the second part of the nikki and a semi-
autobiographical essay written by Kakuken, one of the first pieces of advice Kakuken gave to the 
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readers was that “a retainer should first value discipline, followed by literary knowledge. If one 
does so, the path of lord and retainer should naturally conform to one’s heart.”112 This notion was 
not new as similar ideas appeared previously in the works of the famous Imagawa Ryōshun 
(1326 – 1420), who stated that “those who do not know the literary arts (bundō) will in the end 
have no success in military arts (budō).”113 Ryōshun continued, “with regards to safeguarding the 
province (kuni), without literary learning (gakumon) proper administration (seidō) cannot be 
achieved.”114 Kakuken echoed Ryōshun’s view with regards to the significance of literary skills 
for the warrior for a number of reasons. To start, the use of and association with poetry granted 
warriors prestige due to poetry’s association with the emperor and the imperial family. Such 
prestige granted daimyo significant legitimacy as local overlords, and unsurprisingly, this was 
something that appealed greatly to Yoshihisa. Beyond this, a thorough understanding of literature 
allowed for a widening of lexicon for communication both for warriors speaking amongst 
themselves, as well as for those wishing to speak with the aristocracy. Finally, the practice of 
literature, especially that of poetry, served as a training ground for warriors in synchronizing 
their way of thinking in a manner that coincided with their lord’s mind. Because the use of 
literature brought with them so much benefits, the utilization of courtiers and poets as unofficial 
agents of communication was consciously embraced by the Shimazu administration. 
 In order to fully understand what literary knowledge, and more specifically poetry, meant 
for the Shimazu, we have to go back to the very first imperial poetry collection, the Kokinshū (A 
Collection of Ancient and Modern Japanese Poems), a cornerstone text for poetic education and 
one that Yoshihisa received instructions on from the imperial regent, Konoe Sakihisa (1536 – 
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1612).115 The Kokinshū encouraged warriors to practice poetry by citing its ability to calm a 
warrior’s heart and mind.116 While the potency of this claim is questionable, Watanuki Toyoaki 
notes that poetic composition gave the warriors another method for artistic and humorous 
expression where appropriate, allowing poetry to act as an emotional and mental tranquilizer of 
sorts.117  
 Watanuki also added several other points when considering the reasons behind the 
importance of poetry. He states that a key part of poetry’s importance was its intrinsic 
association with the emperor. Since the art of poetry was directly connected to imperial 
collections (chokusenshū), some of which were compiled by various emperors in the past, the 
ability to be a part of the poetic composition automatically granted prestige to its participants. 
Success in this arena also allowed warriors to leave behind a legacy for posterity in an arena tied 
directly to the imperial court, which was not something most warriors could accomplish solely 
through war and violence.118 This undoubtedly attracted many warriors to study literature and 
poetry if only to try and solidify their own names in imperial history. 
 On a more practical level, the use of poetry and literature was foundational to the 
everyday communication for warriors and aristocrats alike. According to Watanuki, the 
aristocrats’ use of poetry as a form of communication allowed poetic knowledge to disseminate 
down the political hierarchy as warriors and courtiers built close and inseparable working 
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relationship with each other.119 As familiarity with poetry expanded, its function as a form of 
communication went beyond bakufu-court relations and became an intrinsic part of warrior life. 
 When poetry fully seeped into the warriors’ communicative lexicon, the very act of 
poetry composition became an opportunity for the construction of warrior relationships. On an 
interpersonal level, the composition of poetry became a means to express feelings and emotions 
in everyday mundane circumstances. We can see this on the sixth day of the sixth month of 
1585, in an entry where Kakuken wrote of his experience staying overnight at the Sosanji 
Temple; 
We were permitted to go to the second floor of their stables. Since the first floor was 
quite cool, we have asked to stay there at the stables. However, because the second floor 
was directly adjacent to the rice fields, we could hear the occasional rustling of rice and 
leaves as though the autumn winds were near; this was truly absurd! 
Since Sōken was with me at the time, I consoled him with the following: 
 
Shinoaezu  Unbearable is 
kadoda ni kayō the rustling sound of leaves 
akikaze no in the autumn wind. 
soyomeki noboru Is it passing through the fields 
rō no ue kana and climbing up this building? 
 
In this manner we comforted each other. 
When the cool winds came again as if to move our pillows further into the room, I said, 
 
Chikashi to ya Is it not intimate? 
makura ugokasu The autumn wind 
aki no kaze that moves the pillow. 
 
I spoke with Sōken in this manner until the night ended.120 
 
Poetry here was an easy means for warriors to communicate their shared experience with each 
other. The poetic form and its composition, at the intellectual and idealized level, had become an 
acceptable framework for warriors to display emotions.   
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 On a communal scale, monthly poetry gatherings recorded within Kakuken’s diary 
exemplified yet another way warrior relationships were constructed. Over the entirety of the six 
years covered by the diary, sixteen monthly poetry meetings were recorded. This number does 
not include various poetry gatherings at parties, memorial events, and other unscheduled events 
and meetings that involved poetry, which would push this number to roughly seventy-two. This 
averages out to around one poetry event or gathering per month without accounting for possible 
gatherings that were not recorded by Kakuken.121 This also does not include poetry events of a 
spiritual nature as they were held for purposes fundamentally different from that of the routine 
gatherings. With the frequency with which poetry was involved at various events, poetry was 
likely considered a social activity for entertainment, an extension of its original function as a 
communication tool. To fully comprehend the importance of poetry as part of the communicative 
lexicon however, we must also consider the rise of renga, or “linking verse,” during the medieval 
era. It was specifically renga that accentuated the communal and social nature of poetic 
composition and shaped poetry parties into a training activity that coordinated the minds of 
warriors with that of their lords. Of course, not all warriors necessarily liked renga, but most of 
them recognized its popularity and its importance as a communication tool and beyond, thus all 
warriors participated in composing renga on some level.122 
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  A good way to differentiate between renga and waka, the older form of Japanese poetry 
epitomized in imperial collections, is in their fundamental nature as works of literature. In the 
simplest terms, a waka is a poem of a single stanza, composed by an individual, while a renga is 
a long poem consisting of any number of stanzas, themselves roughly half the length of a single 
waka. While it is certainly possible for an individual to compose all the stanzas of a renga, it is 
fundamentally considered a communal form of poetry that emphasized quick-thinking and 
adaptability.123 A renga gathering often involved multiple participants composing individual 
stanzas that logically and poetically connect with a previous stanza without prior knowledge of 
what that stanza may be. This activity thus emphasized a poet’s ability to adapt and communicate 
his or her message effectively through a poetic framework. Unlike waka gatherings where each 
person needed to stay on a particular topic or theme while express some degree of individuality, 
renga gatherings focused the creation of a large work through communal effort and the ability to 
subsume individuality to contribute to a greater whole. With this in mind, it is not difficult to see 
why daimyo would value this form of poetry, actively promoting its practice through the hosting 
of renga gatherings.124 Renga gatherings served almost as a pseudo-training program for 
retainers on the importance of cooperation with each other. More importantly, such gatherings 
allowed the retainers to know how to suppress their personal goals for the agenda of their 
daimyo. The effectiveness of this training was questionable however. As we will see later, 
personal goals remained an important motivating factor for many warriors of this period.  
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 If we combine what we know about the nature of renga composition with the active 
participants in various renga gatherings as recorded in the Uwai Kakuken nikki, we can get a 
fairly clear picture on the practical function of poetry within the Shimazu family and 
administration. On a general level, the frequency with which they had poetry gatherings likely 
contributed to a strong sense of community, one created for a common goal as shaped by the 
very composition of renga at such gatherings.125 Upon closer inspection, we also see that renga 
also served to unite the purposes of warriors of various ranks and origins in certain cases as well. 
Take for example the poetry gathering of the twentieth day of the eleventh month, Tenshō 11 
(1583), held at the residence of Fukami Nagatomo (1532 – 1590).126 We know that this gathering 
was scheduled only a day or two before its occurrence despite prior contact between Nagatomo 
and Kakuken during the third month of Tenshō 11.127 This lack of prior notice suggests that this 
was likely an unofficial poetry gathering, meaning that the gathering itself was not overseen by 
the daimyo, which in turn allowed for a more open and free discussion amongst retainers. What 
planning there was for this gathering can be seen from Kakuken’s entry outlining his plans for 
“tomorrow’s poetry gathering” the day before the twentieth, and suggests that despite the 
spontaneous nature of this particular gathering, this was not entirely a casual meeting either, 
deserving some level of preparation.128 The event itself had a number of important attendees as 
well. Held at Nagatomo’s residence, many important retainers of the Shimazu administration 
attended this gathering. This included both Shimazu Tadanaga (1551 – 1610), cousin of 
Yoshihisa, and Niiro Tadamoto (1526 – 1610), a prominent senior retainer for three generations 
                                                           
125
 Watanuki, Sengoku bushō to rengashi: ransei no interijensu, pp. 51 – 52. See also, Ogawa, Bushi wa naze uta wo 
yomu ka: Kamakura shogun kara Sengoku daimyō made, p. 244. 
126
 Uwai Kakuken nikki, part 1, p. 306. 
127
 For previous correspondence between Nagatomo and Kakuken see Uwai Kakuken nikki, part 1, pp. 218, 221 – 5. 
For Nagatomo’s request, see Uwai Kakuken nikki, part 1, p. 305. 
128





of the Shimazu. Their attendance illustrating for us that the event was of some political 
significance.  
 This particular poetry gathering exemplifies how such events could unite samurai of 
different ranks and origins. The four particular participants that I have highlighted above, 
Shimazu Tadanaga, Niiro Tadamoto, Uwai Kakuken, and the host Fukami Nagatomo, 
represented warriors of differing ranks and origins. That all four of them attended the same 
gathering was not a mere coincidence. These four attendees represented a cross-section of the 
Shimazu’s administration. On the one hand, we have Tadanaga, a family member of the daimyo, 
Tadamoto, a senior retainer of proven loyalty and service, and Kakuken, a mediator of the 
Shimazu. On the other hand, we have Fukami Nagatomo, who was not a direct retainer of the 
Shimazu at all, but was in fact a retainer of a rival daimyo, Sagara Tadafusa (1572 – 1585) who 
was only eleven at the time. We know this as Nagatomo served as a representative of Tadafusa in 
the Shimazu court on the third month of Tenshō 11.129 Based on the fact that Yoshihisa was the 
one confirming Tadafusa’s land ownership, we know that the Sagara was formally under the 
control of the Shimazu.130 Unlike regular retainers of the Shimazu however, Sagara Tadafusa 
was still a daimyo, and with that position came a degree of independence. While the two families 
had a peaceful relationship, there were plenty of reasons for them to distrust one another.131 To 
have a Sagara retainer, one that had no frequent contact with the Shimazu court, host a poetry 
gathering that were attended mostly by Shimazu retainers suggests that this was likely not a 
gathering held for exchanging pleasantries.  
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 While we have no records of the actual poems that were composed that day, we do know 
a lengthy discussion on things not related to poetry took place late into the night.132 The specific 
term that Kakuken used to describe their meeting was eshaku. The term eshaku was originally a 
Buddhist term which describes the act of investigating an outwardly contradictory situation in 
order to arrive at a reality free from such contradictions. Overtime, this term had come to 
describe the act of “coming to a decision through discussion.” Though eshaku did not explicitly 
mean a discussion of important or official business, the distinct lack of alcohol or any other 
forms of entertainment or food throughout the gathering suggests that it is highly likely that their 
discussion involved official business. We know this from the many other poetry gatherings 
recorded in Kakuken’s diary: alcohol, games, and snacks were staples of these events. That 
Kakuken never use the term eshaku to describe poetry despite using this exact term four hundred 
and eighty-one times throughout his diary shows that eshaku meant something distinctly 
different from poetic composition. Poetry was an excuse for all these warriors of different ranks 
and origins to gather in one place to have an open and unofficial conversation about official 
business. In a sense, such gatherings served as an opportunity for communication to occur 
without recourse to the official channels of information and intelligence. 
 The last point of significance when considering the warrior’s relations with poetry is the 
reputation or image the warrior projects through his own literary knowledge. As we saw 
previously, poetry had a profound effect on the person reciting or composing them. For warriors, 
poetry supposedly calmed their hearts and minds, and thus served as a counter-balance to their 
involvement with the more violent side of medieval life. Since this was a generally accepted fact, 
the ability to compose poetry suggested to a warrior’s peers how refined he was in terms of taste 
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and culture, allowing for the projection of an image worthy of respect.133 From a practical 
perspective, this ability to convey to others a cultured and educated façade was crucial as it was 
widely accepted that one’s ability to learn reflected on one’s general capability at large. Being 
able to not only recite knowledge, but to flexibly adapt it to a particular situation was a crucial 
skill in the Sengoku period as it suggested one’s overall adaptability toward situations constantly 
in flux.134 The poetic ability of a warrior was therefore seen as a reflection of his or her ability to 
perform in other political and military arenas.  
  From what we have seen above, we can conclude that poetry was a crucial part of warrior 
society during the Sengoku period. Mastery over poetry meant having access to an efficient 
means of communication even amongst warriors of different loyalties, which in turn provided 
warriors with opportunities to form connections and build communities. This was unsurprisingly 
something daimyo exploited for their own political gains as well. This poetic mastery was also a 
tool of control for the military elite, as the hosting of poetry gatherings became both a method to 
train their retainers in cooperation and a form of reward for those deemed worthy. With the 
significance of poetry in mind, we can now begin to look at how and why aristocrats and poets 
occupied such an important position within the unofficial channels of warrior communication.  
  Given the immense utility provided by the use poetry, it is reasonable to suggest that the 
people who were most knowledgeable at poetry must have some degree of political leverage 
within Sengoku society. This boils down to two primary groups of people, the aristocracy and 
the professional poets. These two groups were by no means mutually exclusive and many 
aristocrats were famous poets as well. While both these groups depended upon the warrior class 
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for their financial well-being, they had considerable sway over the ways the warriors operated in 
society by being the carriers of poetic knowledge. Under the guise of teaching poetry, aristocrats 
and poets gained access to the many different levels of warrior administrations across the 
archipelago, rendering them into an invaluable part of the unofficial warrior communication 
networks. 
 With regards to the aristocracy, who were the inheritors of the classical poetic traditions, 
they commonly traded their cultural knowledge and prestige for financial support and protection. 
This form of exchange rendered aristocrats into one of the primary agents of poetry of the time. 
This exchange between themselves and the warriors also meant that they often kept in touch with 
one another, with aristocrats traveling down to the various provinces in person being a relatively 
common occurrence. Such was the case when the imperial regent Konoe Sakihisa who went to 
Kagoshima and gave a personal poetry lesson to Shimazu Yoshihisa.135 High profile aristocrats 
like the Konoe also frequently served as mediators for powerful daimyo like Oda Nobunaga.136 
In such cases, aristocrats who had politically sanctioned reasons for travelling would have been 
in contact with many warriors and other politically relevant groups. These groups would devote 
the necessary resources, such as security forces or guides, to ensure that their guests arrive safely 
and comfortably in return for being graced by the aristocrats’ visit.137 The ability to travel 
securely allowed the aristocrats to become powerful political figures in their own right, both 
through the message they were meant to deliver and the cultural knowledge they had internalized 
inside them. 
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 Professional poets was another group of people that served as useful mediators for the 
Sengoku warriors. Like the courtiers, famous poets were treated as valued guests by many 
prominent daimyo across the archipelago, the poets also peddled their knowledge of the literary 
arts to various potential warrior patrons like their aristocratic counterparts. This commonality 
between the aristocracy and the professional poets meant that both groups were able to garner 
varying degrees of access to some of the most prominent political figures of the Sengoku period. 
In this way, the poets joined the courtiers as a key part of the larger samurai communication 
network that spanned the archipelago.138  
 Beyond their function as special mediators tasked with negotiation on behalf of their 
warrior patrons however, the traveling aristocrats and poets also served an additional and likely 
unintentional role for the various warriors. Due to how frequent courtiers and poets travelled and 
interacted with the powerful samurai, these non-warrior mediators became an excellent source of 
political and military intelligence for their patrons. According to the poetry scholar Watanuki 
Toyoaki, the ability for the aristocrats and poets to gather and communicate important military 
intelligence from both the imperial court and the various provinces was one of the defining 
functions of Sengoku poets.139 Poets who only excelled at the composition of poetry were not 
highly regarded by warriors at the time because they were unable to efficiently gather and 
provide their patron with valuable intelligence. This was especially the case for poets who were 
not students or descendants of famous poetic figures.140 This utility that poets and courtiers 
brought to the samurai communication system made them especially valuable for the various 
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daimyo. Not only did these carriers of poetic knowledge served as a convenient, albeit unofficial, 
mediators with a high degree of political access, they also brought with them political and 
military secrets that the daimyo sought after, perhaps even more so than the political prestige 
garnered through good poetry. As a result of this, these travelling disseminators of poetic 
knowledge had a great degree of political leverage and was an invaluable part of the Sengoku 
warrior communication as a whole. 
 
III. Circumvention and Exploitation of the Communication System 
 Now that we have a good grasp on how the communication system was supposed to 
function in so far as it was designed by the Shimazu, the role played by the mediators within this 
system, and the unofficial channels that existed to complement this system, we can begin to 
scrutinize more closely how this communication infrastructure was exploited and why. In his 
work on the mediator system of the Shimazu, Yamaguchi Ken’ichi cites an example from the 
Uwai Kakuken nikki to illustrate an instance where the private communication channels were 
utilized. Yamaguchi used this particular case to illustrate the importance of proper 
communications protocols and how Uwai Kakuken as a senior retainer sought to enforce it.141 As 
we will see however, we can also interpret Kakuken’s actions as a case that shows a lack of 
consequences for warriors who attempted to circumvent proper communication protocols.  
A closer look at Yamaguchi’s example will illustrate this point. The diary entry cited by 
Yamaguchi is from the fifth day of the third month of Tenshō 12 (1584), the relevant part of 
which is as follows: 
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Kawano Chikugo-no-kami (Michiyasu) of the Kiyotake warriors (Miyazaki district), 
having not been in contact with me for a long time, came with gifts of wine. His message 
was received by Kashiwara shō (Yūkan), which states that, “I have been living in these 
foothills for the year due to an error with the urgent tax142 I submitted to the jitō (Ijū-in 
Hisanobu). Since we can be of use in your next battle, would you allow us to march 
alongside your forces?” 
 
I replied, “Even if my opinions are different from that of the jitō, it will be inappropriate 
for me to allow someone condemned by the jitō to join me without consulting my close 
retainers on their opinions first. At this juncture, you ought to relay your intent to the 
mediators of Kagoshima, so they can bring it to the attention and discussion of the senior 
retainers. Whether you can join me or not will depend on their decision.”143 
 
Yamaguchi argues that this instance shows the prioritizing of the official communication channel 
and proper protocol by Uwai Kakuken.144 It is undeniable that Kawano Michiyasu was appealing 
directly to Kakuken, who was a senior retainer by this point in his career, without recourse to the 
mediators of Kagoshima.145 The proper course of actions Michiyasu should follow would be to 
officially petition the senior retainers of Kagoshima for the permission to join Kakuken’s 
military campaign, but instead he sought to bypass this procedure and spoke directly to Kakuken, 
making use of their previous relationship. As a senior retainer himself, Kakuken technically had 
the authority to grant Michiyasu’s request at the expense of the central Shimazu administration’s 
authority.  
The reasoning behind Kakuken’s choice to not exercise this authority was ultimately 
ambiguous. Kakuken could have acted to reinforce the proper protocol as Yamaguchi suggested, 
but it was just as likely that Kakuken acted to protect himself from the possible repercussions of 
granting Michiyasu his wishes. That Kakuken justified his decision by referencing specifically 
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Michiyasu’s offense against Ijū-in Hisanobu could suggest that Kakuken was in fact shifting the 
responsibility away from himself and on to a larger decision-making body. By deferring the 
decision to the source of the problem, Kakuken achieved two major objectives. On the one hand, 
this would limit the potential fallout with Hisanobu should Michiyasu later be allowed to join 
Kakuken, as Kakuken would no longer be responsible for accepting or overturning Hisanobu’s 
punishment for Michiyasu. This thus allowed Kakuken to maintain a peaceful working 
relationship between himself and Hisanobu. On the other hand, Kakuken could also protect his 
own reputation amongst his peers and retainers by not overriding Hisanobu’s previous 
judgement. Both of these outcomes would allow Kakuken to reinforce his reputation and 
authority in the long run. With this in mind, it is difficult to suggest that Kakuken were acting 
entirely in a purely altruistic manner by reminding Michiyasu the importance of the 
communication protocols.   
 Kakuken’s diary contains another incident detailing an ex-mediator exploiting the 
communication system of the Shimazu for questionable reasons. This one instance in particular 
involves Kakuken himself and one Nyūta Yoshizane (1533 – 1601). The example highlights 
some of the pitfalls of the Shimazu’s communication system. In being the sole person 
responsible for mediating the communication between the sides, Kakuken managed to take full 
control of the information exchange, making promises without recourse to and at the expense of 
the central administration that Kakuken was supposed to represent. Kakuken circumvented the 
communication infrastructure and ignored the orders of Yoshihisa for the purposes of keeping 





Nyūta Yoshizane was a local warrior located in Bungo province and served the Ōtomo, 
the other dominant power within Kyushu and the primary rivals of the Shimazu.146 Despite their 
service to the Ōtomo, the Nyūta had a strained relationship with their daimyo, as outlined in the 
diary entry of Kakuken, on the fourteenth day of the tenth month, 1585; 
…A letter from Niiro Bushū [Tadamoto] from yesterday had arrived. It spoke of the 
situation of Nyūta (Yoshizane) from southern districts of Bungo (the two districts of Ōno 
and Naoiri) and his dissatisfaction.  
 
According to the letter, despite his re-submission to the Ōtomo five or six years ago, 
Yoshizane was not granted the holdings that he had prior to his return. He wrote to 
inform us of the preparations he is making in Bungo, and that should the news of his 
dissatisfactions were to be discovered, he is ready to withstand a siege at Yurugi (Naoiri 
district) along with the six thousand soldiers at his command. This letter was an urgent 
submission from Sakanashi (Higo, Aso district). 
 
If these events are confirmed to be true, then we [the Shimazu] can begin our campaign 
into Bungo. First, we should circulate an order to the various retainers regarding the 
possible actions that might follow should this turn out to be true…147 
 
According to Marushima Kazuhiro, who studied this particular episode in his exploration of the 
role of mediators in the Sengoku period, Yoshizane fell out of the Ōtomo’s favour due to 
Yoshizane’s father attempting to assassinate the previous Ōtomo daimyo.148 As a result of this, 
even after the Nyūta’s reestablishment of their lord-vassal relationship with the Ōtomo, the 
Nyūta were not granted the same landholdings as before. Yoshizane found this to be 
unacceptable, which triggered a series of events leading to Kakuken taking on the mantle of 
mediator between the Shimazu and Nyūta Yoshizane on Kakuken’s own terms. In maintaining 
his self-appointed role of mediator, Kakuken ultimately chose to disobey Yoshihisa in an attempt 
to keep his promises to the Nyūta. 
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 Another key point that I wish to highlight with the above quote is the deterioration of the 
peace between the Shimazu and the Ōtomo by 1585. That Kakuken’s first reaction to this news 
was to consider the possibility of war against the Ōtomo suggests that the peace currently 
enjoyed by the Shimazu and the Ōtomo was uneasy at best. Animosity between these two 
daimyo was nothing new. As early as 1578, the former shogun Ashikaga Yoshiaki (1537 – 1597) 
attempted to instigate conflict between the Shimazu and the Ōtomo.149 At the time, Yoshiaki’s 
sanctioning of Shimazu military actions against the Ōtomo resulted in open conflict between 
these two rivals almost immediately.150 This state of affair lasted until Oda Nobunaga’s 
intervention in 1580, when he tasked Konoe Sakihisa with the mission of brokering peace 
between the Shimazu and the Ōtomo.151 The peace negotiated by Sakihisa in 1580 was respected 
by the Shimazu for many years to come.152 When Toyotomi Hideyoshi issued orders for the 
cessation of violence in Kyushu, the Shimazu used their strict adherence to the peace established 
in 1580 as grounds for denying Hideyoshi’s request. According to the Shimazu, the blame should 
fall squarely on the shoulders of the Ōtomo, claiming them to be the violators of the peace 
established by Nobunaga, and suggesting that any military actions on the part of the Shimazu 
were taken entirely for self-defence.153 
 This declaration of self-defence was not entirely baseless. Despite previous suggestions 
to the contrary by their retainers, the Shimazu did manage to avoid open conflict amidst rising 
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tension between themselves and the Ōtomo.154 It was in fact the Ōtomo who first initiated 
conflict as the following entry from Kakuken’s diary, on eighth day of the eighth month of 1585, 
indicates; 
Today, a messenger with the surname Ijū-in arrived here by the order of Chūsho-kō 
[Shimazu Iehisa]. The messengers spoke of the matter Chūsho-kō has heard from 
Yamanaka (Nishi-Usuki district, Migimatsu Bizen-no-kami).  
 
Apparently there was an in-depth discussion between Bungo (Ōtomo Yoshimune) and the 
Aso (Koremitsu) family. It seems that Bungo wants to send armour and headgear to Mitai 
(Mitai Chikatake), headgear to Nagato-no-kami (Munehiko) of Kai, and also numerous 
military equipment to someone else to match that person’s needs. It seems that Bungo’s 
intention is to make sure that should they arrive on the battlefield, they would remember 
receiving these gifts.  
 
They [the Ōtomo] were at the height of their schemes at various locations.155 
 
From this, we can begin to understand why Kakuken saw the Nyūta’s situation on the fourteenth 
day of the tenth month of the same year as a window of opportunity the Shimazu should 
capitalize on.156 This information provided by Iehisa offered the exact evidence the Shimazu 
needed to justify military actions as self-defence. With this, the Shimazu can continue to 
maintain their reputation as the respectful followers of the peace established by Nobunaga and 
Sakihisa from before, while simultaneously taking military actions against the Ōtomo. 
 With this context in mind, we can understand the fundamental assumptions Kakuken had 
made when approaching his diplomatic negotiations between himself and the Nyūta. Namely, 
despite the uneasy peace between the Shimazu and the Ōtomo, Kakuken was aware of the 
tension bubbling just beneath the surface of this peace. As such, he saw this as the perfect chance 
to take swift and decisive action toward the Ōtomo without having to worry about the peace of 
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Nobunaga and Sakihisa. As we will see later, this was enough of a reason for Kakuken to seize 
this opportunity and capitalize on the situation on his own terms.  
Despite Kakuken’s pivotal role in the exchange between the Shimazu and the Nyūta, 
Kakuken was not the only person who was in contact with the Nyūta on behalf of the Shimazu. 
In fact, prior to establishing direct contact with Kakuken on the sixteenth day of the second 
month of Tenshō 14 (1586), the Nyūta communicated solely with Shimazu Iehisa and Niiro 
Tadamoto, which represented a two-prong effort by the Shimazu to maintain contact with the 
Nyūta.157 This initiation of contact between the Nyūta and Kakuken represented the turning point 
in Kakuken’s decision process for it was only after this that Kakuken actively petitioned for the 
Shimazu to send military aid to the Nyūta.158 In a sense, helping the Nyūta became a personal 
mission for Kakuken to prove his worth as a mediator, and it was for this reason that Kakuken 
exploited his position as mediator between the Nyūta and the Shimazu. A closer look into the 
actions taken by Kakuken in his efforts to promote his personal agenda at the expense of both the 
well-being of the Shimazu and the authority of Yoshihisa will illustrate this clearly. 
 The Shimazu’s façade as peace keepers in Kyushu was not much more than mere 
posturing. On the twenty-second of the first month of 1586, roughly three weeks prior to 
Kakuken’s direct contact with the Nyūta, Shimazu Yoshihisa had in fact decided to initiate a full 
scale invasion of Bungo:  
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Item. Twenty-second day. I attended court this morning as usual. Dangisho (Kagoshima, 
Daijō-in Morihisa) completed a kuji159 [prognostication] at the Gomasho.160 We sought 
guidance from the kami [Japan’s local deities] in determining whether we should march 
on Bungo (Ōtomo Yoshimune) from both Higo and Hyūga, or gather all our forces at 
[Hyūga] and proceed from a single front instead. The result of the kuji states that we 
should attack from two places simultaneously. 
 
The result was reported to our two lords and each of them was pleased. It was decided 
that that Taishu (Yoshihisa) will march from [Hyūga], while the Muko (Yoshihiro) will 
march from [Higo]…161 
 
With this decision made, it is unsurprising that Kakuken also began his own preparations for the 
upcoming campaign. Part of this preparation involved getting in touch with the people in Bungo, 
like the Nyūta, with whom he could coordinate his military efforts. On the sixteenth of the 
second month of 1586, Kakuken wrote, 
A mediator from Nyūta Munekazu (Yoshizane) with the surname of Hori was sent here… 
According to him, a certain Shiga Dōeki (Chikanori), son of Michiteru, recently stole the 
mistress of Yoshimune (Ōtomo) and hid her. This shocked Yoshimune. Yoshimune was 
furious with Dōeki, and placed him in house arrest at a place called Sugasako. As such, 
Dōeki has now sided with the Nyūta in their plotting against the Ōtomo… 
 
The mediator brought diagrams with him and explained to me in detail the current 
situation at Bungo. As this situation merited a response, a letter was drafted to Dōeki and 
I entrusted it to the mediator.162  
 
The letter states that, “Since last year the Nyūta has met and discussed with us various 
details with the current affairs, and we are impressed with your recent allegiance with the 
Nyūta. As everyone knows, the peace between Bungo and Satsuma was the result of the 
interventions of Kyoto (Oda Nobunaga, Konoe Sakihisa). However, since last winter, it is 
apparent that the Ōtomo sought to break this agreement with us. Furthermore, they 
continuously cling on to their ambitions on the frontlines (Higashi-Usuki district). As 
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such, there should be no oppositions to us replying with force. It is under this situation 
that we express our good will to you.”163 
 
This entry highlights that, beyond simply cultivating his ties with the Nyūta, Kakuken was taking 
advantage of the developing situation in Bungo and attempted to incorporate other retainers of 
the Ōtomo into the Shimazu military structure. More than simply illustrating for us the 
mechanisms behind the formation of warfare however, this particular instance also exposes the 
relative autonomy a senior retainer had as a diplomatic mediator within the Shimazu 
communication infrastructure. Not only did the Nyūta agents share military intelligence with 
Kakuken and not with the daimyo or with Kagoshima, Kakuken also operated independently 
when it came to the solicitation of aid from Shiga Dōeki. At no point was the will of the senior 
retainers of Kagoshima nor that of Yoshihisa consulted in this process. Based on his diary 
entries, there are no indications that Kakuken attempted to notify Kagoshima at all with regards 
to the actions he took when dealing with the Nyūta or Dōeki prior to his arrival in Kagoshima 
three days later.164  
 Upon Kakuken’s arrival in Kagoshima however, the plans that he set in motion began to 
unravel. According to Kakuken’s diary entry on the nineteenth day of the second month of 1586, 
developments elsewhere within the Shimazu domain interrupted their planned invasion of 
Bungo: 
The mediators who delivered our lord’s message were Honda Gyōbu-no-shō (Masachika) 
and Ijichi Hōki-no-kami (Shigehide). The message states, “As it seems everyone here has 
a bit of time today, I would like to return to a previously decided issue. This is because 
while it is entirely expected that those from Hichiku165 will send us hostages, they might 
be arriving late. If this is true, then our planned invasion of Bungo for the middle of next 
month will be quite impossible. As for postponing it to the fourth month, we would enter 
into the raining season. Since there are numerous large rivers in both Higo and Hyūga, 
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invading in the rain will be difficult. As the world at large166 will surely hear of this, I 
wonder if it would be better to postpone our operations to early autumn…”167 
 
With this, the senior retainers of the Shimazu proceeded with their debate and came to the 
conclusion that it was more important to secure the hostages from the various jitō of Higo, and 
since by autumn hostage transfer would surely be completed, it was best for them to delay their 
invasion of Bungo until then.168 Although Kakuken did protest this decision, citing the instability 
within Bungo and his connections with Nyūta as the perfect opportunities to be seized upon by 
the Shimazu, no one sided with him and the decision to postpone the invasion was finalized.169 
 Despite this abrupt change of plans, Kakuken and the Nyūta managed to maintain their 
relationship, perhaps with plans to continue their arrangements in the autumn. However, when 
early autumn finally arrived another episode similar to the one described above occurred again. 
The Shimazu began their large scale military invasion of Bungo early in the sixth month of 1586, 
with soldiers beginning to gather at their two major bases of operation for this campaign, Higo 
and Hyūgo, on the ninth day of the sixth month.170 Judging solely from the massive investment 
of resources necessary for a large scale gathering of troops at these two provinces, the Shimazu 
appeared to be determined in their conquest. Yet on the sixteenth day of the same month, the 
order for a complete redeployment of their forces against the Tsukushi family instead of the 
Ōtomo was issued.171 As a result, the Shimazu campaign against Bungo province was cancelled 
once again, this time due to the result of yet another consultation with the kami through kuji.172 
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 Regardless of the spiritual reasoning used for this redeployment of military forces, 
Kakuken himself has found such action difficult to justify.173 It was at this point that Kakuken 
decided to take matters into his own hands. During a meeting with Iehisa, Kakuken noted that, 
with regards to the Nyūta, it appears that they have severed their ties with the Ōtomo. 
This was something that happened after it was decided that we should attack Tsukushi. 
That we should abandon the Nyūta in their predicament when they were following the 
plans of myself and those serving Chūsho [Iehisa] is thoroughly absurd. At any rate, in 
planning for the future, perhaps we should ask for the help of Muko [Yoshihiro] in 
seeking assistance for the Nyūta.174 
 
At this point, part of Kakuken’s central motivating factor becomes clear. The treatment of the 
Nyūta by the Shimazu was unacceptable for Kakuken specifically because they were following 
the plans of Kakuken and Iehisa. The issue here was clearly seen as personal from Kakuken’s 
perspective. The matter was troublesome enough to Kakuken that he was willing to completely 
undermine Yoshihisa’s military authority in order to pursue his own ends. The very proposal of 
appealing to Shimazu Yoshihiro (1535 – 1619) in seeking permission to aid the Nyūta not only 
circumvented the jurisdictional prerogative of the daimyo, but also was in direct violation of the 
order issued by Yoshihisa to redirect their attention away from Bungo. Marushima suggests that 
because the official severing of ties between the Nyūta and the Ōtomo took place after 
Yoshihisa’s decision to redeploy their forces towards Tsukushi, Kakuken perhaps thought that 
such a new development merited a reconsideration of the military plans on Yoshihisa’s part.175 
Even if this was the case however, his decision to appeal not to Yoshihisa but to his younger 
brother Yoshihiro illustrates most clearly Kakuken’s intention to subvert Yoshihisa’s authority 
for Kakuken’s own plans. For while Yoshihisa was the undisputed leader of the Shimazu, 
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Yoshihiro held the post of shugo-dai. Translating roughly to “deputy military governor,” the 
shugo-dai held significant authority when it came to military matters.176 The gravity of 
Kakuken’s proposal to appeal to Yoshihiro cannot be overstated. Should Kakuken succeeded in 
his appeal to Yoshihiro, Kakuken’s action would have uprooted the military infrastructure of the 
Shimazu completely by having the deputy military governor take direct action against the orders 
issued by the daimyo. That the post was held by Yoshihiro likely made matters worse as 
competition amongst siblings for military and political control was a common occurrence during 
the Sengoku period. 
 Fortunately for Kakuken, Yoshihiro had no intention of usurping his brother’s authority. 
When Yoshihiro received Kakuken’s request, Yoshihiro showed sympathy towards Kakuken’s 
predicament but nevertheless reported Kakuken to Yoshihisa, who was understandably furious at 
Kakuken’s disobedience.177 According to Kakuken’s diary, Yoshihisa responded to the news as 
follows: 
When informed of my plea to Muko, my lord found it thoroughly unacceptable, and in 
the end, as this directly hinders my lord’s will, he found it utterly absurd. This is 
especially so as I went to Kagoshima and was present at the discussion when our lord’s 
mind was made. 
 
Ihaku [Ijichi Hōki-no-kami] and Kichisaku [Yoshida (Seizon) Mimasaka-no-kami] 
delivered this message to me, and told me in detail what was said. When the two of them 
reported to our lord previously in the scenario mentioned before, the issue of me being 
unwell due to swelling was brought up again. A thorough discussion ensued, and the 
mediators were questioned. This was a bit of a change from before. 
 
Furthermore, in the reply from Kashiwara, it was noted that though I was informed of a 
separate, celebratory event, I had made no effort to participate, and that this is because I 
am an outsider [takokujin]. This would explain why I did not harbour ambitions and 
disloyalty until now.178  
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Despite this colourful display of anger rarely seen in official documents, punishment never came 
for Kakuken. Three days after hearing of Yoshihisa’s displeasure towards Kakuken, on the 
seventeenth of the seventh month of 1586, Kakuken received a message from Yoshihisa 
dismantling Kakuken’s claim that he had never acted for selfish reasons (shikyoku naki) by citing 
numerous prior cases where Kakuken had failed to arrive at the warfront in a timely manner.179 
Yoshihisa demanded that Kakuken immediately begin marching his troops towards the frontlines 
against Tsukushi. In response to this, Kakuken immediately prepared for his departure the next 
day.180 And while the matter concerning the Nyūta continued to linger on as discussion 
surrounding the Shimazu military campaign against the Ōtomo re-entered the conversation in the 
later months of 1586, Kakuken understandably took a much more passive role in this matter 
going forward.181 
 This episode illustrates quite clearly that mediators wield significant amount of political 
leverage in their role as diplomatic agents, and they would use this leverage for their own 
individual plans. There was a difference in scale between the mediator that operated internally 
within the Shimazu administration and one that dealt with inter-daimyo diplomacy, but both had 
significant political power in their control over information. That the diplomatic responsibility 
fell mostly on senior retainers acting as mediators meant that the same failsafe measures used by 
the Shimazu to regulate their internal mediators cannot be applied here. This lack of 
administrative oversight on senior retainers as mediators meant that they were essentially free to 
wield the authority of the daimyo for their individual goals so long as there were no overt 
                                                           
179
 Uwai Kakuken nikki, part 3, pp. 150 – 1. 
180
 Uwai Kakuken nikki, part 3, pp. 151 – 2. 
181
 The Nyūta would appear again in Kakuken’s diary several more times after this incidence. While these entries 
indicate that Kakuken and the Nyūta kept in touch with one another, Kakuken no longer played such an active role 





contradictions between what the daimyo wanted and what the senior retainers wanted. We saw 
this when Uwai Kakuken coaxed Shiga Dōeki into joining the Shimazu war effort without prior 
consultation with the daimyo. We might interpret Kakuken’s interaction with Shiga Dōeki as one 
that would ultimately benefit the Shimazu had the battle actually happened. In this hypothetical 
situation, we can argue that the freedom for senior retainers to wield the daimyo’s authority in 
this manner had the potential to benefit the daimyo. As the senior retainers were left to police 
themselves on the use of such authority however, this same freedom to wield the daimyo’s 
authority could just as easily be used to undermine the prerogatives of the daimyo. In other 
words, if their sense of morality and loyalty were the only things keeping senior retainers from 
using their lord’s authority for individual gains, than we must consider this aspect of the 
communication and intelligence infrastructure as a significant flaw. As we saw in the case of 
Kakuken, morality and loyalty were not the focus of Kakuken’s decision-making per se. Instead, 
from Kakuken’s view, the absurdity of the situation stemmed from his failure to be an effective 
liaison and mediator between the Shimazu and the Nyūta. 
 That Kakuken operated on his need to benefit or protect his own image is something that 
Marushima Kazuhiro agrees with in his own research.182 Marushima argues that, while Kakuken 
might claim that abandoning the Nyūta to their fate could harm the Shimazu in the future, the 
primary concern that occupied Kakuken’s mind was his own identity as mediator and 
diplomat.183 By establishing himself as the primary representative of the Shimazu to the Nyūta, 
Kakuken had placed his own reputation at risk should he fails to deliver what he promised to the 
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Nyūta.184 In weighing the importance of his own reputation versus Yoshihisa’s will, it would 
appear that Kakuken deemed the former was of greater significance.185 Marushima’s claim here 
resonates with the justification that Kakuken gave to Kawano Michiyasu when the latter asked 
Kakuken if he could join in Kakuken’s military campaign. At the time, Kakuken likely was not 
willing to risk his reputation by either granting or denying Michiyasu’s request, instead choosing 
to pass the responsibility on to the senior retainer council. Similarly, in the case of the Nyūta, 
Kakuken once again refused to risk his own reputation even if it meant defying Yoshihisa’s 
orders. The maintenance of his own reputation was a key concern of Kakuken when it came to 
the political decisions he made in both regards.  
 This case reveals a lot about the many factors that affected Yoshihisa’s decisions as well. 
Kakuken’s offense was that he violated a direct command of Yoshihisa and attempted to call on 
the deputy to provide him with military aid, therefore undermining the military command 
structure of the Shimazu administration. Despite the severity of the offense, Yoshihisa’s criticism 
of Kakuken was highly personal. Instead of referencing Kakuken’s attempt to undermine his 
military authority, Yoshihisa cited times when Kakuken may have pretended to be sick when 
summoned and when Kakuken did not congratulate Yoshihisa on his celebrations. Yoshihisa 
took Kakuken’s actions as a personal offense, and that Kakuken’s attempt to circumvent him was 
not so much an undermining of the military hierarchy, but a personal slight and further evidence 
that Kakuken did not respect him. What prevented Kakuken from suffering a harsher punishment 
might be the fact that Kakuken’s actions could be read as ones that were taken to benefit 
Yoshihisa. Indeed, by securing an alliance with the Nyūta, Kakuken’s actions might have been 
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helpful to the Shimazu. But whatever Kakuken’s intentions were, from the moment he chose to 
directly disobey Yoshihisa’s orders, Kakuken surrendered any claims he might have had for 
acting to benefit Yoshihisa. As such, it is difficult argue that Kakuken placed the wellbeing of 
Yoshihisa before his own agendas.  
 
IV. Conclusion: the Pipelines and Gatekeepers of Information 
 The value of information and intelligence undoubtedly rose tremendously during the 
Sengoku era as political and military tensions were heightened to the extreme across the 
archipelago. This was an understandable situation. After all, political and military intelligence 
were crucial for the survival for the warriors of the period. What is less understandable however, 
is the way that information and intelligence were utilized by both the daimyo and his retainers. 
 We have seen in the earlier sections of the current chapter the process through which 
information and intelligence circulated within the Shimazu administration and the identity of 
those responsible for gathering and delivering such information and intelligence. As a way to 
ensure the effective functioning of the administration, information and intelligence were 
transmitted by a selected group of mediators. They were the sole carriers of information between 
the various levels of the administration, and thus held a certain degree of political leverage. As 
such, they needed to be managed accordingly by the daimyo. To increase the accuracy of the 
information and intelligence the administration received, the Shimazu made sure to have 
multiple mediators appointed to a particular tasks in proportion to the importance of said task. 
The Shimazu also made sure to minimize the mediators’ incentive to cheat the system by 
eliminating as many conflicts of interest as possible. Many middle-ranking warriors of the 





climbed up through the ranks acted as mediators previously. This served two key purposes for 
the Shimazu administration. On the one hand, by having the upper-most echelon of the 
administration be wary of how the information system can be manipulated, it naturally helped to 
prevent any such attempts from being successful. On the other hand, being trained properly for 
handling information was crucial to senior retainers as they were most likely to be assigned as 
mediators themselves when dealing with important diplomatic exchanges between daimyo. 
Assignment to the mediator post was, in a sense, part of their career training.  
Outside of this internal system of communication, there were also many unofficial 
channels of information and intelligence used by the Shimazu, the most important of which was 
the one utilizing the aristocracy and the poets. Their significance as mediators stemmed from the 
diplomatic access granted to them because of their ability to compose poetry in conjunction to 
the imperial prestige specifically associated with the courtiers. Poetry was a highly valued skill 
for the warriors of the medieval age. As a result of this, aristocrats and poets were frequently 
invited to various daimyo’s courts to teach their craft to local warriors. This ease of access to 
various warrior courts meant that the aristocracy and poets became great information collectors, 
serving as pseudo-spies as they delivered critical military intelligence from one domain to the 
next. This added value that they bring to the table was a key part of why courtiers and poets were 
such an important part of the communication system of the daimyo. Unfortunately, despite the 
efforts of the daimyo to gather as much information as possible, control over the accuracy of 
such information still eluded their grasp.  
Without fundamental guiding principles in the operation of the domain for each level of 
the administration, both daimyo and retainers were left to their own devices when it came to 





benefits, and Uwai Kakuken was no exception to this. The interactions between Kakuken and the 
Nyūta illustrates for us that at least some of the factors controlling the political actions taken by 
Kakuken had to do with his needs to reinforce his reputation as a mediator. For Kakuken, his 
reputation outweighed his desire to respect the military authority of his lord. Similarly, in 
responding to Kakuken’s offense, Yoshihisa showed that he too saw the entire episode with the 
Nyūta as a personal act of disrespect against his authority. Both daimyo and retainer only 
considered their actions through the lens of individual gains and benefits, as opposed to any 
abstract notions of politics. Infractions toward the Shimazu administration and political 
infrastructure paled in comparison to the personal insult felt by Yoshihisa because, like Kakuken, 
Yoshihisa was concerned with his own reputation as a ruler and the legitimacy of his leadership 
within the Shimazu. 
We have outlined here the flaws of the Shimazu communication system, and the ways 
and reasons for retainers to circumvent this system. What is missing however, is the role and 
approach taken by the daimyo in dealing with their lack of control over the accuracy of 
information. In the next chapter, we will look at how the daimyo responded to the uncertainty of 
the information and intelligence they were receiving. Specifically, through the analysis of 
rumours, we will see what some of Yoshihisa’s key considerations were when it came to his own 









Based on our modern understanding of rumours, it is difficult perhaps to categorize them 
as a reliable source of information. As one of the defining features of rumours is their 
unsubstantiated nature, making decisions based on rumours seem to be a foolhardy endeavour. 
Yet rumours were not without their political utility. The manipulation of rumours by prominent 
political figures was a fairly common practice in medieval Japan and was enabled by a general 
limited access to information by the population at large. This chapter will focus on how Shimazu 
Yoshihisa used rumours to his advantage in order to reinforce his reputation and legitimacy.  
At the most fundamental level, rumours is just one of the many kinds of communication 
and military intelligence. If all unsubstantiated information was considered to be rumours, then 
almost all information a daimyo receives on a daily basis would be nothing but rumours. But this 
was clearly not the case. That Kakuken made note of rumours in his diary and separated them 
from the daily information he encountered suggest as much. Within a daimyo’s administration, a 
clear distinction was made between rumours and normal information. Since the truthfulness of 
any information and intelligence a daimyo received can never be fully affirmed, the 
unsubstantiated nature of rumours cannot be what distinguished them from the other pieces of 
intelligence the Shimazu received on a daily basis. Instead, the key feature of a rumour for the 
Sengoku warriors was their mysterious origins. Rumours epitomized the ambiguous nature of 





fact, rumours provided daimyo with unprecedented opportunities to further his own individual 
agenda by exploiting the ambiguity inherent in such information.  
The first section of this chapter explores the medieval Japanese conception of rumours 
and their value as a source of information within the medieval warrior society. Borrowing from 
the work of Sakai Kimi, we will see that despite our modern concepts of what rumours are and 
the unreliable nature of such information, people in medieval Japan had a very different 
understanding of and relationship with rumours. In fact, rumours were valued by investigators 
and courts alike throughout the Kamakura and the Muromachi period in solving crimes and 
infractions against the warrior elites. Rumours were more than just simple hearsay or pieces to a 
larger picture of the truth; rather they were information with inherent truth value. For those who 
wished to contest the truth of any given rumours in the Sengoku era, they were tasked with 
almost the impossible. In premodern Japan, rumour, or fūbun,186 was one of many types of 
discourse used to communicate ideas and information. While the mysterious origins of fūbun was 
what separated fūbun as rumours from all other forms of unsubstantiated information, rumours’ 
relationship to truth and the authority of truth was a much more ill-defined matter. Lacking the 
dichotomous notion of truth versus falsehood prevalent within Western thinking, the value and 
authority of “truth” was much more ambiguous in premodern Japanese thinking. Because of the 
nebulous nature of truth itself, rumours became a risky but critical instrument of rule for the 
Sengoku daimyo. 
The second section of this chapter will be two case studies regarding rumours found in 
the Uwai Kakuken nikki. Through our investigation of these two cases, it will become clear that 
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Shimazu Yoshihisa was much more concerned with how he could use rumours to reinforce his 
own position within his administration as opposed to any ideological or abstract notions. 
Furthermore, we will also see how the uncertain nature of rumours actually contributed to their 
value as key pieces of information. For Yoshihisa, the ambiguous value of truth lied in the 
effects it might have on his own reputation. 
 The first case of rumours we will explore here is with regards to Iriki-in Shigetoyo and 
the rumours of his supposed ambition against the Shimazu. This case shows that the very 
existence of the rumours affected the decisions of the retainers in dealing with the Iriki-in. In 
resolving these rumours, no efforts were dedicated to finding out the truth behind these rumours. 
Instead, Yoshihisa encouraged Shigetoyo to prove his innocence to his peers in a way that was 
consistent with Yoshihisa’s personal pursuit of authority and legitimacy. In trying to secure his 
own agenda, Yoshihisa also repeatedly emphasized his own lack of responsibility in coaxing 
Shigetoyo to relinquish his landholdings, showing a preoccupation for projecting the image of a 
righteous and magnanimous ruler.  
The second case we will discuss here is one that we have a lot less information on. The 
value of this case lies in how Yoshihisa responded to it. When asked by a retainer, Hirata Kunai-
no-shō, if he could transfer to a new location, Yoshihisa cited the existence of a rumour as the 
basis for rejecting this retainer’s request. This case was a rare instance when Yoshihisa explicitly 
stated that the only truth he cared about was the existence of the rumours themselves, and not the 
truth buried beneath said rumours. More importantly, Yoshihisa will not risk his own reputation 
just to grant such a request. Yoshihisa clearly prioritized his image as a filial son above the actual 
political and military repercussions of granting or denying a retainer’s request. This case thus 





might had to suffer because of them, downplaying the impact of his decisions upon the other 
parties such decisions might affect. 
 
I. The Importance of Rumours 
 Rumours, by their very nature, are unsubstantiated sources of information. Given the 
unstable sociopolitical environment of the Sengoku period, one might perhaps assume that such 
unreliable form of information was of limited utility. This point of view might be even more 
convincing if we consider how important successes on the battlefield were to the warriors of this 
time period. After all, if these warriors could not plan their martial endeavours according to 
accurate military intelligence, they would likely not last very long on the frontlines. Similarly, 
the inability to navigate the murky and turbulent waters of Sengoku politics would have led 
many a daimyo astray. Despite the precarious situations the warriors found themselves, rumours 
nevertheless remained an important part of the communication apparatus for many throughout 
the medieval period. Before examining the specifics of some of the rumours Uwai Kakuken 
inscribed in his diary, we need to clarify some significant characteristics of medieval rumours. 
 The first thing that we must address about rumours is the way that they were perceived by 
medieval warriors. While we might be tempted to look at rumours by seeking out their origins, 
this was rarely the impulse shared by warriors in the medieval period. Indeed, it was specifically 
because of their obscured origins combined with their widespread circulation that lent rumours 
an air of respectability and a supernatural aura for the medieval audience. According to Sakai 
Kimi, who wrote extensively on medieval rumours and their utility throughout the Kamakura and 





into society were reasoned as something that surpassed human capabilities in medieval Japan.187 
Lacking any plausible explanations for where rumours came from and how they spread, it was 
believed that rumours were created by spiritual beings such as the kami.188 Extant records from 
the period has also cited the activities of tengu or tenko, mythical creatures commonly translated 
as “goblins” and “fox spirits” respectively, as the reason for the phenomenal spread and 
circulation of rumours within short periods of time.189 Rumours were considered as something 
that was beyond the control of human agency, and to seek out those responsible for starting and 
spreading rumours was thus a fruitless endeavour. As the belief that spiritual forces intervened in 
human affairs was common at the time, it was easy to think of rumours as simply part of this 
larger pattern of supernatural activities. Due to rumours’ association with the supernatural 
however, they also came to embody the will of the kami during the Kamakura and the 
Muromachi periods.190 This in turn meant that to dismiss a rumour as baseless was to challenge 
the will of the kami, and nothing short of providing proof of divine will could someone actually 
do this.191 The difficulty associated with an official dismissal of rumours meant that the content 
of rumours was rarely challenged. Because of this, rumours were accepted as an instrument of 
rule until proven otherwise. 
 Rumours also impacted medieval law enforcement. While rumours by themselves did not 
constitute sufficient evidence for conviction, they nevertheless played a role in the final decision-
making by the various judiciary institutions of the medieval period. Here we once again turn to 
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Sakai’s work, specifically her study of the adjudicatory process of Hōryūji in Nara during the 
first half of the fourteenth century.192 According to Sakai, Hōryūji viewed and gave value to 
evidence in two categories. First was proof substantiated by eyewitness accounts of a crime in 
action or the place where stolen goods were stashed away. The second were graffiti and hearsay, 
both of which fell in the category of rumours. These merely pointed to specific people as 
suspects. However, in conviction, the use of rumours and graffiti was six times more frequent 
than the use of the substantiated proof.193 In other words, in judicial decision-making, rumours 
were significant during the medieval period as part of a larger set of evidence needed to convict 
someone for committing a criminal act. 
 This is not to say that such notions of rumours, stemming mostly from the Kamakura and 
the Muromachi periods, remained unchanged by the time of Kakuken’s writing, or that these 
same notions were equally relevant in every corner of Japan. While the supernatural origins of 
rumours were widely accepted, local authorities did not hesitate to curtail the spread of rumours 
when such rumours were instigating rebellions or uprisings.194 They were, in other words, more 
than willing to work against the supposed will of the kami when it suited their own interests. 
Similarly, rumours circulating within an insular political administration, such as that of a 
daimyo’s household, were generally more thoroughly investigated.195 Without undermining the 
spirituality of rumours, those affected by rumours within a closed system tended to be more 
eager to find the person who started their circulation.196 After all, if the rumours were transmitted 
through the work of the supernatural, surely it would have travelled beyond the walls of a 
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particular household. That the rumours remained within the household must mean that it was the 
work of humans and not spirits.   
 
II. Rumours of Iriki-in Shigetoyo’s Ambitions 
 In examining the effects that rumours had on the political decisions of the Shimazu, the 
case of the Iriki-in and the rumours surrounding their ambitious plan to betray Yoshihisa 
illustrates for us how rumours can be used by the daimyo for his personal gains. Specifically, 
Yoshihisa used the Iriki-in rumours to reinforce his own authority within the Shimazu family and 
protect his image as a filial son. This case also highlights the fact that there were no attempts to 
investigate the validity of the rumours, nor were there any attempts to find their origins. This was 
consistent with the way rumours were treated throughout the medieval era. Instead, the burden of 
proof to show the innocence of the Iriki-in fell on the shoulders of Iriki-in Shigetoyo (d. 1583), 
the leader of the Iriki-in family at the time of the incident. Yoshihisa’s decision to force 
Shigetoyo to do everything he can to disprove the rumours, allowed Yoshihisa to achieve two 
primary objectives. First, Yoshihisa was able to seize control of some of the key Iriki-in 
landholdings on legitimate grounds, thus reinforcing his political legitimacy as the ruler of the 
Shimazu. Second, Yoshihsa managed to reinforce his reputation as a daimyo who exercised his 
power in a measured manner by allowing Shigetoyo to take the initiative in proving his 
innocence. Let us begin by looking at the circumstances that these rumours appeared in the 
historical records.  
 We get a sense of the tension between Iriki-in Shigetoyo and Shimazu Yoshihisa from the 
opening passages of Kakuken’s diary. On the first day of the eighth month of Tenshō 2 (1574), 





Item. This morning it was stated that the sword from Iriki-in (Shigetoyo) should be given 
to our lord as a gift after the presentation of the gift from Tōgō (Shigehisa). The senior 
retainers stated in response, “Since Tōgō, Kedō-in, and Iriki all stemmed from the same 
family, it should be Nejime (Nejime Shigenaga) who presents his sword as a gift next.”  
 
The mediator from Iriki (Satsuma district, Iriki-in Shigetoyo), Murao Kurando said, “As I 
am still inexperience in such matters, I must first return to Danjō-no-chū (Shigetoyo) and 
ask him for his orders. A decision should be made soon.” 
 
The senior retainers reconsidered this and replied, “If one person from that family was 
prioritized before others, it should not matter when the other branch families present their 
gifts.” Despite this, the mediator retired from court without understanding the senior 
retainers’ position nor providing a response. The go-between for this situation was Honda 
(Chikaharu) Inaba-no-kami and myself.197 
 
As this was the first entry of Kakuken’s diary, we were given no context of the underlying 
tension between the Shimazu and the Iriki-in present at this time.  
A brief outline of what was supposed to happen on this specific day can be seen through 
Kakuken’s actions during this event. The first of the eighth month was hassaku, a day for lord 
and vassal to exchange gifts to reaffirm their bonds.198 On this particular day, the many other 
retainers of the Shimazu were set to present their daimyo with gifts as part of a ritualistic gift 
exchange. For example, Kakuken presented Yoshihisa with a single sword and a hundred copper 
coins. In return for these gifts, Yoshihisa awarded Kakuken with a sword and a bow.199 There 
was an underlying political purpose here. With the exchange of gifts, the relationship between a 
lord and his retainers was supposedly reaffirmed. As this relationship formed the basis of 
political power and authority during the Sengoku period, we can easily see why participation in 
this act of gift exchange might be important for retainers and daimyo alike. 
                                                           
197
 Uwai Kakuken, Uwai Kakuken nikki part 1, p. 2. 
198
 Hassaku was a practice that began during the Muromachi period (1336 – 1573). 
199





 In trying to understand the tension between the Shimazu and Murao here, Asakawa 
Kan’ichi contends that Murao’s arrogance was representative of the same attitude held by Iriki-in 
Shigetoyo who was not satisfied with his new subservient position vis-à-vis the Shimazu.200 
Having surrendered to the Shimazu only five years before, the Iriki-in had not fully acclimated 
themselves to Shimazu lordship. Asakawa thus implies that Murao, in representing his lord Iriki-
in Shigetoyo, was purposefully acting in an arrogant manner, which Asakawa presumes to be a 
product of Shigetoyo’s own pride and unwillingness to recognize his new position.201 However, 
a deeper consideration of this particular episode shows Asakawa’s argument to be circumstantial 
at best.  
 First, to accept Asakawa’s claim that Murao’s actions were representative of the 
arrogance displayed by the Iriki-in, we must infer from the text that it was Murao that voiced this 
complaint in the first place. If we look at the actual text as it appears in the diary however, it is 
unclear as to who actually suggested that the Iriki-in should be the ones to present their gift after 
the Tōgō. Later records like the Yoshihisa-kō go-fuchū (The Chronicles of Lord Yoshihisa) and 
the Shimazu kokushi (The Provinical History the Shimazu) suggest that Murao was the one who 
took issue with the order in which gifts were presented. However, since these accounts were 
compiled much later and without reference to any specific historical documents, their accuracy 
remains questionable at best, especially in contrast to the first-hand account presented by 
Kakuken.202  
                                                           
200
 Asakawa, The Documents of Iriki, p. 311. 
201
 Asakawa, The Documents of Iriki, p. 311. 
202
 The Yoshihisa-kō go-fuchū is a generic title given to an eclectic set of documents that were compiled sometime 
during the Tokugawa Period (1603 – 1868). Most of these documents and accounts were of unknown origins, 
though the originals were likely to have existed during the time of its composition. The specific section from which 
this event was recounted is taken from a narrative section of this collection. See Kuroshima, “Shimazu Yoshihisa 
monjo no kisoteki kenkyū,” p. 11. The Shimazu kokushi is an official history commissioned by the twenty-fifth 





 Second, even if we accept that the complaints were voiced by Murao, we must also 
dismiss his claims of inexperience as a mediator for Asakawa’s argument to make sense. Since 
there are no extant evidence that could provide us with more information on the identity of 
Murao, we cannot say with any degree of certainty whether or not he was truly inexperienced.203 
Furthermore, a supposed sense of arrogance must also be attributed to Iriki-in Shigetoyo, who 
had no direct control over the way his mediators would act and represent him in the Shimazu 
court. Even if Shigetoyo was displeased with his position relative to the Shimazu, he could not 
remotely control the way Murao acted in his stead. As such, there should be a separation between 
Murao’s disrespect towards the Shimazu and the supposed malicious intentions harboured by 
Shigetoyo. 
 Third, Asakawa also cited Murao’s failure to present Shigetoyo’s gift before his 
departure as another sign of the arrogance of the Iriki-in.204 Given that it was hassaku, we could 
interpret Murao’s failure to deliver Shigetoyo’s gift to the Shimazu as a symbolic dismissal of 
the bonds between the Iriki-in and the Shimazu. This claim however runs into the same 
difficulties as the previous claim with regards to the intentions behind Murao’s actions. 
Specifically, we must assume that Murao was lying with regards to his inexperience in order for 
us to justify this act as an indication of arrogance. We must also assume that there is a consistent 
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attitude between the Iriki-in family on the one hand, and their mediators on the other hand. 
Unfortunately, we simply do not have enough evidence to suggest that this was the case.  
 What can help us in explaining the tension between the Iriki-in and the Shimazu however 
is the presence of the rumours during hassaku. The first time Kakuken explicitly mentioned the 
rumours surrounding Iriki-in Shigetoyo was on the eighth day of the eighth month of Tenshō 2 
(1574); 
With regards to the reply from Iriki-in in response to what was stated last month, it was 
received by Honda (Chikasada) Shimotsuke-no-kami, Ijichi (Shigehide) Kage,205 and 
myself. Yamaguchi (Shigeaki) Chikuzen-no-kami and Tōgō (Shigemae?) Mimasaka-no-
kami represented Iriki-in and delivered this reply to us at the Gomasho. It states that, 
“When I was in service at court last month and rumours surrounding my ambition was 
mentioned, my lord dismissed such matter with a single utterance, thus securing my 
possessions – for that I am truly grateful. I understand that, as my lord suggested, since it 
is unreasonable to expect others to serve alongside someone harboring such ambitions, I 
should do something to openly prove my innocence. I therefore submit my landholdings 
to my lord. As to which holdings specifically are to be transferred, I await the decisions 
of the senior retainers.” 
 
I relayed this message to Murata (Tsunesada) and Hirata (Masamune), who told me to 
report this to my lord. As it appeared that my lord was not in a good mood, I did not 
report this matter to him.206 
 
From this passage, it is clear that the rumours surrounding Iriki-in Shigetoyo was already in 
circulation by the time of hassaku, and may have played a part in the tension between Murao and 
the senior retainers of the Shimazu. 
Notably, this solution proposed by Shigetoyo arrived at Kagoshima after hassaku. As 
such it is not unreasonable to suggest that rumours of the Iriki-in’s ambition likey strained the 
relationship between the Shimazu and the Iriki-in. The presence of these rumours likely affected 
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the way the Shimazu administration treated Shigetoyo and his mediator. By taking into account 
the presences of these rumours, we can begin to make sense of how communication between the 
Shimazu and the Iriki-in broke down during the event of the first of the eighth month. 
 It is important to keep in mind that the first of the eighth month was an occasion for the 
reaffirmation of the lord-vassal relationship. The presence of these rumours challenges the 
validity of Asakawa’s explanation for Murao’s actions.207 As the rumours were already in 
circulation, it made little sense for Shigetoyo to act in such an arrogant manner on hassaku, only 
for him to retract this position and submit his landholdings to Yoshihisa as an act of loyalty a 
week later. Seen from this perspective, it is hard to argue that Murao’s actions were purely done 
out of arrogance that either he or his lord felt. Whatever logic Murao was operating with, 
arrogance was unlikely to be the primary factor here.  
 Similarly, we cannot assume that the decisions rendered by the senior retainers after two 
separate rounds of deliberations were a simple reaction toward the supposed arrogance of the 
Iriki-in. Given the somewhat turbulent history between the Shimazu and the Iriki-in, there were 
plenty of reasons for the senior retainers to be biased against the Iriki-in. If we are to assume that 
Shigetoyo was arrogant because he was not accustomed to Shimazu lordship, we must also 
assume that the Shimazu were eager to put the Iriki-in in their place as subordinates. Viewed 
from this perspective, we can begin to see how the very declaration of Murao’s arrogance would 
fit within a larger plan to reinforce the legitimacy of the Shimazu as the overlords of the Iriki-in. 
The rumours of Shigetoyo’s ambitions and the ambiguity of the situation at the time of hassaku 
gave the Shimazu retainers enough reasons to portray Murao and Shigetoyo as arrogant and 
unruly. These rumours could also contribute to the senior retainers’ decision to deny Murao’s 
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request. Whatever the actual reasons, the senior retainers’ decision communicated loudly and 
clearly that the reinforcement of the lord-vassal relationship between the Shimazu and the Iriki-
in would only be done on the Shimazu’s terms. 
The above entry also gives us valuable insight as to how daimyo like Yoshihisa managed 
to render himself as a benevolent ruler while manipulating his retainers into giving him what he 
wants. Key to Yoshihisa’s plans was his own dismissal of these rumour’s validity with regards to 
Shigetoyo’s treachery. By reassuring Shigetoyo that Yoshihisa himself did not believe in such 
rumours, Yoshihisa reframed himself into an impartial actor throughout this entire incident. In 
this context, rumours of Shigetoyo’s disloyalty was a problem only in so far as it disrupted the 
relationship among his fellow retainers. Any actions taken by Shigetoyo to prove his innocence 
will thus be seen as voluntary acts of a retainer done for the benefit of the collective, instead of a 
set of punitive measures enforced by the daimyo. Furthermore, by explicitly stating his trust in 
Shigetoyo at the onset, Yoshihisa prevented any potential appeals for an investigation into both 
the origin and the validity of the rumours. The task set for Shigetoyo was not to show the 
falsities of the rumours but to display his supposed loyalty to the Shimazu for all his peers to see. 
 Another important element with regards to rumours and political decisions that can be 
gleaned from the above passage is the method through which innocence and loyalty could be 
proven by retainers during the Sengoku period. As was suggested in the previous section, since 
rumours were considered as a vehicle for transmitting divine will on a spiritual level, disproving 
it would be close to impossible. As such, a much more effective and efficient way of dispelling 
notions of disloyalty was to simply relinquish one’s resources that were vital to a potential 






 While Shigetoyo was being placed under tremendous pressure to prove himself due to 
these rumours, Yoshihisa had plenty to gain by their circulation. Yoshihisa’s declaration of trust 
from the very beginning was nothing but a façade that had little political impact on the larger 
Shimazu administration. After all, Yoshihisa had the power to dismiss all doubts within the ranks 
of his own retainers through official proclamations. If the comfort of his retainers in serving 
alongside someone suspected of being overly ambitious was truly a concern, Yoshihisa had the 
power to dispel such discomfort at his fingertips. That he chose not to issue any proclamations 
about it and instead demanded Shigetoyo to prove his loyalty to his peers through actions that 
only benefitted Yoshihisa suggests that he was not motivated by the wellbeing of his retainers 
per se. This allowed Yoshihisa to de-escalate the situation by reassuring Shigetoyo that he was 
not in immediate danger, set an example to other retainers operating within the Shimazu 
administration, make implicit demands of Shigetoyo, and if such rumours were in fact true, 
undermine the political and military power of the Iriki-in. Yoshihisa’s actions allowed him to 
achieve all of these objectives while maintaining the image of being a just and magnanimous 
ruler. By relinquishing his own holdings, Shigetoyo would thus satisfy all of Yoshihisa’s 
motivations for acting in this manner in the first place.  
 This brief entry of the Kakuken’s diary illustrates how rumours supposedly dismissed by 
the daimyo could still impact the daimyo’s administration as retainers work to prove their 
loyalty. We can also see that the validity of the rumours meant very little in the larger scheme of 
things, especially when the parties involved were more concerned with how they can take 
advantage of the situation than finding out the truth behind the rumours. Both Yoshihisa and 
Shigetoyo were focused on finding a mutually beneficial resolution instead of actually 





him to dispel any potential suspicions Yoshihisa might have held towards the Iriki-in.  On the 
other hand, Yoshihisa managed to minimize a potential domestic disturbance by forcing 
Shigetoyo to voluntarily submit his landholding while also maintaining a positive public image 
of Yoshihisa as the daimyo of the Shimazu. Both parties got what they wanted, but it was 
Yoshihisa who had gained more in this exchange.    
 Now that we have looked at how rumours had a direct effect on the way the Iriki-in and 
the Shimazu interacted with each other we can continue our examination of these rumours and 
how they were utilized by Yoshihisa. As noted above, Shigetoyo had previously petitioned 
Yoshihisa and suggested that he should return his landholdings to Yoshihisa as proof of the Iriki-
in’s innocence. From the way that Yoshihisa chose to respond to this proposal, we can see both 
the possible motivations of Yoshihisa in his actions, and how Yoshihisa potentially utilized these 
rumours as a political weapon.  
After the petition by Shigetoyo for returning his landholdings to Yoshihisa on the eighth 
day of the eighth month of Tenshō 2 (1574) was received by the senior retainers, the matter was 
eventually relayed to Yoshihisa. Upon hearing of this, Yoshihisa decided that with regards to 
these landholdings, he will leave it to the senior retainers to decide what to do with them. 
However, before letting his retainers do their job, Yoshihisa noted that “if we specified how 
much of his landholdings he should submit, then it would appear as though I mentioned these 
rumours for the sake of getting his landholdings. Maybe we should give him ten chō of land in 
return for every ten chō he submits, so that similar amounts of lands were exchanged.”208 
Yoshihisa is clearly concerned with how others might see him as a selfish and retributive ruler 
who stirred up rumours for his own gains. While we do not have definitive evidence to prove 
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this, it is strange that he explicitly stated that he did not want to be blamed for the rumours when 
no one else ever made an issue of it. That no other statements like this were ever made by 
Yoshihisa before or after this episode within Kakuken’s diary also renders Yoshihisa’s statement 
somewhat suspicious.  
A later account of Shigetoyo’s rumours found in the Yoshihisa-kō go-fuchū also 
highlights Yoshihisa’s concern over his own reputation, but frames it in a manner that renders 
him into an enlightened and forgiving ruler. 
Iriki-in Danjō-no-chū’s plan to plot against us was already revealed, and even children 
and servants knew about his schemes. Though he is to be punished without being warned, 
this cannot be seen as a despotic act. Regarding this, three mediators were sent to Danjō-
no-chū last month and told him, “Though you wish to hide your treachery it is too late. 
Yoshihisa has decided that, if you do not change your ways, he will send troops and 
cause great turmoil in your land, but this is not what he wants. If you correct the errors of 
your way and prove your loyalty, then all will be forgiven right away.”209 
 
According to this particular rendition of the message sent, while there were no overt calls for 
Shigetoyo to give up his holdings, the threat of violence was real and would likely be enough of 
a motivation for Shigetoyo to voluntarily give up his landholdings. The emphasis here is for 
Yoshihisa to not appear despotic, and that despite being able to attack and punish Shigetoyo 
Yoshihisa chose to give him a chance to prove his loyalty instead. 
 Whether or not it was explicitly stated, the implied threat of violence was likely ever-
present throughout the entire situation created by these rumours. Given the gravity of these 
rumours, we should expect that military actions against Shigetoyo had always been a possibility. 
Beyond the threat of retaliation however, the account in the Yoshihisa-kō go-fuchū merits further 
examination as it presents a very different Yoshihisa from the one we read about in Kakuken’s 
diary. While both the Yoshihisa-kō go-fuchū and Kakuken’s diary showed Yoshihisa as someone 
                                                           





concerned with his reputation, the motivations depicted are very different. In the case of the 
Yoshihisa-kō go-fuchū, Yoshihisa was altruistic and magnanimous, providing Shigetoyo a chance 
at redemption while showing restraint when it came to the use of force. Kakuken’s writing 
however shows a ruler fearful of being judged by others. In the case of the latter, Yoshihisa was 
not spurred to act because he wanted to give a second chance to Shigetoyo. Instead, Yoshihisa’s 
actions were motivated by the need to protect his own image. The former acted for the good of 
his retainers while the latter acted for himself. 
In order for us to tease out some of the factors affecting Yoshihisa’s decisions we need to 
once again address the reliability of the Yoshihisa-kō go-fuchū. As this is a record complied 
many years after the actual events recorded in it, specific details in the Yoshihisa-kō go-fuchū 
might not entirely be accurate.  A look at how Yoshihisa-kō go-fuchū characterizes Shigetoyo’s 
response from the eighth day of the eighth month of Tenshō 2 (1574) can clearly illustrate the 
biases inherent in this particular work; 
Danjō-no-chū suddenly changed his evil intents, and on the eighth day of the eighth 
month of Tenshō 2, sent his retainer Yamaguchi Chikuzen and Tōgō Mimasaka to 
petition his humble opinion: “As I am predisposed to carelessness, that I have held the 
ambitions of one without any possessions in the past has led to rumours of treachery, 
suddenly endangering both me and my household. Still my lord gave me the opportunity 
to change my ways to one of kindness, allowing me to devote this kindness to 
establishing my house. How can I turn my back to such courteous benevolence? I thus 
immediately kneel before our lord’s flag. If I cannot accumulate loyalty and merit then I 
cannot show my fidelity as a retainer. As such, I present to my lord my 
landholdings.”…210 
 
The tone of Shigetoyo’s message here is dramatically different from that which was recorded in 
the Uwai Kakuken nikki, While in both instances, Shigetoyo showed gratitude toward 
Yoshihisa’s understanding and support for the Iriki-in, the version found in the Yoshihisa-kō go-
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fuchū seems hyperbolic to say the least. While both accounts noted that Shigetoyo thanked 
Yoshihisa for dismissing the rumours surrounding the Iriki-in and thus protected Shigetoyo’s 
landholdings and possessions, the gratitude shown by Shigetoyo in the Yoshihisa-kō go-fuchū is 
greatly exaggerated. In the Yoshihisa-kō go-fuchū account, Shigetoyo not only gave praise to 
Yoshihisa’s magnanimity, but also explicitly called Yoshihisa an ideal lord through references to 
his “benevolence” 211 while depreciating himself as a careless retainer who willingly kneeled to 
Yoshihisa’s rule. Shigetoyo’s claims of trying to prove his own loyalty to his colleagues were 
replaced with a narrative that shows Shigetoyo being compelled to give up on his ambitions by 
his a priori need to serve the benevolent Yoshihisa. 
 A simple explanation of these differences can be attributed to two primary factors. First, 
since these are not first-hand accounts, it is entirely possible that the exchange between 
Shigetoyo and Yoshihisa was simply not recorded accurately by compilers of the Yoshihisa-kō 
go-fuchū. Second and perhaps more likely, given that this particular set of documents were 
compiled and created during the Tokugawa period, the compilers might have taken the liberties 
to render the historical narrative within a Neo-Confucian moral framework. Notions of Neo-
Confucian ideals of kingship can be seen throughout this particular account of the event, namely 
through the focus on Yoshihisa as a “benevolent” ruler, his unwillingness to use force to resolve 
the matter, and how his benevolence can compel others to serve him. Yet even within this 
context, we cannot deny the threat of violence implicit in Yoshihisa’s “benevolent” message. 
After all an unwillingness to utilize a military solution implies both the ability to and the restraint 
from pursuing such violent methods.   
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 Despite their differences, these accounts illustrate clearly that the presence of the rumours 
gave Yoshihisa an opportunity to garner political advantage over his own retainers and further 
consolidate his power. He did this through absorbing and redistributing landholdings of 
Shigetoyo, and in the process ensures that Shigetoyo’s possession of these landholdings was 
granted through the blessing of Yoshihisa. Such a use of rumours for the reaffirmation of a 
daimyo’s legitimacy seemed to be a common enough occurrence that Yoshihisa felt the need to 
pre-emptively defend himself from the negative fallout of such actions. This same concern was 
stated again the next day, the eleventh of the eighth month, when the messengers of Iriki-in came 
with another proposal; 
Item. Eleventh day. I attended court as usual. This morning the mediators from Iriki-in, 
Tōgō Mimasaka and Yamaguchi Chikuzen came to deliver a message. They were 
received in the Gomasho by Hon-Noshū (Honda Chikasada), I-Kanmoshi (Ijichi 
Shigehide), and myself. Their message read, “[…] While it was decided that the exact 
holdings to be submitted will be determined by the senior retainers, I once again come to 
you with a suggestion. As I am currently in possession of four other myō212 besides 
Kiyoshiki (Satsuma district), namely Yamada, Amadatsu, Tasaki, and Yoshida (all within 
the same district), I wish to submit these four myō of land to my lord.” 
 
This message was presented to Yoshihisa who responded, “If I was to accept all of these 
holdings, it would appear as though I wanted them in the first place. As such for each 
holdings submitted one of similar size should be given in return. With regards to 
Yoshida, since it was Hakuyō (Shimazu Takahisa) who granted this holding to the Iriki-in 
so that they can have some land next to the sea, it will be difficult for me to change the 
ownership of this holding.”…213 
 
Here again we see Yoshihisa concerned with his own reputation as a ruler. This passage also 
hints at the possibility that other retainers might see the land acquisition as a punitive and selfish 
act, and how this possibility formed a portion of Yoshihisa’s larger concern over his own image. 
We can see this through his hesitation towards removing Yoshida from Shigetoyo’s possession. 
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Importantly, Yoshihisa felt that such a decision would run directly counter to his father’s will. As 
Yoshihisa’s father, Takahisa, has passed away in Genki 2 (1571), Yoshihisa was clearly not 
worried about being reprimanded by Takahisa for undermining him. Yohihisa’s decision makes 
sense if we consider how the Iriki-in came into possession of the landholdings listed above. 
Through such an examination, it will be clear that Yoshihisa’s acquisition of Yamada, Amadatsu, 
and Tasaki was done specifically to reinforce Yoshihisa and his family’s legitimacy as the 
overlords of the Iriki-in because these three holdings were not given to the Iriki-in by Yoshihisa 
or his immediate predecessors. Kiyoshiki and Yoshida however, were granted to the Iriki-in by 
Yoshihisa’s father and thus were left untouched in this transaction. 
 The significance of allowing Iriki-in Shigetoyo to maintain control over Yoshida cannot 
be overstated here. As we have discussed in the introduction to this dissertation, due to the poor 
agricultural capability of southern Kyushu, landholdings with access to the sea was extremely 
valuable. The overall lack of agricultural production meant that access to maritime trade allowed 
samurai to have a much more robust revenue stream. If Yoshihisa was truly fearful of a potential 
Iriki-in rebellion, then crippling the Iriki-in’s economy by denying them access to the sea would 
be the most logical step to take. Yoshihisa’s refusal to take this step further suggests that 
Yoshihisa was likely more concerned with his own reputation than the military threat posed by 
the possibility of an Iriki-in rebellion in general. 
 With regards to Yoshihisa’s need to reinforce his own legitimacy in the Shimazu 
administration, we have noted previously that Yoshihisa’s branch of the Shimazu family was not 
the primary line of the Shimazu prior to the ascendancy of Yoshihisa’s grandfather. After their 
rise to power within the Shimazu family, one of the primary methods of establishing their 





exemplified by Shimazu Takahisa’s decision to staff his newly established administration with 
equal numbers of retainers from the overthrown regime and from his personal retinue.214 The 
desire for continuation and stability explains why Yoshihisa declined the submission of Yoshida 
from Shigetoyo as appropriate to the current situation, for the very acceptance of Yoshida would 
not only undermine the stability granted by Yoshihisa’s father, but also colour Yoshihisa as an 
unfilial son. By respecting the decision made by Takahisa, Yoshihisa thus reinforces his branch 
family’s legitimacy and paints himself as respectful of precedents as established by his father. 
 If the continuation of the decisions made by his predecessors was the concern, then 
Yoshihisa did not need to show the same degree of restraint when it came to the other holdings 
Shigetoyo forfeited. According to Shigetoyo’s suggestion, he wanted to submit Yamada, 
Amadatsu, Tasaki, and Yoshida to Yoshihisa while maintaining control over Kiyoshiki. Unlike 
the other four myō, Kiyoshiki was not up of consideration here and it was a decision that 
Yoshihisa respected. Kiyoshiki was never mentioned again as a possible holding for transfer. 
Unsurprisingly, the Iriki-in’s possession of Kiyoshiki was confirmed by Yoshihisa’s father on 
the first month of Genki 1 (1570), shortly after the Iriki-in’s surrender to the Shimazu at the end 
of the previous year.215 That neither Shigetoyo nor Yoshihisa ever suggested Kiyoshiki as a 
landholding that should be consider was likely not a coincidence. This could also mean that there 
was a mutual understanding as to what was happening here. Both parties involved knew 
Yoshihisa was never concerned with landholdings his father had previously confirmed, and that, 
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in reality, the rumours were never about Shigetoyo’s ambitions at all but rather his semi-
ambiguous relationship with Yoshihisa’s particular branch of the Shimazu family. 
 The situation surrounding Yamada, Amadatsu, and Tasaki is quite different from Yoshida 
and Kiyoshiki. These three holdings were already controlled by the Shibuya family, the main 
family that the Iriki-in family splintered from, and was passed on internally to the Iriki-in at least 
as early as Eiden 1 (1490).216 Only the Iriki-in’s control over Yamada myō was ever reaffirmed 
by the Shimazu, but unlike Kiyoshiki or Yoshida, Yamada myō was reaffirmed by Shimazu 
Tachihisa in Kanshō 3 (1462), who was a daimyo from a branch of the Shimazu different from 
that of Yoshihisa and his father.217 As for Amadatsu and Tasaki, there are no extant records that 
show either of these holdings were officially confirmed by the Shimazu at all.218 This 
commonality between these three holdings is important in understanding the possible 
motivations behind Yoshihisa’s action with regards to the rumours of Shigetoyo’s ambition. The 
Iriki-in’s possession of Yamada, Amadatsu, and Tasaki can be seen as illegitimate from 
Yoshihisa’s perspective, thus the resubmission of these holdings by Shigetoyo was not only 
justifiable but preferable in Yoshihisa’s eyes. Even if Yoshihisa decided to let Shigetoyo keep all 
of the suggested holdings, the crucial point here is that Shigetoyo would now only be in 
possession of these holdings not by inheritance or the authority of rival Shimazu branches, but by 
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the grace of Yoshihisa. In this manner, Yoshihisa reaffirms the political dominance of his own 
branch of the Shimazu at the expense of his real or imagined rivals. While it is impossible to say 
with complete certainty whether or not this was Yoshihsa’s plan initially, this was certainly an 
outcome that benefited Yoshihisa. Regardless of his intentions, Yoshihisa capitalized on the 
opportunity generated by these rumours in a way that reinforced his legitimacy while also 
maintained his reputation as a ruler and a son.219  
 Unfortunately, extant records do not show the ultimate resolution of these rumours 
surrounding the Iriki-in. While evidence suggests that the land holdings of Yamada, Amadatsu, 
and Tasaki myō were given to Yoshihisa, what Shigetoyo received in return remains unclear. No 
extant documents detailing this land exchange itself exist. The closest confirmation of the 
transaction comes from an entry from Uwai Kakuken’s diary detailing a petition from Shimazu 
Iehisa, in which he asked to be placed in control of Yamada, Amadatsu, and Tasaki in exchange 
for his own holding of Kumanojō.220  
One of the key things to take away from this entire affair surrounding the rumours of 
Shigetoyo was Yoshihisa’s concern over how he will be perceived and judged by others. It is 
clear that Shigetoyo’s relinquishment of land was common knowledge within the Shimazu 
administration itself.221 As it was impossible for this land exchange to take place without people 
knowing, Yoshihisa’s concern for how people would judge him was not completely 
unreasonable. Yoshihisa’s concern was also echoed by his younger brother Iehisa. While trying 
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to convince Yoshihisa to give him these holdings, Iehisa said to the senior retainers that “with 
regards to this matter with Iriki-in, as Chūsho [Iehisa] was one of the people involved in talking 
about these rumours, it will be troublesome if people think he did so because he coveted Iriki-
in’s holdings in the first place.”222 Both this statement by Iehisa, and the general concern shown 
by Yoshihisa suggest that both the Shimazu brothers were at least aware of the conflict of 
interest at play here. Both brothers wanted to capitalize on the situation, and both of them tried to 
resolve this conflict of interest by controlling the narrative. Rather than giving up this chance, 
both Yoshihisa and Iehisa instead attempted to spin the narrative in a way that makes themselves 
the reluctant recipients of an unwanted fortune, thus allowing them to get what they wanted 
without having to risk their own reputations. 
As I have suggested here, what were at stake throughout the exchange between the 
Shimazu and the Iriki-in were issues surrounding reputation and legitimacy. Careful utilization 
of the rumours surrounding Shigetoyo’s ambitions allowed Yoshihisa to maintain his façade of 
magnanimity, re-legitimize his own position as the lord of the Shimazu vis-à-vis the Iriki-in, and 
weaken the Iriki-in just in case these rumours were true. By repeatedly emphasizing the risks to 
Yoshihisa’s reputation through the Shimazu’s absorption of Shigetoyo’s holdings, both the 
senior retainers and Yoshihisa seem to be overcompensating for their motivations behind their 
actions. By granting Shigetoyo new landholdings that Yoshihisa personally affirmed in exchange 
for landholdings the Iriki-in had inherited or were granted by other Shimazu branches, the 
lordship Yoshihisa held over Shigetoyo was solidified. The rumours surrounding Shigetoyo was 
simply a political tool. These rumours presented Yoshihisa with a chance to reinforce his 
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reputation and legitimacy. The truth behind the rumours was ultimately irrelevant throughout the 
interactions between these two families.  
Further evidence for Yoshihisa’s indifference towards truth or facts buried beneath 
rumours in the face of his own interests can be seen in the way he handled Hirata Kunai-no-shō’s 
request for a landholding exchange. Still completely concerned with his own reputation as a 
ruler, Yoshihisa continued to wield rumours as a political weapon. Unlike his dealings with 
Shigetoyo however, in the case of the Hirata, Yoshihisa used rumours as an excuse to deny 
Hirata Kunai-no-shō’s request, stating explicitly how the presence of rumours would negatively 
impact his reputation if he were to grant Hirata Kunai-no-shō’s wishes. 
 
III. Rumours of Hirata Kunai-no-shō: A Tale of Poison? 
 The case of Hirata Kunai-no-shō and his petition for a transfer to the landholding of 
Ushine is particularly enlightening for our discussion of Yoshihisa’s possible motivations behind 
his political decisions. In his response to this petition, Yoshihisa explicitly stated that he did not 
care for the truth. Specifically, using the rumours surrounding Hirata Kunai-no-shō and his 
father, Yoshihisa argued that the simple existence of such rumours was enough justification for 
him to deny Hirata Kunai-no-shō’s petition due to the adverse effects such rumours would have 
on Yoshihisa’s own reputation. 
 Despite not having the actual petition from Hirata to Yoshihisa, we do know roughly the 
content of the petition through Kakuken’s diary. On the fourteenth day of the eighth month, 
Tenshō 2 (1574), Kakuken wrote, 
On the deliberation of Hirata Kunai-no-shō’s request to be transferred to Ushine 





[Shimazu Takahisa] in the past. No one knows if this was true or not,223 but the world at 
large has heard of these rumours. As such, if I [Yoshihisa] am to give the slightest 
allowance to Hirata Kunai-no-shō’s request, would the people not think that I have 
forgotten about my own father? Since rumours like these would be most troublesome, his 
transfer cannot be granted.224 
 
In this rare instance, we see Yoshihisa’s explicit disregard for factual validity. Unlike the more 
complicated political discourse he employed when dealing with Shigetoyo, Yoshihisa’s denial of 
Hirata Kunai-no-shō’s request was extremely direct. Yoshihisa would not grant assistance to 
Hirata Kunai-no-shō because people might think Yoshihisa was an unfilial son, one who helps 
those who conspired to kill his father. Only the rumours that might arise from Yoshihisa’s 
assistance figured into the considerations of Yoshihisa for his concern was with how his 
reputation would be affected in the end. 
We might argue that perhaps Yoshihisa was simply using the rumours as a convenient 
excuse to deny Hirata Kunai-no-shō’s request for reasons beyond his own reputation, similar to 
the way Yoshihisa capitalized on the rumours surrounding Shigetoyo for political purposes. This 
however appears to not be the case. When pressed by a member of the senior retainer council, 
Hirata Masamune, Yoshihisa did not in fact give any other reasons as to why he denied Hirata 
Kunai-no-shō. Insteasd, Yoshihisa stated that,  
I commend you [Hirata Masamune] on the depth of your consideration and sympathy. 
However, such matters [like the transfer suggested by Hirata Kunai-no-shō] should be 
discussed between parent and child or husband and wife. Being simply a member of the 
same [Hirata] family should not be enough for you to extend your sympathy into this 
matter.225 
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As Masamune was a member of the senior retainer council, the highest level of decision makers 
within the Shimazu administration, he was privy to the larger political agenda of the 
administration as a whole. Any secret motivations behind Yoshihisa’s reasoning for his denial 
would undoubtedly be known to Masamune, and the failure of Yoshihisa to bring up such 
motivations at all suggests that there were none. That Masamune pressed Yoshihisa on this issue 
at all hints at the possibility that Masamune found Yoshihisa’s response surprising and perhaps 
unorthodox. Unlike with Shigetoyo, there were no recourse to political euphemisms such as 
“loyalty” or “benevolence” in Yoshihisa’s response. What was given instead was an unfiltered 
admission by Yoshihisa, stating that he cared more for his reputation as a ruler and a son than 
any other administrative or military implications his decisions might have. By dismissing 
Masamune’s challenge due to the lack of proper protocol, Yoshihisa did not actually address the 
problem, but rather emphasized the idea that as the daimyo, Yoshihisa did not need to explain 
himself.  
One curious aspect of the relationship between Yoshihisa and Hirata Kunai-no-shō is the 
fact that Yoshihisa continued to allow Hirata Kunai-no-shō to serve the Shimazu despite the 
rumours. Considering Yoshihisa’s concern over his appearance as a filial son, one might be 
surprised to find the lord-vassal relationship intact between the two of them. Unfortunately, the 
lack of information on the precise identity of Hirata Kunai-no-shō and his father means that it is 
next to impossible to provide a satisfying explanation for this. One possibility was that whatever 
happened between Takahisa and Hirata Awa-no-suke, the issue was resolved by Takahisa, thus 
allowing the Hirata to continue their service under the Shimazu. If this was the case, Yoshihisa’s 
continued patronage of Hirata Kunai-no-shō would be a filial act, respecting the decisions of 





maintain his possessions of Kiyoshiki and Yoshida as well. The support of Hirata Kunai-no-shō 
as a Shimazu retainer thus represented the maintenance of a pre-established status quo and an act 
of respect toward Takahisa. Whether or not to grant Hirata Kunai-no-shō’s request however 
seemed to be an entirely different issue. For such a decision breaks with the status quo in a 
manner that directly benefits Hirata Kunai-no-shō. Yoshihisa’s granting of such a request would 
be conceived as unfilial as it would not be the maintenance of a state-of-affair previously 
established. Instead, it would simply be helping the descendants of those who supposedly 
attempted to poison Yoshihisa’s father. From this perspective, we begin to see how a daimyo 
imminently concerned with his own reputation could support the livelihoods of supposed old 
enemies while arguing that granting their requests would be unfilial. The facts behind the 
rumours only mattered if it did not reflect negatively on those who held political power.  
 
IV. Conclusion: Weaponized Words 
 The interactions between Yoshihisa and the rumours that circulated within his 
administration represent a point where the two important factors of Yoshihisa’s decision-making 
process intersected. One the one hand, as we have seen from the cases here, the careful 
management of rumours allowed Yoshihisa to pursue his own agenda without challenge while 
also shielding himself from any potential criticism from his retainers. On the other hand, because 
of the nature of rumours and how they were thought of at the time, this adherence to and 
acceptance of rumours as significant could be understood as a spiritual reaction on the part of 
Yoshihisa. While it is difficult to gauge the amount of faith Yoshihisa had for the kami, that his 





 In the case of Shigetoyo, the repeated assertions made by Yoshihisa regarding the 
relinquishing of Shigetoyo’s landholdings and that this was not something Yoshihisa intended 
hint at Yoshihisa’s potential guilt. Of particular interest to us here however is the fundamental 
sentiment that motivated Yoshihisa’s actions. Namely, Yoshihisa did everything he could to 
protect his image as a just ruler who firmly trusted Shigetoyo. The fact that Yoshihisa expected 
Shigetoyo to reciprocate such trust by proving his own innocence to his peers was swept aside 
for a different narrative, one that showed Yoshihisa’s benevolence and magnanimity instead. We 
see this concern for his own reputation again in the case of Hirata Kunai-no-shō and his request 
for a transfer. Unlike the case with Shigetoyo however, Yoshihisa dropped his façade completely 
in response to Hirata’s request. Here Yoshihisa stated explicitly that because granting Hirata’s 
request will make the world think ill of him as a son, therefore he will not grant such a request. 
Yoshihisa was concerned with abstract ideals such as loyalty or innocence only in so far as how 
such ideals would reflect on his own image as a ruler. What we have here is an unfiltered 
statement of how Yoshihisa’s concern over his image motivated him to make political decisions. 
 In thinking about some of the motivating factors behind the political decision-making 
process, it is important to keep in mind that the very existence of these rumours became part of 
the motivations of both the daimyo and the retainers. We see this in both of the cases we have 
looked at in this chapter. During the events at hassaku of Tenshō 2 (1574), it is reasonable to 
assume that the existence of the rumours surrounding Shigetoyo affected the treatment his 
mediator received at the Shimazu court. While these events would later be characterized as one 
that showed the arrogance of the Iriki-in, such accounts were drafted by the Shimazu many years 
later and thus remain dubious. This effect rumours had on the political decision-making is again 





poisoning of Takahisa clearly motivated Yoshihisa to reject Hirata’s request. The truth behind 
these rumours was either assumed or irrelevant. Rumours by themselves were enough of a 
motivating factor to directly impact the political decisions of the daimyo and his retainers.  
 Beyond all of this, through the weaponizing of rumours that circulated within the 
Shimazu administration, Yoshihisa managed to push forward with his own agenda. We see this 
primarily with the case of Iriki-in Shigetoyo. It was not a coincidence that all the landholdings 
accepted by Yoshihisa were holdings that were not approved by Yoshihisa or his direct 
predecessors. This is especially true when we consider the reasons for Yoshihisa’s preclusion of 
Kiyoshiki and Yoshida as part of the landholding exchange. Yoshihisa used these rumours to 
force Shigetoyo into a position where he would have to renew his pledge of loyalty to the 
Shimazu through Yoshihisa’s authority. In this light, the events at hassaku can also be 
understood as a deliberate course of action designed to deny the renewal of the lord-vassal bonds 
between Yoshihisa and Shigetoyo, thus leaving the latter with no other choice but to voluntarily 
give up his landholdings. 
 All in all, while the daimyo might not have control over the truthfulness and the accuracy 
of the information he received from both the official and unofficial channels of communication, 
he managed to circumvent this systemic flaw by dismissing the necessity for truth altogether. 
The value of any information lies in how the daimyo could wield them to his advantage, up to 
and including the ambiguous nature of said information. In their minds, this lack of clarity with 
information was a feature that generated value, and not a problem to be solved. As such there 







On Familial Forces 
 
We have so far established that one of the key factors of consideration that dominated the 
decision-making process of Yoshihisa and the Shimazu senior retainers was the need to reinforce 
their own positions within the larger administrative system. In considering how Yoshihisa sought 
to protect his own interests and what he cared about, we must expand the scope of our 
examination beyond Yoshihisa’s own person and look at how Yoshihisa treated his family. This 
is what the current chapter will explore. Specifically, this chapter will investigate how the 
involvement of direct family members affected the political decision-making process of the 
daimyo. Through the investigation of three specific cases in this chapter, we will see that the 
wellbeing of his brothers, parents, and children was a crucial part of Yoshihisa’s concerns. 
Perhaps unsurprisingly, Yoshihisa displayed a degree of leniency and empathy when it came to 
members of his own family unfounded within Yoshihisa’s treatment of the other retainers of the 
Shimazu administration. As such, the involvement of various Shimazu family members had a 
direct impact upon Yoshihisa’s political decision-making process as he navigated to protect and 
show favour towards his own family. Further, Yoshihisa’s concern for the members of the 
Shimazu family also fits snuggly within his broader concerns with the legitimacy of his 
particular branch of the Shimazu as internal struggles between brothers would undoubtedly 





 In this chapter, we will look at three particular instances that highlight Yoshihisa’s family 
and how their involvement impacted Yoshihisa’s decisions. In order to fully appreciate how 
Yoshihisa’s family members affected him, these three particular instances are selected 
specifically as they all dealt with similar cases we have seen in previous chapters, but with the 
added twist of being incidents that directly involved the immediate family members of 
Yoshihisa.  
 Through the examination of these three cases, we will see the impact Yoshihisa’s 
protective attitude toward his family had upon his decision-making process. The actions taken by 
Yoshihisa as they are illustrated in this chapter could be seen as consistent with Yoshihisa’s 
overall goal of protecting his own image: a filial son, a protective brother, and a loving father. 
This in turn gave Yoshihisa political leverage as well. By showing favouritism towards his 
family, it could reduce the likelihood that Yoshihisa’s authority as the leader of the Shimazu be 
challenged by his brothers who technically had an equal claim to the leadership position. 
Similarly, by being lenient towards his son-in-law, Yoshihisa discouraged any potential 
ambitions this son-in-law might have. In this manner, Yoshihisa’s concerns for his family 
intertwined with his goal of reinforcing his reputation and his wish to protect his own position as 
the daimyo of the Shimazu. 
 
I. The Youngest of the Shimazu and False Information 
For this first case, we will return to the interactions between the Shimazu and the Nyūta 
in Tenshō 13 (1585). Here we will focus on Shimazu Iehisa, the youngest brother of Yoshihisa, 
and his work as a mediator between the Shimazu and Nyūta. Like Uwai Kakuken, Iehisa was 





Nyūta on several occasions. Of particular interest for us is that, unlike Kakuken who was 
chastised for trying to elicit help from the shugo-dai, Iehisa suffered no consequences for his 
actions. This was by no means due to the relative severity of the offense committed by Iehisa in 
contrast to Kakuken. Iehisa fabricated false military intelligence and submitted them to 
Yoshihisa in an attempt to coax his older brother into action. If not for the caution taken by 
Kakuken, Yoshihisa would have fallen for Iehisa’s lies and be entangled in a military offensive 
that Yoshihisa did not want to be a part of. The lack of consequences faced by Iehisa suggests 
that Yoshihisa was not motivated to act in an impartial manner when it comes to punishing his 
brothers as subordinates. 
 Amongst the four Shimazu siblings, Iehisa stood at a somewhat unique position. Shimazu 
Iehisa was the youngest of the Shimazu brothers. Furthermore, while each of the Shimazu 
siblings were separated by two years of age, Iehisa did not fall into this pattern. Unlike his three 
older brothers, Shimazu Iehisa was fourteen years younger than Shimazu Yoshihisa, the oldest of 
the four, and ten years younger than Shimazu Toshihisa (1537 – 1592) who would be the closet 
to Iehisa’s age.  
This difference in age seemed to have affected the relationship between Iehisa and 
Yoshihisa, as it is not uncommon to see Yoshihisa taking a much more informal tone with Iehisa, 
speaking in a manner closer to what we might expect of siblings. In his dealings with Iehisa we 
can also see how Yoshihisa emphasized the familial nature of this interaction. By seeing Iehisa 
more as his brother than as his retainer, Yoshihisa inadvertently allowed himself to treat Iehisa 
with a greater degree of leniency and understanding in contrast to the way he treated other 
Shimazu retainers. We see this in Kakuken’s diary entry for the eighteenth day of the eighth 





Item. Eighteenth day. I attended court as usual. I alone relayed to our lord the petition that 
Chūsho [Iehisa] submitted to the senior retainers.  
 
Our lord states, “With regards to exchanging away Nishida-myō, I cannot even begin to 
understand his reasoning. I do not understand because he said there were constant 
problems with his holding of Kumanojō. Despite this, he never bothered to inquire into 
these problems, and instead he asks for an exchange when there are difficulties? What 
kind of reasoning is that?  
 
“Furthermore, he wants the Yamada holding for this exchange. This is a holding with a 
castle, and as such needs to be handled differently than any other regular holdings. How 
can he ask me for a castle? Especially now, when Kingo (Shimazu Toshihisa) is already 
watching and complaining about [Iehisa’s] landholdings. If I give him what he wants, I 
will never hear the end of it.”226 
 
From this passage, we can ascertain several things about the Shimazu siblings and how they 
decided on their course of action. First, Iehisa, being the youngest by a significant margin, was 
treated with excessive leniency and favour by Yoshihisa. This favouritism can be gleaned from 
Shimazu Toshihisa’s complaints regarding Iehisa’s landholdings. While it is difficult to say 
whether Toshihisa’s objections were a response to his own jealousy, what is clear is that Iehisa 
was seen as being treated with a degree of favouritism different from the others within the ranks 
of the Shimazu retainers.  
Second, this passage suggests that Iehisa, like his older brother, was primarily concerned 
with his own agenda. In this particular instance, it was Iehisa’s own peace of mind with regards 
to the problems he faced at Kumanojō that was likely his primary concern. In this sense, Iehisa’s 
request exemplifies the logical result of favouring personal goals at the expense of all other 
concerns. From the above passage, it is clear that the only reason Iehisa wished to exchange his 
landholdings for new ones was due to domestic problems in Kumanojō. Since Iehisa only wanted 
to alleviate himself of the problems he was facing, the quickest and easiest solution to the 
                                                           
226





domestic problems in Kumanojō was to simply ask for a different landholding, and leave the 
problems of Kumanojō to the next person appointed to it.  
Finally, this passage also highlights the familial nature of Yoshihisa’s political decision-
making process. We see this through Yoshihisa’s reasoning. Yoshihisa argued that the reason 
why he cannot grant Iehisa his request was due to the possibility of Toshihisa’s incessant 
complaints. Yoshihisa’s citing of Toshihisa’s complaints as his primary motivator underscores 
the unofficial nature of this entire interaction between the two brothers. By framing Iehisa’s 
demands within the context of brothers not getting along with each other, Yoshihisa turned this 
request into a family affair. In this framework, Iehisa was not an unreasonable retainer, but a 
younger brother too lazy to deal with his own problems. Similarly, Toshihisa was not a retainer 
who was upset at the favouritism within the court and a potential threat to the Shimazu family, 
but another sibling whose complaints bothered Yoshihisa. With this window into the relationship 
between Yoshihisa and his brothers, let us continue our investigation into Iehisa’s interactions 
with the Nyūta and the consequences of his action relative to those suffered by Kakuken for 
committing similar but lesser offences.  
 As stated before, Iehisa was one of the two primary points of contact with the Nyūta 
before the Nyūta established formal ties with Uwai Kakuken in Tenshō 14 (1586). It was Iehisa 
who first told Kakuken that the Nyūta was ready to officially sever their ties with the Ōtomo, and 
pushed for the overall support of the Nyūta from the Shimazu.227 Yet, Iehisa’s push for the 
Shimazu to act in this regard also resulted in nothing. Unlike Kakuken who decided to eventually 
give up his active support of the Nyūta however, Iehisa decided to create false military 
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intelligence in order to force Yoshihisa’s hand in granting his wishes. In other words, Iehisa 
conjured false information in order to goad his brother into action. 
 The situation of Iehisa’s false information was recorded by Kakuken in his diary. 
According to Kakuken, Iehisa had initially pushed for providing military support for the Nyūta 
on the twentieth day of the eleventh month of Tenshō 13 (1585) by suggesting that the Nyūta 
were ready to betray the Ōtomo on the twenty-fourth day of the same month.228 However, due to 
the kuji conducted on the following day, it was requested that if the Nyūta wished to betray the 
Ōtomo they should do so on the thirtieth instead.229 Despite this request, Yoshihisa’s mediator 
met with Kakuken two days later and stated that 
…with regards to the matter of the Nyūta and their separation from Bungo, he received 
the will of our lord from Ōsumi, delivered by Hishijima kunai-no-shō (Kunisada).  
 
Our lord stated, “The situation is completely different from what we thought. According 
to Tanaka Chikuzen-no-kami of Sadowara who had come to serve at the shrine (Aira 
district), the Nyūta had already severed ties with Bungo on the sixteenth. The southern 
districts (Bungo Ōno and Naoiri districts) were completely destroyed and everything is 
covered in smoke. 
 
“When we were about to attack Nisshū in a previous year (Tenshō 4, eighth month?), I 
was also praying at the main shrine (main Hachiman Shrine), and from there we launched 
our campaign. That the exact same situation is happening again must be a sign that we 
should begin our march on Bungo now.”230  
 
Kakuken thought this development was suspicious and he took it upon himself to verify this new 
information. We can get a glimpse of the result of his work in his diary entry on the twenty-
eighth day for the same month: 
Although everything was already decided, perhaps due to my petitioning of contrary 
information, everything was put on hold when my mediator was presented to our lord. 
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This was fortuitous. My petition stated, “In case there is a mistake with what Tachiku 
[Tanaka Chikuzen-no-kami] said, we should send someone from Miyazaki to Takachio 
[for confirmation] as this would only take a couple of days.” Surely our lord also saw this 
theory as valid and thus listened to my foolish ideas and considered my proposal.  
 
Since my concerns were shared by our lord, the matter was further discussed in 
Kagoshima. As several other doubts were brought to light from the border regions as 
well, it was decided that it would be unreasonable to suddenly march our forces out 
toward Bungo.  
 
Chūsho-kō (Shimazu Iehisa) too was asked to come and explain this situation. This is due 
to the fact that it was Tachiku who met with the Nyūta, and it was that information which 
was submitted. This is preposterous beyond measure…231 
 
Based on this entry, it would appear that Kakuken managed to convince both Yoshihisa and the 
senior retainers that the information presented by Tanaka Chikuzen-no-kami was questionable to 
begin with. As a result, it was decided that rashly moving their forces into Bungo was not a good 
idea, leading to the postponing of the invasion. 
 Despite the outcome of this situation, Iehisa faced little repercussions. If Kakuken was 
guilty of trying to circumvent the orders of Yoshihisa by appealing for the intervention of the 
shugo-dai, then Iehisa was guilty of attempting to instigate a war between the Shimazu and the 
Ōtomo using falsified military intelligence. The senior retainers’ request for Iehisa to come to 
Kagoshima to explain the situation in person can be interpreted as an attempt to place some 
responsibility on Iehisa’s shoulders. This makes sense as Tanaka Chikuzen-no-kami was a 
retainer of Iehisa.232 In other words, it is highly unlikely that Tanaka Chikuzen-no-kami acted 
independently in providing false intelligence to Yoshihisa without Iehisa’s knowledge.233 Iehisa 
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had to be somewhat held accountable by the senior retainers because of this, but Yoshihisa 
himself chose to remain silent on this matter. 
Iehisa’s decision to go to such lengths to solicit help for the Nyūta can be explained 
through the circumstance he found himself in with regards to this entire situation. Iehisa’s 
predicament mirrored the situation Kakuken faced when he dealt with the Nyūta as discussed 
previously. Like Kakuken, Iehisa seemed to place significant value on upholding his reputation 
as the mediator between the Nyūta and the Shimazu. His concern over his reputation caused 
Iehisa to agree with Kakuken when Kakuken suggested that they should ask the shugo-dai for 
military support. As with his request for a new landholding, Iehisa’s decision here epitomized the 
Sengoku warrior’s decision-making process and the inherent concern with their need to solidify 
their own position and reputation. In this particular instance, Iehisa was willing to risk the lives 
of the Shimazu warriors and the fortune of the Shimazu family in general for the sake of his own 
reputation, as a military campaign initiated on false pretences could have disastrous results for 
the Shimazu. 
 The offense committed by Iehisa was more severe than that committed by Kakuken, but 
the same cannot be said about the consequences faced by each of them. Iehisa faced no real 
consequences to his actions. Yoshihisa’s reaction to Iehisa’s crimes can be summed up in his 
message to Kakuken on the first day of the twelfth month of Tenshō 13 (1584); 
With regards to the matter of the Nyūta, I greatly appreciate the various things your two 
mediators had told us. At any rate, in trying to arrive at a solution now, it would be 
unwise to haphazardly launch an attack. Please bring this message in person to Chūsho 
[Iehisa] as well.234 
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Rather than showing any outward signs of anger towards Iehisa’s attempts to instigate a war, 
Yoshihisa simply urged Iehisa to take a more cautious approach when handling the matter 
concerning the Nyūta. Iehisa however, continued to ignore Yoshihisa’s advice for caution, and 
redoubled his efforts in pushing for a Shimazu intervention on behalf of the Nyūta. Iehisa even 
plead to Kakuken for his support on this front.235 That Iehisa continued this course of action in 
such a blatant manner illustrates quite clearly that his goals did not align with that of the 
Shimazu as a whole, nor did they align with what Yoshihisa wanted. Beyond the possible 
reasons and justifications Iehisa might have had however, what I wish to highlight here is the 
leniency that Yoshihisa was showing in allowing Iehisa to continue chasing his individual 
agenda. This inconsistent application of punishment against members of the Shimazu household 
when violating the daimyo’s will makes sense when we remember that Yoshihisa likely saw and 
treated Iehisa as his younger brother instead of a retainer. 
This case thus illustrates both the arbitrary application of rules and the blatant favouritism 
shown towards members of the Shimazu family. When the daimyo’s youngest brother commits 
an offense, he faced no punishment for his action. Such minimizing of internal conflicts within 
the daimyo’s household projects an image of solidarity and mutual support. This in turn served to 
solidify Yoshihisa’s grip on the Shimazu as a whole. By treating his own brother with such 
leniency, Yoshihisa is now considered a loving brother and a filial son who keeps his family 
together during times of unrest. This is not to suggest that the wellbeing of Iehisa did not play a 
part in Yoshihisa’s decision at all. Rather, in defending Iehisa, Yoshihisa also managed to protect 
his overall reputation as well. Whether he was conscious of this or not, Yoshihisa’s concern for 
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securing his own position in the Shimazu could not be separated from the overall wellbeing of 
his family. 
 
II. The Treacherous Hishikari 
In the case of the Shimazu’s interaction with the Nyūta, we have seen that Yoshihisa had 
chosen to be extra lenient when it came to punishing Iehisa’s offenses. We might be tempted to 
explain this special treatment afforded to Iehisa as an anomaly with the Shimazu caused by the 
large age gap between Yoshihisa and Iehisa. This was not exactly the case however. While the 
age difference between these two brothers was likely a consistent factor with regards to how they 
treated each other, Yoshihisa’s protection and favouritism extended to all of his immediate 
family. This included Shimazu Yoshihiro, the second oldest of the Shimazu sibling. In this 
particular instance, the protectiveness of Yoshihisa had for his siblings contributed to the harsh 
attitude Yoshihisa took towards the Hishikari family. 
The first of the two cases of rumours we will examine in this chapter involves Hishikari 
Shigehiro and the rumours of his ambitions to rebel against the Shimazu. Despite the similarities 
between these rumours and those that surrounded Iriki-in Shigetoyo examined in chapter two, the 
tone Yoshihisa adopted here in summarizing these rumours was harsher and more explicit. This 
was due to the combination of the past offenses committed by the Hishikari and the way 
Yoshihisa framed these offences in his mind. Not only did the repeated acts of treachery against 
the Shimazu suggest a disregard for their authority and legitimacy, the Hishikari’s actions were 
framed by Yoshihisa as actions specifically targeting his father and brother. This sense of 
personal offense felt by Yoshihisa was underscored by an assassination attempt targeting 





this only bolstered Yoshihisa’s need to be protective towards his brothers, which is consistent 
with the attitude he had shown towards Iehisa. 
The discussion surrounding the Hishikari took place on the fifth of the tenth month in 
Tenshō 2 (1574) between the Hishikari mediators that were visiting Kagoshima and the 
mediators of Yoshihisa, one of them being Uwai Kakuken himself. The mediators of the 
Hishikari came to receive Yoshihisa’s instructions with regards to the rumours of Hishikari 
Shigehiro’s ambitions.236 The entire diary entry is too long to be included here, but Yoshihisa’s 
objective was ultimately the same as when he was dealing with the Iriki-in. Yoshihisa wanted to 
force the Hishikari into giving up their landholdings in exchange for new ones. The expression of 
these wants however, was much more explicit in this particular instance. Whereas Yoshihisa 
expressed concerns with people thinking he might have wanted the Iriki-in holdings for himself 
before, Yoshihisa showed no such concerns here. The message he delivered to the Hishikari 
ended with “whether or not these rumours are true, that they exist at all surely is not good for the 
Hishikari family. As such, Shigehiro must consider what landholdings should be up for 
exchange.”237 In his demands for the landholdings of the Hishikari, Yoshihisa illustrates for us 
that his goals here were consistent with the case of the Iriki-in. With similar goals in mind, 
Yoshihisa once again showed his indifference towards the truth behind these rumours by using 
the the threat of violence and the ambiguity of the facts for his own benefits. 
Further differences between the rumours of the Hishikari and the ones of the Iriki-in can 
be seen in how Yoshihisa concluded that both these families needed to submit their landholdings 
for exchange. Rather than declaring his trust as he did with Iriki-in Shigetoyo, Yoshihisa 
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demanded a landholding exchange by recalling past offenses committed by the Hishikari against 
the Shimazu. While all of these were acts of treachery against the Shimazu family as a whole, 
Yoshihisa re-contextualized these conflicts into personal offences targeting either his father or 
his brother. The personal nature of these crimes, at least from Yoshihisa’s perspective, 
undoubtedly factored into why the Hishikari rumours were treated in such a harsh manner 
relative to the Iriki-in rumours. The explicit threats Yoshihisa made toward Hishikari could not 
be fully explained by the antagonistic family history either. After all, both the Iriki-in and the 
Hishikari were hostile towards the Shimazu in the past. As such, it is difficult to dismiss the 
personal nature of the Hishikari’s offenses as being at least part of the reason Yoshihisa was so 
blunt with his demands.  
Hishikari’s personal offenses began prior to Yoshihisa becoming the Shimazu daimyo. In 
recounting the Hishikari’s past crimes, the first of the offenses Yoshihisa cited took place on 
Kōji 3 (1557). According to Yoshihisa’s recollection,  
Previously, during the reign of Takahisa and his chastisement of Gamō (Norikiyo), when 
we took to the battlefield against the Gamō, what did Hishikari (Shigetoyo)238 do? He 
chose to set up camp against us. Of course, as we moved in accordance to the laws of 
Heaven [tendō], the Hishikari formations were soon broken. With several of the 
Hishikari’s retainers killed, the Gamō surrendered to us.239 
 
This antagonism between the Shimazu and the Hishikari during this initial conflict served as a 
background to Yoshihisa’s issues with the Hishikari in general. Critical to understanding why 
Yoshihisa’s took this incident so personally is the subsequent forgiveness granted to the 
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Hishikari by Takahisa despite the Hishikari’s military actions during the Gamō campaign.240 
Through this retelling, Yoshihisa framed the subservient position of the Hishikari into one 
established on a personal level, with the Hishikari promising to “correct their past mistakes 
through service”241 to Takahisa. All subsequent antagonistic actions were thus acts of betrayal 
not only towards the Shimazu administration in the abstract, but towards Yoshihisa’s father 
specifically. By centering the subjugation of the Hishikari on the person granting forgiveness, 
Yoshihisa’s recollection of these events foregrounded the personal nature of the conflict between 
these two families, and renders the current rumours surrounding Hishikari Shigehiro as a direct 
insult to Takahisa’s magnanimity. 
  To underscore the kindness of his father, Yoshihisa continued to elaborate upon the good 
will Takahisa showed toward the Hishikari despite their former antagonism toward each other. 
On Eiroku 1 (1559) a major inheritance dispute broke out within the Kitahara family, resulting in 
one of their members, Kitahara Ise-no-kami (Kanemasa), seizing control of Yokawa castle in the 
Aira district and solidifying their position there in rebellion.242 After retaking Yokawa castle, 
Takahisa granted this castle to the Hishikari because of the latter’s repeated showing of good 
faith.243  
Yoshihisa’s retelling of these events seemed to only highlight the insidious nature of the 
Hishikari’s betrayal following this generous gift. Yoshihisa continued his summary of the 
Hishikari’s past crimes, stating: 
 When we made our move against the Mitsu-no-yama area (Nishimorokata district, 
controlled by Itō Yoshisuke at the time; Eiroku 9 [1567]), the Hishikari sent a secret 
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missive to the low ranking warriors244 of the Itō to interfere with our plans. Knowing that 
Hyōgo-no-kami (Shimazu Yoshihiro) will be leading several hundred soldiers through a 
place called Uemura (Higo, Kuma district), the Hishikari told the Itō to place their 
soldiers there to ambush our forces. While the ambush ended in failure, it is undeniable 
that the Hishikari made an attempt on Hyōgo-no-kami’s life.245 
 
The personal nature of the crimes committed by Hishikari is quite obvious from the way that 
Yoshihisa framed the narrative here. While the sending of the secret missive was clearly 
something that went against the Shimazu’s agenda, the focus here is on the assassination attempt 
towards Yoshihisa’s younger brother, Shimazu Yoshihiro. That the attempt was brought up by 
Yoshihisa suggests to us the degree in which he was personally offended by the Hishikari’s 
actions. We can see Yoshihisa framing the Hishikari’s assassination attempt as a personal attack 
for two reasons. First, the assassination attempt was not successful, and therefore technically no 
harm was physically done to Yoshihiro. Second, Yoshihiro himself was no stranger to risking his 
own life on military campaigns. His very participation in the Mitsu-no-yama campaign meant 
that many people will be trying to kill him on a daily basis. Similarly, when the Hishikari first 
took up arms against Takahisa, they also wished to defeat or kill Takahisa.  
What made the Hishikari’s attempt here on Yoshihiro’s life different from all other 
instances was the personal nature of the betrayal. On the one hand, this was an abuse of the trust 
granted to them by Takahisa. Despite granting the Hishikari ownership over Yokawa castle, they 
repaid Takahisa’s kindness by trying to kill Yoshihiro. On the other hand, unlike casualties in 
war resulting from mutual violence from both sides, this assassination attempt was an 
unprovoked attack that targeted a specific member of the daimyo’s immediate family. Given that 
there were no discernable reasons for the Hishikari to target Yoshihiro, the assassination attempt 
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was seen as a concentrated act of violence directed towards a single person. In other words, this 
was an attack not on the polity but on the family and the individuals in it. 
 It is also telling that this particular assassination attempt was singled out from the other 
consequences of the Hishikari’s interference during the Mitsu-no-yama campaign. Yoshihisa 
continued with his recollection of the events that followed; 
This rendered our plans for Masaki impossible, and after hearing various opinions from 
our retainers, we turned our attention towards Magoshi (Isa district) instead (Eiroku 10 
[1568]). The Hishikari were ordered to stay at Honjō. For some reason, they left their 
own holdings by request of Kedō-in (Shigetane), joined forces with those at Kuma (Higo, 
Kuma district; Sagara Yoshiteru) and stood in opposition to us again.246 
 
 The larger military reprecussions of the Hishikari’s actions were relinquished to the background 
of Yoshihisa’s narrative once again and served as an afterthought to the assassination attempt. 
The impact of the Hishikari’s actions acted merely as a prelude to the larger military betrayal at 
Kuma. Just as it was with the Hishikari’s previous treachery, the Shimazu was again triumphant 
in their conquest. Subsequently, Takahisa forgave the Hishikari for their betrayal, resulting in the 
current rule of the Hishikari family by Hishikari Shigehiro.247  
 This long summary of the history between the Shimazu and the Hishikari served as the 
justification for Yoshihisa’s demand for the landholdings of Hishikari Shigehiro. While the 
checkered past of the Hishikari likely affected how Yoshihisa evaluated the rumours surrounding 
them, we cannot deny the importance of family implicit within the way that Yoshihisa framed 
the entire narrative. Each of the offense committed by the Hishikari were tied directly to 
Yoshihisa’s immediate family members as opposed to the Shimazu as a whole. In both large 
military campaigns described by Yoshihisa, the fortunes of the Shimazu seemed predetermined 
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as he associated the Shimazu’s victories with the law or path of Heaven (tendō).248 The usage of 
this idea of tendō convey a sense of righteousness and inevitability that was beyond mortal 
explanation. In other words, by associating the Shimazu’s past victories with tendō, Yoshihisa 
implies that the Hishikari’s actions were meaningless in the grand scheme of things.  
By framing the Hishikari’s actions in this light, Yoshihisa downplayed the impact they 
had on the Shimazu’s successes. This did not mean that the Hishikari’s treachery had no effect 
however, as Yoshihisa merely shifted the impact of their betrayal on to a personal level by tying 
each act to the members of his immediate family. Yoshihisa highlighted the grace of Takahisa by 
emphasizing the forgiveness shown to the Hishikari on two separate occasions. In both instances 
of forgiveness in Kōji 3 (1554) and in Eiroku 12 (1570), they were conducted by Takahisa 
personally in Yoshihisa’s retelling. In the case of the former, Hishikari Tengansai personally 
visited Takahisa to pledge the Hishikari’s service to the Shimazu in return for forgiveness. 
Tengansai was the grandfather of Hishikari Shigehiro and had in fact, according to the “Traitor” 
chapter of the Honpan jinbutsu-shi (Records on the Personnel of this Domain), previously 
surrendered to Takahisa in Tenbun 8 (1539).249 Yoshihisa’s failure to mention this prior 
interaction between the two families was likely not coincidental. By ignoring the Hishikari’s 
previous surrender to the Shimazu and focusing instead on Tengansai’s plead for forgiveness 
from Takahisa, Yoshihisa framed the relationship between the Hishikari and the Shimazu into 
one built upon personal trust as opposed to political or military subjugation.  
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The personal nature of Takahisa’s grace was re-emphasized in the second granting of 
forgiveness in Eiroku 12 (1570). According to Yoshihisa, after this betrayal Takahisa said, 
“What reason is there to destroy these local warriors?”250 It was supposedly with that one 
statement that all the charges against the crimes of the Hishikari were subsequently forgiven, 
leading to the current state of affairs that Yoshihisa was faced with.251 Based on what we know 
of the Shimazu administration and the way decisions were made, Takahisa’s decision was likely 
debated and discussed by the senior retainer council before it was rendered official. By crediting 
Takahisa with the forgiveness shown to the Hishikari, Yoshihisa once again rendered an 
administrative decision into a personal one. According to this narrative, the Hishikari’s very 
existence was due to the magnanimity of Takahisa. The course of actions taken by the Hishikari 
thus showed how intentionally ungrateful they were in the face of such kindness. Within this 
framework, the rumours of the Hishikari’s subsequent betrayal could be seen as an affront to the 
very memory of Takahisa. 
The involvement of both Yoshihiro and Takahisa within this particular set of events 
surrounding the Hishikari directly provoked Yoshihisa and impacted the way he managed the 
prospect of yet another Hishikari betrayal. Through the framing of Yoshihisa’s summary of the 
antagonistic history between the two families, we can see that both the attempt on Yoshihiro’s 
life and the repeated abuses of Takahisa’s trust deeply disturbed Yoshihisa. Unlike the case of 
the Iriki-in from the previous chapter, Yoshihisa paid little attention to his own image. The 
comparison between Yoshihisa’s reactions to these two sets of rumours is particularly apt due to 
the similarities between the Iriki-in and the Hishikari. As I have hinted at above, both the Iriki-in 
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and the Hishikari were antagonistic towards the Shimazu before. Both families resisted the 
Shimazu for many year and at one point joined their forces together to fight the Shimazu.252 
Neither Iriki-in Shigetoyo nor Hishikari Shigehiro personally spearheaded anti-Shimazu 
activities. Both of them were however, immediate descendants of those who fought against 
Shimazu dominance. Both Shigetoyo and Shigehiro became the leader of their respective family 
after the failure of predecessors. The key feature separating the Iriki-in from the Hishikari boils 
down to the personal nature of the latter’s offenses. As such, it is extremely unlike that the harsh 
treatment by Yoshihisa directed towards the Hishikari was not connected to this particular aspect 
of the Hishikari’s past. That this harshness was absent from Yoshihisa’s approach to similar 
rumours that surrounded the Iriki-in suggests that the direct involvement of Yoshihiro and 
Takahisa likely impacted Yoshihisa’s decisions to some degree with regards to the Hishikari. 
Yoshihisa’s reponse to the Hishikari rumours can be understood through some of the 
primary factors affecting his decision-making, such as the maintenance of his reputation and the 
reinforcing of his legitimacy. In a way, the repeated abuses against Takahisa’s generosity and 
trust by the Hishikari fundamentally undermined the authority of Yoshihisa’s branch of the 
Shimazu. This was especially the case when we consider the fact that Takahisa was the first of 
their branch to rule the Shimazu. Yoshihisa’s treatment of the Hishikari and his retelling of the 
history between their families was a conscious choice that reflected Yoshihisa’s displeasure 
towards the Hishikari. Given that a key difference between the Hishikari and the Iriki-in was the 
personal nature of the former’s offenses, we can extrapolate from this that the involvement of 
Yoshihisa’s family likely had a direct impact upon Yoshihisa’s decision-making process beyond 
this particular case. 
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III. Yoshitora’s Ambition and Ohira’s Message 
The final example we will explore in this chapter involves yet another supposedly 
ambitious retainer seeking to betray Yoshihisa. In particular, the rumours were about Shimazu 
Yoshitora. This presented Yoshihisa with a particularly pertinent threat as Yoshitora was a direct 
descendent of a rival Shimazu branch. Despite this however, Yoshihisa took to protecting 
Yoshitora in the end. This was due to the intervention of Ohira, the eldest daughter of Yoshihisa 
and the wife of Yoshitora. The existence of this familial connection between Yoshihisa and 
Yoshitora meant that an overtly forceful approach was out of the question. This was especially 
true when punitive measures against Yoshitora would negatively impact Ohira as well. 
Unsurprisingly, the wellbeing of Yoshihisa’s own children played a part in Yoshihisa’s decision-
making process. Through our discussion of the Shimazu’s interaction with the Nyūta and the 
Hishikari, we have seen how the involvement of the immediate family members of Yoshihisa 
affected the way he made his decisions. Whether it was favouritism towards his family or the 
directed hostility towards those who targeted his family, it is clear from both these instances that 
family involvement shaped Yoshihisa’s decision-making process. As a continuation of the 
previous examples, this next case will explore how his own daughter affected Yoshihisa’s 
decision-making process.  
The rumours surrounding the ambitions of Shimazu Yoshitora (1536 – 1585) were 
brought to the forefront of the entire administration’s attention when Ohira personally wrote to 
Yoshihisa. Her letter significantly altered the way that these rumours were handled. As a result 
of this, no landholdings were demanded of Yoshitora. This was in sharp contrast to how 





Before diving into the details regarding the rumours of Yoshitora, we should begin by 
quickly addressing the identity of Shimazu Yoshitora. As I have stated previously, the current 
control over the primary branch of the Shimazu by Yoshihisa and his father, Takahisa, was a 
relatively new development within the broader Shimazu family history. Prior to Shimazu 
Takahisa’s ascension to the leadership position, his primary competitor was the leader of a rival 
Shimazu branch, Shimazu Sanehisa (d. 1553). Key to our current discussion is the fact that 
Yoshitora was the son of Sanehisa and the head of this rival branch of the Shimazu family after 
Sanehisa’s death.253 This rendered Yoshitora a challenger to Yoshihisa’s leadership position 
within the primary branch of the Shimazu. Furthermore, Yoshitora also had family connections 
with the Hishikari and the Kedō-in, both historic enemies of Yoshihisa’s rule.254 This meant that 
potentially rebellious elements within the Shimazu, like the Hishikari, would likely stand with 
Yoshitora should he ever decide to challenge Yoshihisa’s rule. In other words, Yoshitora was a 
threat that needed to be managed.  
Despite the antagonistic history between Yoshihisa and Yoshitora, they managed to co-
exist quite peacefully within the Shimazu administration. Like both Iriki-in Shigetoyo and 
Hishikari Shigehiro, Yoshitora also never showed any signs of open hostility towards Yoshihisa. 
But unlike Shigetoyo and Shigehiro however, Yoshitora secured his place within the Shimazu 
government through his marriage to Ohira.255 This indirectly tied Yoshitora’s personal wellbeing 
to that of Yoshihisa and his family. The bond of marriage between Yoshitora and Ohira 
distinguishes this particular case from the others we have explored thus far. It is not a 
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coincidence that Yoshitora received the most generous treatment, despite his position as the head 
of a rival Shimazu branch. Because Yoshitora was married to Yoshihisa’s daughter, Yoshihisa 
must protect Yoshitora for the sake of Ohira. And while the tension between Yoshihisa and 
Yoshitora remained high during the initial circulation of the rumours, the direct intervention of 
Ohira was enough to soften Yoshihisa’s approach, allowing for a peaceful resolution for all 
parties involved. 
The first sign of trouble surrounding Yoshitora was recorded in Kakuken’s diary on the 
fourth day of the eighth month of Tenshō 2 (1574). Kakuken wrote,  
Today we had a meeting at the temporary residence of Ki’iri (Suehisa). We [the 
mediators] were asked whether or not the Tōgō had submitted a petition regarding the 
rumours about an attack they launched from Sendai (Satsuma district, holding of Tōgō 
Shigehisa) to Mizuhiki (same district, holding of Shimazu Yoshitora). As I did not know 
anything about this matter, they suggested that we should perhaps ask Shirahama Suo-no-
suke (Shigemasa), but he also knew nothing about this.256 
 
This was the first indication of the brewing conflict between Yoshitora and his long term rival 
Tōgō Shigehisa. The above entry suggests that it was the Tōgō who initiated aggression against 
Yoshitora. Further evidence of Shigehisa’s violent actions came on the ninth of the same month, 
when Kakuken received word that Shigehisa led two to three hundred of his soldiers into Chūgō 
and ousted the jitō, Torimaru Shigetoshi, killing three commoners and one religious personnel.257 
Despite Shigehisa’s military aggressions however, the Shimazu administration as a whole did 
nothing to stop or even reprimand him. Instead, the senior retainers inquired into whether or not 
the Tōgō submitted a petition for his actions. That the senior retainers chose to not condemn the 
Tōgō’s unsanctioned use of military force suggests their tacit approval of such actions. Both the 
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Tōgō’s actions and the Shimazu administration’s reaction can be explained by the rumours at the 
time regarding Yoshitora. 
 We can get a sense of what the rumours surrounding Yoshitora actually accused him of 
through a private letter sent by Yoshitora to the senior retainer Ki’iri Suehisa (d. 1588) on the 
fourth day of the third month of Tenshō 2 (1574). In this letter, Yoshitora pleaded his innocence 
with regards to these rumours. Yoshitora wrote, 
Because it is common for everyone to voice their complaints, when we defeated the 
Shibuya I pleaded with my lord to be placed on guard duty only, but was instead granted 
the landholdings of Taki and Mizuhiki. As for Tōgō and Chūgō being left unoccupied, 
because this was the decision made by our lord, I believe it to be the correct thing to do 
and I responded to my lord’s wishes. I thus took up my guard duty at Taki and Mizuhiki 
since then. 
 
Further, with regards to Yamano, this was a tremendously laborious landholding. The 
decision to grant this landholding to me was made by our lord when we were in Ōguchi. 
While I asked repeatedly for my lord to reconsider, since he continuously wished that I 
take charge there, I maintain control over Yamano even now. I am indebted to my lord 
for all of this. However, whether it was my ignoring of our lord’s words and flooding my 
forces into Tōgō, or that I somehow think that Chūgō should be under my control, these 
and other rumours can be traced to the orders given to me as stated here. 
 
The situation being as above, in answering our lord’s call, I surely should not be 
considered an enemy!258 
 
According to Yoshitora’s understanding, the rumours in circulation insinuated that Yoshitora 
wanted control over both the Tōgō and the Chūgō landholdings. These rumours further stated 
that despite Yoshihisa’s will, Yoshitora moved his army into Tōgō to seize control of that area, 
after which he set his sights on Chūgō as his next target. In this letter, Yoshitora denied these 
charges, and claimed that all the holdings in his possession were given to him by Yoshihisa. 
Yoshitora attempted to further prove his loyalty by stating that,  
As for all the various rumours that are frequently circulated beyond those above, naturally 
if I harboured even the smallest amount of such evil, I will immediately and without 
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reason come to an end by the punishment of the various kami and Buddhist deities that 
occupies the three provinces, as stated in my oath which I have previously submitted.259 
 
From this it is clear that Yoshitora was well aware that rumours regarding the Tōgō and Chūgō 
landholdings were not the only ones that were being circulated about him. The lack of 
specificities regarding other potential rumours however hints at the preemptive nature of 
Yoshitora’s efforts here. In other words, as he was defending his name with regards to the 
holdings of Tōgō and Chūgō, Yoshitora anticipated further attacks to be made against his 
reputation.  
 Taking the content of these rumours into consideration, we can begin to understand why 
Tōgō Shigehisa was able to launch an attack against Yoshitora without repercussions from the 
Shimazu. The targeting of Yoshitora by Shigehisa was not an accident. Shigehisa was not taking 
an initiative in punishing Yoshitora out of some abstract sense of duty to their daimyo. Instead, 
Shigehisa was likely being an opportunist when it came to his attacks on Yoshitora, using the 
rumours as a convenient excuse to seek vengeance against Yoshitora, as he was one of the 
primary commanders responsible for ending the Tōgō’s independence from the Shimazu in 
1570.260 The conflict in 1570 resulted in Shigehisa losing possession of the Chūgō landholding 
along with Taki and Mizuhiki, both of which were granted to Yoshitora as a result of this. These 
rumours of Yoshitora coveting Chūgō for himself thus gave Tōgō Shigehisa just the excuse he 
needed to reclaim his lost landholdings from Yoshitora.  
 The lack of a response from Yoshihisa could be understood as a form of approval toward 
Shigehisa’s aggression. As Kakuken’s diary entries show, the senior retainers were clearly aware 
of these attacks, but did nothing to stop Shigehisa’s efforts. It is difficult to see the lack of any 
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kind of discussion, much less any punitive or mitigating actions, on the part of the Shimazu 
administration as anything except for an unofficial sanctioning of a military response toward the 
rumours surrounding Yoshitora. In addition to this, we know that Yoshitora had sent a letter to 
plead his case to the senior retainers. That at no point during this entire incident did Ki’iri 
Suehisa mention anything regarding Yoshitora’s side of the story suggests that the administration 
as a whole was likely indifferent to the entire situation in general. This was without a doubt the 
most severe response against rumours we have seen thus far. Through the willful ignorance of 
the tension between Shigehisa and Yoshitora, Yoshihisa and his administration punished 
Yoshitora through violence while maintaining a level of detachment from the actual punitive 
actions. By not officially granting Shigehisa permission to go to war, Yoshihisa can distance 
himself from this affair, protecting his reputation as a merciful lord while indirectly punishing 
his retainers. 
 This apathetic approach taken by Yoshihisa and the Shimazu administration regarding the 
rumours of Yoshitora’s ambitions took a sharp turn however during the beginning of the ninth 
month of Tenshō 2 (1574), when Ohira contacted Yoshihisa. Kakuken recorded the events of the 
first day of the month as such: 
Item. First of the ninth month. I attended work as usual. As there was a horse wrangling 
event at Sezaki and Izumi (Izumi district, Shimazu Yoshitora), a foal was submitted to us 
despite the poor results of the event.  
 
His wife (Yoshitora’s spouse, Yoshihisa’s daughter) sent a message to our lord, “As you 
have previously sent someone to express good wishes to us, we should have sent a gift in 
return. Though that was quite a while ago, I hope you enjoyed my gift.” The mediator 
delivering this message was Matsuoka Minbuzaemon-no-jō. 
 
Before long, my lord responded; “the Sezaki foal is truly of the highest quality! I shall 
treasure this gift the best I can so that you can come see it the next time you visit!” My 
lord continued, “A few days ago, several menials brought your gift to me. I am impressed 





are both doing well.” After this, the mediator was free to go, but as the senior retainers 
had need of him, he was asked to stay the night.261 
 
The tone that Yoshihisa had towards his daughter illustrates quite a different side of the daimyo. 
Most importantly for our current purposes however is the way that Yoshihisa stated his 
happiness for his daughter and Yoshitora’s good health. Though slightly less explicit in the 
original text, it is clear that Yoshihisa was not simply addressing Ohira alone when he expressed 
his happiness regarding Ohira and Yoshitora’s good health.262 The inclusion of Yoshitora within 
Yoshihisa’s good wishes was implicit. Through this simple expression of good will, we see 
Yoshihisa conflating the wellbeing of Yoshitora with that of Ohira. Whether or not this was a 
genuine act on Yoshihisa’s part does not matter. The very act of referencing both Yoshitora and 
Ohira as a single unit illustrates that the married couple shared their abstract and literal fortune in 
reality. This short exchange between father and daughter was a timely reminder to Yoshihisa that 
the continued ignorance of the rumours surrounding Yoshitora will directly affect the fortune of 
his own child. 
Here we should address the nature of Ohira’s marriage to Yoshitora and the political 
implications entailed by it. There is little doubt that the marriage between Yoshitora and Ohira 
was all part of the threat management necessary to keep Yoshitora and his branch of the Shimazu 
in check. The fact that it was Takahisa, the man responsible for ousting Yoshitora’s father from 
the Shimazu family, who ordered this marriage underscores this point.263 From this perspective, 
we can perhaps interpret Ohira’s intervention in the rumours surrounding Yoshitora as her 
fulfilling the purpose of their marriage as designed by Takahisa. Yet the predetermined utility of 
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this marriage alliance between the competing branches of the Shimazu family cannot explain the 
sudden shift in attitude within the Shimazu administration. If the marriage was designed to 
discourage Yoshitora from rebelling and therefore reduce the threat of violence, then it would 
imply that Yoshihisa himself likely did not wish to seek conflict with Yoshitora. The Shimazu’s 
initial inaction suggests however that they were perfectly happy to see Yoshitora suffer attacks 
from the Tōgō. That the Shimazu leaped into action immediately after Ohira’s letter hints at the 
possibility that it was her relationship with Yoshihisa that prompted the administration to act 
instead of the previously established marriage alliance between the two branches of the family. 
 Indeed, the impact that Ohira had on the Shimazu administration as a whole can be seen 
immediately. On the following day, the senior retainers met to discuss these rumours after doing 
nothing about them for at least a whole month; 
The senior retainers said, “Recently there are numerous rumours in circulation, many of 
which involved Yoshitora. For his part, he had continuously petitioned our lord to show 
his concerns, including nagabumi264 and other letters. Regarding this, a decision was 
made. Perhaps we should deliver a message to Yoshitora through the mediator he sent 
yesterday. Or perhaps, should we need to amend our decisions, we can send a couple of 
mediators to meet with the warriors in Taki and Mizuhiki (both in Satsuma district, 
Yoshitora’s holdings) and tell them of our decisions then.”  
 
Upon understanding this, the mediator said, “We will make sure to send someone here to 
receive further instructions later.” With that, he returned to Yoshitora. I was the mediator 
who delivered the message.265 
 
A couple of things stood out from the above diary entry. First, while we do not have the letters 
and petitions from Yoshitora, we know that Yoshihisa and the Shimazu administration had 
received Yoshitora’s petitions several months prior to Tōgō Shigehisa’s attacks in the eighth 
month of Tenshō 2 (1574). Second, a decision was in fact ready to be delivered before Ohira 
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ever made contact with Yoshihisa. To come up with a viable solution, the administration would 
had have to meet and discuss the situation, factor into their consideration the Tōgō’s actions, 
come to a decision as a whole, and have the decision approved by Yoshihisa. Adding to this, it 
would also involve the multiple layers of mediators and message delivery that were necessarily 
for communication and decision-making within the Shimazu administration. All of this suggests 
that the Shimazu administration’s decision here was not likely made in a single sitting. Given 
that this one and only meeting happened the day immediately after Yoshihisa received Ohira’s 
letter, it is likely that they already made a decision before this meeting, but chose to do nothing 
with it. Ohira’s intervention essentially spurred the administration into action. 
 The two particular points shown above highlight the apathetic nature of the Shimazu’s 
initial stance on this matter and the impact Ohira had on the entire political decision-making 
process as a whole. The fact that even after receiving numerous letters and petitions from 
Yoshitora, Yoshihisa still chose to do nothing when Tōgō Shigehisa launched his attacks 
underscores that indifference and mistrust Yoshihisa likely had toward Yoshitora. After all, 
Yoshitora was the head of a rival Shimazu branch. Adding to this is the possibility that the 
administration had already come to a decision with regards to the rumours themselves prior to all 
this. The inaction of the Shimazu was thus likely intentional when it came to dealing with the 
Yoshitora situation. By withholding their decision on this matter, the Shimazu purposefully 
allowed Shigehisa to attack Yoshitora without getting involved. In other words, just as Tōgō 
Shigehisa took advantage of the situation to get his revenge on Yoshitora, the Shimazu took 
advantage of Shigehisa’s aggression to punish a retainer, leading them to withhold their decision 





 Another peculiar point with regards to the meeting on the second of the ninth month as it 
was recorded within Kakuken’s diary is the indecisiveness with which the final decision was 
made. That the proper protocols for what to do if they were to change their minds about 
Yoshitora was discussed at all was certainly abnormal. This very discussion suggests that not 
only did they expect that they will need to change their previous decision, but that such changes 
were not normal enough for proper protocols to be thoroughly established in the first place. This 
discussion thus highlights the uniqueness of this entire situation even further. That all of this 
happened in a meeting on the day immediately following Yoshihisa’s communication with Ohira 
illustrates the influence Ohira had upon the entire decision-making process. In fact, Ohira 
continued to exert an influence on this affair in the following weeks. 
 Later in the month, when the matter surrounding the ambitions of Yoshitora was brought 
up again, Yoshihisa took a very different approach not only in contrast to the way he previously 
dealt with this particular case, but also relative to the other rumours we have seen. On the 
twenty-sixth of the ninth month, Kakuken wrote, 
 Item. Today, Honda Jakushū (Chikatoyo), Ijichi Kageyu, and I were sent to meet with the 
mediators Ise-no-kami, Ibusuki Suo-no-suke, and Chishiki Danjōchū from Izumi. Their 
message states, “Recently there are many rumours in circulation. Specifically, during the 
beginning of last month, we were visited by Ki’iri Kuyasai. He told us that these rumours 
started in the presence of Chūsho (Shimazu Iehisa), as such it is imperative that Yoshitora 
goes to Kushikino to explain himself. Otherwise, he risk losing everything he has.” 
 
As this was told to us by Kuyasai and Ki’iri Sesshū (Suehisa), we have asked Hon-
Jakushū to ask Chūsho directly about this matter. As our lord [Yoshihisa] had stated, it 
seems that Chūsho knew nothing about this at all. This was told directly to the mediators 
of Izumi.266 
 
This was the first instance where we see efforts being devoted to finding the culprit circulating 
rumours within the Shimazu administration. Rather than exploiting the ambiguity of these 
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rumours to further his own agenda, Yoshihisa instead took an effort to investigate these rumours’ 
origins. The connection between these rumours and the immediate family members of Yoshihisa 
undoubtedly played a part in this decision. In this particular case, the search for the rumours’ 
origin became a necessity as it will directly affect the fortune of both Iehisa and Ohira. 
 The investigation into the content and origins of the rumours of Yoshitora’s ambitions 
intensified further when Yoshihisa heard of these concerns from Izumi. Responding to the issues 
raised by the Izumi mediators, Yoshihisa said, 
Was this information [about the rumours being started by Iehisa] conveyed by Kuyasai 
misunderstood by the mediators? Was Seishū’s decision to return north of [the Satsuma] 
mountains the result of orders given by Yoshitora? The answers to these are crucial at 
least for us in planning our next move in dealing with this matter.  
 
Next, with regards to the frequent rumours of such nature, is it true that Yoshitora was 
planning to rebel? Or were these just baseless rumours? We have not heard anything on 
this issue, but were these rumours started by people serving in Izumi? Or perhaps they 
were started by those within Yoshitora’s own branch? Who are the people responsible 
and what are their surnames? What are their motives? We want a full account from 
Izumi.267 
 
Yoshihisa’s urge to shield his own brother from taking blame for these rumours is immediately 
apparent. Rather than exploring the links between Iehisa and Yoshitora’s rumours, Yoshihisa 
instead responded to the Izumi mediators’ inquiry by demanding Yoshitora to investigate his 
own retainers and come up with a list of names of those that might be guilty. The pressure placed 
on Yoshitora to find the culprits among his own retainers represents the continuation of the 
indifference that Yoshihisa had for the possible truth obscured by the rumours. In trying to 
protect his own brother and daughter, Yoshihisa gave Yoshitora an opportunity to withdraw from 
the entire situation gracefully. By allowing Yoshitora to carry out an internal investigation 
independent from the Shimazu administration in Kagoshima, Yoshihisa was demanding 
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someone, anyone, to take responsibility for the rumours. This new order from Yoshihisa 
therefore gave Yoshitora a way to exit from the entire situation while protecting Iehisa from any 
potential suspicions. 
 Almost immediately after Yoshihisa demanded a list of names for those responsible for 
these rumours, the Shimazu administration also addressed the other issue surrounding Shimazu 
Yoshitora. Specifically, with regards to the border conflicts between the Tōgō holding and the 
Taki holding, and the apparent seizure of the hemp harvest by Yoshitora’s men from the Tōgō 
holding which was controlled by Tōgō Shigehisa.268 For this, the full decision on what to do was 
withheld until the senior retainer council could hear Shigehisa’s side of the story.269 This urgency 
with which the Shimazu dealt with matters related to Yoshitora was a far cry from their previous, 
nonchalant approach to the entire affair. In explaining this shift in attitude, the timing of Ohira’s 
intervention should not be overlooked.  
With regards to the rumours of his ambition, Yoshitora will not bring up the issue again 
with Yoshihisa until late in the eleventh month of Tenshō 2 (1574). The matter ultimately ended 
with a whimper. The resolution achieved what Yoshihisa sought as it endangered neither Iehisa 
nor Ohira in the end. On the twentieth of the eleventh month, mediators from Izumi told 
Yoshihisa that, 
Regarding the rumours that we spoke about before, when previously Ise-no-kami 
(Shimazu Tadaharu?) and two or three others came here they received orders from the 
senior retainers. Specifically, they were tasked to find out from Kuyasai (Ki’iri) if he 
really heard that these rumours originated from Chūsho [Iehisa], and through Ki’iri 
(Suehisa) told Yoshitora as such. Perhaps there was truly a mistake, and these rumours 
came from elsewhere. 
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Next, as for the actual origins of these rumours, finding out where they came from is of 
utmost importance. As it stands, we have not made any progress towards this quite yet.270 
 
In response to this lack of result, Yoshihisa said, 
With regards to the rumours in circulation, since it was told to Setsu-no-suke (Ki’iri 
Suehisa) by Kuyasai, we gave orders to Seishū (Shimazu Tadaharu?) previously about 
this matter. Perhaps it was possible that Kuyasai misspoke? Since this was, at any rate, 
not a matter that was spoken of in Kagoshima, we gave such an order to Seishū. At the 
time, Sesshū [Ki’iri Suehisa] was feeling unwell and was staying at Ki’iri (Ibusuki 
district). You should send an inquiry there instead.271 
 
This was the last entry in Kakuken’s diary that related to the rumours of Yoshitora’s ambition. 
The key here is the shifting of focus from before. Whereas previously, the primary issue was 
with regards to the validity of the rumours about Yoshitora and the potential of a rebellion, now 
the issue was focused on the identity of the person making the mistake of blaming Iehisa and the 
origins of such mistakes. The content of the rumours was assumed to be baseless. Likewise, the 
blame placed on Iehisa was also assumed to be false. The only truth that Yoshihisa was 
concerned with was the fact that these rumours existed and they could threaten his family. As 
such, once this threat was eliminated, further inquiries into the facts of the rumours were likely 
meaningless to Yoshihisa. In other words, now that both Iehisa and Ohira will no longer be 
affected by this entire issue, Yoshihisa no longer cared enough about the results of these 
investigations to further involve himself or Kagoshima in general. 
 
IV. Conclusion: the Shimazu Family and Yoshihisa 
 In this chapter, we have look at three different cases where the involvement of 
Yoshihisa’s immediate family members affected his political decision-making process. In each 
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of these cases, we see Yoshihisa showing either favoritism towards his own family by shielding 
them from consequences or accentuate his wrath towards those who specifically targeted his 
family members. While the biases towards one’s family is not anything unique to or necessarily 
unexpected in medieval Japan, they were critical in the mind of Yoshihisa, directly affecting his 
decision-making process. 
 In the first case, we saw how Iehisa was treated differently than Kakuken in their dealings 
with the Nyūta. On the one hand, Iehisa, who was fabricating intelligence and sending them to 
Kagoshima in order to instigate a full scale invasion of Bungo, faced no real reprisal from 
Yoshihisa and the senior retainer council for his actions. On the other hand, Kakuken, who 
sought the help of the shugo-dai in gathering support for the Nyūta, was denounced in court for 
his actions and chastised as an outsider who did not have the welfare of the Shimazu in mind. 
Both Iehisa and Kakuken took similar actions for similar purposes, but only Kakuken faced any 
consequences for his actions. While it would not make sense to claim Iehisa to be an outsider 
since he was the daimyo’s brother, we could at least expect some minimal punishment to be dealt 
to Iehisa for falsifying information. Instead, despite all the trouble he caused, Iehisa got away 
with a simple message from Yoshihisa informing Iehisa of the change of plans.  
 As for the second case, the Hishikari found themselves facing explicit threats and 
demands from Yoshihisa when rumours of their ambitious intents reached the ears of their 
daimyo. This approach stood in stark contrast to similar rumours surrounding the Iriki-in as we 
have seen in the last chapter. Both the Iriki-in and the Hishikari had a contentious relationship 
with the Shimazu in the past, with the two joining forces at one point to stand against 
Yoshihisa’s father. Yet the Hishikari was singled out by Yoshihisa when rumours of their 





Shimazu, thus framing the actions of the Iriki-in as a voluntary demonstration of their loyalty, 
the punishment for the Hishikari was explicit and predetermined. The key difference between 
these two former enemies of the Shimazu was the personal nature of the Hishikari’s offense, 
underscored by the way Yoshihisa framed the events that took place between the Shimazu and 
the Hishikari. In Yoshihisa’s mind, the Hishikari’s actions were personal betrayals of his father’s 
trust. The assassination attempt against Yoshihiro by the Hishikari only heightened this feeling 
of personal offense felt by Yoshihisa. This was the key defining feature that separated the 
Hishikari from the Iriki-in. From the way that Yoshihisa used it as a justification for forcing the 
Hishikari to give up their landholdings, it is clear that this was a significant factor that affected 
Yoshihisa in his decision-making process. 
 Finally, when it came to the rumours surrounding Yoshitora, Yoshihisa shifted his entire 
approach from one of indifference to one of protection after receiving a letter from Ohira. After 
ignoring the entire situation and implicitly sanctioning the Tōgō’s unapproved military actions 
towards Yoshitora, the day after receiving a letter of Ohira, the administration immediately 
shifted gears and directly addressed these rumours. Without delay, the Shimazu administration 
sent their decisions to Yoshitora on the following day, and made preparations to change these 
very same decisions should the need arises. Furthermore, when news reached Yoshihisa that 
perhaps Iehisa was involved in starting these rumours, an inquiry was launched into the origins 
of these rumours. Through this process, Yoshihisa was able to create a situation where both his 
daughter and his brother were protected. Once he knew both of them were shielded from the 
consequences of these initial rumours, Yoshihisa shifted the burden of the investigation to 
Yoshitora and the Ki’iri. In other words, once it longer directly concerned Yoshihisa or his 





 These three cases highlight the fact that for Yoshihisa, the wellbeing of his family 
members was very much part a core part of his considerations when it came to making various 
decisions. That Yoshihisa would be concerned for his family needs little explanation. What is 
perhaps more abnormal is Yoshihisa’s concern for his brothers, since siblings were the primary 
challengers to many daimyo’s authority during the Sengoku period. In this regard, Yoshihisa 
showed quite a bit of confidence. Iehisa, for all the trouble he seemed to be causing for 
Yoshihisa, had a strong relationship with his older brothers. While Yoshihiro, despite his close 
age to Yoshihisa and position as shugo-dai, never once attempted to challenge Yoshihisa’s 
authority. When Kakuken asked Yoshihiro to step in and use his authority as shugo-dai to 
support the Nyūta, Yoshihiro not only declined Kakuken’s request but reported the entire matter 
to his older brother immediately. Indeed, even when Yoshihisa was forced into retirement after 
the Shimazu’s surrender to Hideyoshi in 1587, Yoshihiro never involved himself in the political 
affairs of the Shimazu despite the installation of Yoshihiro’s son as the “official” leader of the 
Shimazu by Hideyoshi. Instead, Yoshihiro and his son both chose to continue their military 
duties, leaving all political decisions and administrative affairs to Yoshihisa.272 While the reasons 
for the strong bonds shared by the Shimazu brothers are difficult to pin down, the protectiveness 
with which Yoshihisa treated family undoubtedly played a part in this. By actually thinking 
about his brothers’ wellbeing in his decision-making, Yoshihisa likely garnered significant 
respect from them, which would reduce the likelihood of his brothers wanting to rebel. In the 
end, whether he was aware of it or not, by choosing to protect his own family, Yoshihisa 
managed to further solidify his position as the undisputed ruler of the Shimazu. 
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 So far, in our current exploration of the motivating factors behind the decision-making 
process of Shimazu Yoshihisa and his retainers, we have focused on their tendency to protect and 
reinforce their own position within the administration. They were often concerned with finding 
ways to benefit themselves or those they deemed important to them. A prime example of the 
warriors’ need to protect those around them can be seen from how Yoshihisa was shielding his 
family from harm through the decisions he had made in the previous chapter. Beyond worrying 
about the physical wellbeing and position within the administration of either themselves or those 
around them, Yoshihisa and his retainers were also deeply concerned with the spiritual 
implications of their actions. An important window into this possible motivational factor of 
Yoshihisa and his administration can be found through the act of kuji.  
The kuji is a process of divination that involves a predetermined list of options set by 
those conducting the act itself. From these limited options, a result was randomly generated 
through a lottery process, similar to drawing a random lot. The divination was conducted to 
consult the kami when the administration was faced with difficult or particularly important 
decisions. As such, results of the kuji were seen as divine messages and were taken very 
seriously for those involved. This divination process was not unique to the warrior class nor to 
medieval Japan. Kuji continues to exist to this day in shrines across Japan in the form of omikuji. 





to see how successful they will be in their future endeavours. Despite the slight shift in its 
function in the modern period, at the most fundamental level, the kuji continued to act as an 
avenue for people to deduce the kami’s will in facing their daily challenges.   
 In this final chapter, we will examine the impact spirituality had on Yoshihisa’s decision-
making process, before diving deeper into the kuji as a specific example of how faith impacted 
Yoshihisa. This chapter argues that spiritual considerations played a significant part in affecting 
the daily decisions of the Shimazu administration. To do this, the chapter will be separated into 
three distinct sections. 
The first of the three sections will be devoted to addressing some of the established views 
on the function of the kuji within the Shimazu administration. This section will be dealing 
primarily with the arguments forwarded by Fukushima Kaneharu and Nagamatsu Atsushi. 
Focusing on the possible functions of the kuji, Fukushima argues that the kuji was a way that 
allowed the daimyo to grant spiritual authority to his own decisions through the manipulation of 
the results beforehand. Fukushima thus suggests that the kuji was a tool used to quell any 
dissents within the senior retainer council. Nagamatsu’s exploration of the kuji focuses instead 
on the ties between the kuji and the specific retainers that conducted these divinations. By 
highlighting the connection between the kuji and the practice of shugendō, Nagamatsu suggests 
that the kuji were used mainly as a spiritual means to consolidate military intelligence and 
surveillance data, and injecting such information into the decision-making process. While I agree 
with both Fukushima and Nagamatsu in that the kuji was a tool utilized by the daimyo, I would 
argue that we cannot dismiss the spiritual significance of the kuji in examining the motivating 





arguments of Fukushima and Nagamatsu in detail, and provide some preliminary counter-
arguments to their positions on this matter. 
In the second section of this chapter, I will provide several different examples from the 
Uwai Kakuken nikki that illustrate the fundamental importance of spirituality and religion for the 
Shimazu’s general worldview. These examples will highlight how important spiritual practices 
were to the Shimazu. From their interpretations of certain events as auspicious omens to their 
monthly poetry gatherings, it is clear that attaining divine favour through worship was an 
important aspect of the Shimazu’s daily life. It is ultimately impossible for us to understand the 
various concerns of the Shimazu without addressing the significance of their spiritual practices 
and beliefs. The importance placed on spirituality by the Shimazu further points to the fact that 
the interpretations of the kuji proposed by Fukushima and Nagamatsu are ultimately inconsistent 
with the fundamental worldview of the Shimazu administration. Given the Shiamzu’s faith and 
dedication to worship, it is highly improbable that Yoshihisa would manipulate the results of a 
kuji in order to quell dissent within the ranks of the senior retainers. This is especially true when 
Yoshihisa already had all the administrative authority to silence retainers who disagreed with 
him and his administration without the need to usurp the divine authority of the kami.  
In the final section, we will return to the issue of the kuji, and look specifically at four 
distinct examples of the kuji as recorded by Kakuken. Through these examples, it will become 
clear that the kuji was fundamentally ill-suited for the daimyo to communicate secret objectives 
as suggested by Fukushima and Nagamatsu. To start, the results of the kuji were vague by 
design. The inherent ambiguity of kuji results made sense as a form of divination for it allowed 
for creative and adaptive interpretations of the results, but it makes much less sense as a tool to 





was to the Shimazu. Kuji results could not be denied and must be followed through to the end 
even if it was politically or militarily nonsensical for the Shimazu to do so. Changes to the kuji 
could only be made when the Shimazu was able to attain permission from the kami through yet 
more kuji. All of this points to the spiritual significance of the kuji and the Shimazu’s genuine 
belief in the religious nature of divination. Rather than rationalizing the kuji, we need to embrace 
the Shimazu’s understanding of the kuji in order to fully grasp what their concerns were with 
regards to their daily decisions. 
 
I. Divination as an Excuse? 
 The interpretation of the kuji as an administrative and communicative tool rests on the 
identity of the retainers who conducted the kuji for Yoshihisa. According to both Fukushima and 
Nagamatsu, these retainers were key in allowing Yoshihisa control over the kuji and their results. 
What these two scholars neglected to consider however is the very nature of these divinations as 
a religious act. Because of this, the interpretations offered by Fukushima and Nagamatsu provide 
us with a complex but ultimately incomplete understanding of the function of the kuji and its 
impact on the overall Shimazu administration. 
One of the reasons for viewing the kuji as a tool explicitly used for decision-making and 
political maneuvering has to do with the fact that the same people who were in charge of 
conducting these divinations were also retainers directly in service to Yoshihisa. Within the 
Shimazu administration, those in charge of conducting the kuji for Yoshihisa were practitioners 
of shugendō.273 This was what provided these particular retainers with the necessary spiritual 
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authority to conduct such rituals in the first place.274 This has a couple of important 
consequences in how we interpret the role of kuji in the broader political decision-making 
process. First, these particular retainers combine in themselves both the authority endowed to 
them by the administration and the spiritual power granted to them as shugendō practitioners. In 
other words, when it came to conducting spiritual acts such as the kuji for the purposes of 
making administrative decisions, these retainers held an almost unparalleled degree of authority 
relative to their peers.  
 Second, being shugendō practitioners, these retainers had exclusive access to the larger 
communication network that spanned the entire archipelago. This is directly related to the nature 
of shugendō practice and the many mountain ascetics, or yamabushi, in their ranks. Retainers 
practicing shugendō were frequently in contact with the yamabushi who also served as envoy 
monks for the purposes of communication between daimyo.275 This connection between the 
yamabushi and the retainers who practiced shugendō allowed these retainers to easily obtain 
information on the military movements of neighbouring daimyo through careful surveillance. 
Furthermore, these retainers also had access to secretive pilgrimage routes used exclusively by 
the yamabushi, allowing mediators working for these retainers to securely deliver messages 
quickly and without hindrance from potential rivals.276 Retainers of the Shimazu who practiced 
shugendō thus became an invaluable part of the administration, providing access to information 
that they could not otherwise obtain. 
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 It is not difficult to see why scholars would suggest that the kuji served much more than 
spiritual purposes. The retainers who had exclusive access to the secret information network of 
the yamabushi were also the ones in charge of conducting these important divinations. As such it 
is unsurprising that scholars would suspect the possibility that these retainers operated to control 
the larger decision-making process from behind the scenes. Fukushima Kaneharu is one such 
scholar.  
In Fukushima’s analysis of the power dynamics between the Shimazu daimyo and his 
senior retainers, Fukushima argues that the kuji was a tool of political control employed by the 
daimyo in order to tame the chaos resulting from the clashing opinions of the senior retainers.277 
According to Fukushima, a key part of the reason why the Shimazu was able to do this was by 
designating specific shrines as sanctioned sites for conducting the kuji. All of the shrines which 
were permitted to do so were ones that the Shimazu were either personally affiliated with or 
whose holdings the Shimazu directly confirmed.278 Fukushima suggests that this connection 
between the shrines and the Shimazu, in addition to employing of shugendō practitioners to 
deliver the will of the daimyo to these shrines through secret passages, allowed the Shimazu to 
control the outcome of the kuji.279 The kuji was therefore, Fukushima argues, a system through 
which the daimyo suppressed any possible dissent within the senior retainer council through the 
divine approval of the kami.280  
 Another prominent strand of interpretation with regards to the kuji can be seen in the 
work of Nagamatsu Atsushi. Nagamatsu argued that the results of these kuji need to be analyzed 
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through the lens of information gathering and surveillance.281 Nagamatsu suggests that the kuji 
was a process that crystallized all the information gathered through the shugendō networks, 
converting them into official sanctions that carried the necessary spiritual weight to override 
previous decisions.282 Nagamatsu went so far as to call kuji a method for determining political 
policies through the participation of shugendō practitioners.283 The understanding of kuji as 
represented here fundamentally downplays the spiritual nature of the divination itself. As such, 
Nagamatsu’s interpretation of the kuji remains incomplete at best. 
 The interpretations of the kuji propagated by both Fukushima and Nagamatsu are by no 
means unreasonable. The only real significant difference between these scholars’ understanding 
lies in the intention and control exerted by the Shimazu. While Fukushima argues for the 
manipulation of the kuji outcome so that the Shimazu could justify their own decisions in the 
face of dissent, Nagamatsu instead suggests that the kuji were merely the product of synthesizing 
political decisions with additional information attained through the shugendō networks. Indeed, 
if we consider some of the factors behind the decision-making process of the Shimazu in general, 
we can easily imagine a scenario where Yoshihisa’s need to control his retainers would prompt 
him to try and control the results of a kuji. There are however two major problems with this line 
of interpretation. First, based on our understanding of the administrative processes of the 
Shimazu, we know that the daimyo could easily manipulate decisions made by his administration 
should he saw fit to do so. For example, in our previous look at Kakuken’s interactions with the 
Nyūta, we have seen Yoshihisa implicitly pressure the senior retainers to change their minds 
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when it came to his decision to “reschedule” their invasion of Bungo in the second month of 
Tenshō 14 (1586).284 Given sufficient political and military justifications, there was no need to 
invoke the will of the divine in this process. In other words, if Yoshihisa wanted to override the 
decisions made by the senior retainer councils, he can simply do so through subtle political 
maneuvering without usurping and manipulating the words of the supernatural. 
 Second, and more importantly, the interpretations offered by both Fukushima and 
Nagamatsu do not address the spiritual aspects of the kuji. Fukushima’s argument in particular 
was framed with the specific aim of explaining the irrationality inherent in the use of kuji within 
the Shimazu decision-making process.285 By viewing the kuji as a problem that needs to be 
explained and rationalized, Fukushima is assuming that the Shimazu shared the same focus we 
have upon secularism and rationality within our own views of government and the military. This 
is a fundamentally incomplete understanding of the kuji and the function it provided for the 
Sengoku daimyo as it ignores a crucial aspect of the divination. Furthermore, some of the 
particular issues addressed by Fukushima and Nagamatsu could be answered from the 
perspective of spirituality as well. 
  In particular, the idea that both Fukushima and Nagamatsu sought to explain is directly 
linked to the importance placed upon the kuji results. The conducting of a kuji was not something 
taken lightly, as once a kuji was completed, it became almost impossible for the samurai to act in 
opposition to it.286 This by itself speaks to the spiritual power of the kuji, as a fortune granted by 
the kami was understandably something that the daimyo cannot easily deny without some level 
of political and spiritual backlash. It is only when we try to rationalize this act of divination that 
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the conducting of kuji became something that needs an explanation at all. This is not to deny the 
political power of the kuji or any potential utilitarian motivations behind the divination itself, but 
these aspects of the kuji should complement our understanding of the kuji from a spiritual 
perspective and not override it. 
 For example, while Fukushima suggests that the designation of specific shrines for the 
kuji and the employment of shugendō practitioners as evidence for the Shimazu’s control over 
the result of the kuji, this is by no means the only way we can understand why the Shimazu made 
this decision in the first place. Indeed, the selection of specific shrines for the kuji can simply be 
due to issues of trust. We know that the results of a kuji were taken very seriously. As such, it 
was likely that the Shimazu would want to ensure the divination to be successfully and correctly 
conducted. Having it be done at a trusted shrine was one way to do this. Similarly, the use of 
shugendō practitioners for this ritual makes sense if we consider the spiritual authority they 
embodied. These retainers’ knowledge of secret passages used by mountain ascetics allowed for 
a safer and faster transference of the kuji results from the shrine to the daimyo, further ensuring 
the accuracy of said results.  
Lastly, regarding the idea that the kuji was used to suppress dissent within the senior 
retainer council, we cannot deny that the overwhelming spiritual authority held by the kuji could 
silence any opposition. That being the case, it is unsurprising that kuji results often unwittingly 
served this purpose as it was naturally during times of indecision that the will of the kami would 
be consulted. Thus the suppression of dissent was not so much an indication of the function of 
the kuji, but rather the natural result of appealing to a higher power for an absolute decision. 





 In order to show that spirituality was a major motivating factor behind the political 
decision-making process of the Shimazu administration, we shall look at the overall levels of 
faith and spirituality displayed by the Shimazu as recorded by Kakuken in his diary. Through 
these displays of faith found in the daily operation of the Shimazu administration, we will see 
that an investigation into the kuji’s influence on the decision-making process of the Shimazu 
must address issues of spirituality. Spirituality was a key part of medieval life and needs to be 
seen as a key part of military calculations and factored into the warriors’ needs to protect their 
own administrative position. 
 
II. Faith and Spirituality in the Shimazu Administration 
 In this section, we will see how important spiritual practices and worship were to the 
Shimazu through several examples. This sense of religiosity and spirituality that formed the 
foundation of the Shimazu administration are apparent even from several of the cases we have 
examined in the previous chapters. In both the cases dealing with Iehisa on the one hand and 
Yoshitora on the other, we have seen how the underlying spirituality of the Shimazu could affect 
the making of political decisions. In addition to this, we can also see the faith of the Shimazu 
expressed through their poetry gatherings throughout the years, so much so that the Shimazu 
scheduled their administrative calendar around their monthly gatherings. All of these instances 
serve to highlight how important the Shimazu saw their own spiritual practices. The impact these 
beliefs had on the way that the Shimazu operated suggests that it was very unlikely that the 
Shimazu were simply using faith as a political tool. As such, it was quite improbable that the 





 If we recall the way that Iehisa manipulated false intelligence to coax Yoshihisa into 
moving the Shimazu forces towards Bungo in Tenshō 13 (1585), we see the important role 
played by spirituality in Iehisa’s schemes. One of the primary reasons why Yoshihisa believed 
Iehisa’s information was noted by Kakuken on the twentieth day of the eleventh month of 
Tenshō 13 (1585). According to Kakuken, Yoshihisa stated that, “[w]hen we were about to 
attack Nisshū in a previous year (Tenshō 4, eighth month?), I was also praying at the main shrine 
(main Hachiman Shrine), and from there we launched our campaign. That the exact same 
situation is happening again must be a sign that we should begin our march on Bungo now.”287 
From this passage, it is clear that Yoshihisa saw the timing of Iehisa’s news regarding the 
Nyūta’s betrayal of the Ōtomo as a sign from the divine rather than a simple coincidence. Of 
course, that Yoshihisa received such news during his visit to the Hachiman Shrine288 only served 
to reinforce his trust in Iehisa’s news. Iehisa, for his part, likely knew how Yoshihisa would 
interpret his false military intelligence. In other words, Iehisa took advantage of his brother’s 
underlying faith in the kami in order to manipulate Yoshihisa. That Yoshihisa’s interpretation of 
this news as an omen, and that an omen was enough to compel him to act suggest that 
Yoshihisa’s faith had a tangible impact on his decision-making in general. Within the context of 
our current examination, this incident highlights the spirituality that formed the foundations of 
the Shimazu administration and how Yoshihisa could be swayed to act by religious reasons. 
 Similarly, when it came to Yoshitora and his rumours, one of the primary ways he 
attempted to prove his innocence to the senior retainer Ki’iri Suehisa was by reminding him of 
the oath Yoshitora sworn on the pain of divine retribution. In his letter, Yoshitora specifically 
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noted that, “if I harboured even the smallest amount of such evil, I will immediately and without 
reason come to an end by the punishment of the various kami and Buddhist deities that occupies 
the three provinces, as stated in my oath which I have previously submitted.”289 Such faith based 
oaths of loyalty were not uncommon. From our modern perspective, it is easy to claim that 
swearing an oath to a higher power does not mean much in the practical sense, but there is no 
evidence to suggest that such oaths were sworn merely as a formality with no spiritual substance. 
Furthermore, even if these oaths were purely procedural, it does outline for us the underlying 
believe system of the Shimazu. Indeed, that Yoshitora specified the kami and Buddhist deities of 
the three provinces suggests that the wording of this oath was particular to the Shimazu, as it 
referred specifically to the three provinces which stood for Satsuma, Ōsumi, and Hyūga, these 
being provinces traditionally governed by the main Shimazu branch. This is yet another 
indication of the fundamental importance of spirituality and religion for the Shimazu 
administration and Yoshihisa. 
 We also see examples of the importance of faith and spirituality in the lives of mid-level 
warriors like Uwai Kakuken. For example, in his diary entry from the twenty-eighth day of the 
eighth month of Tenshō 11 (1583), Kakuken wrote, 
Last night I dreamt of this poem. 
 
Tonikaku ni Somehow 
tanomu kokoro ni  in my pleading heart 
makasu nari I was entrusted this: 
yukue mo shiranu the unknown destination 
nami no ume ga ka of the waves’ plum fragrance. 
 
Since we are about to set sail towards the Arima forces, perhaps this poem is saying that 
either in the name of Tenjin, or maybe even Christianity, the Arima will be completely 
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destroyed. Meanwhile our forces will be protected by Tenjin. This, I think, is an 
auspicious message.290   
  
Much like when Yoshihisa heard the false information about the Nyūta from Iehisa, Kakuken 
interpreted his dream as an auspicious omen. In this specific instance, the importance of 
spirituality extended even beyond the familiar kami and Buddhist deities of Japan. The very 
consideration by Kakuken that perhaps it was the Christian deity who was guiding the Shimazu 
to their victory shows the fundamental and universal importance of spiritual beliefs for the 
Shimazu warriors during this period. If this was the general worldview that the Shimazu held, it 
is highly improbable that a kuji designed specifically to decipher the will of the kami would be 
something the administration thought appropriate to manipulate. The fear of divine retribution 
was very real for the warriors within the Shimazu administration. 
 Further examples of the strength of the Shimazu’s faith can be found within their worship 
of Tenjin, hinted at by the above passage from Kakuken’s diary. The kami known as Tenjin 
during the Sengoku period is supposedly the spirit of Sugawara no Michizane (845 – 903), a high 
ranking courtier during the Heian period whose success threatened the Fujiwara regents at the 
time. As a result, Michizane was exiled to Kyushu where he died shortly thereafter. The story of 
Michizane did not end with his death. After Michizane’s death, the people responsible for his 
exile were supposedly cursed with a series of unfortunate events, ones that greatly affected the 
functioning of the imperial court. Believing these events to be the doing of Michizane’s angry 
spirit, the court proceeded to clear Michizane’s name and raise his court rank posthumously, but 
to no avail. It was only when the court promoted Michizane to the status of a kami that these 
events finally ceased, and Michizane became known as Tenjin. 
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 Despite being commonly known as the kami of learning and literary pursuits by the 
Sengoku period, the association between Tenjin and literature was a much later creation, dating 
to the Kamakura period (1185 – 1333).291 In fact, the role Tenjin played in the religious 
landscape of premodern Japan was highly amorphous. Murayama Shūichi notes that it is quite 
possible that the Tenjin that was known as the kami of learning was in fact an amalgamation of 
the belief in Michizane’s spirit and the deities of the early agricultural pantheon such as Raijin 
and Suijin, the kami of thunder and water respectively.292 The nebulous nature of Tenjin’s divine 
domain continued to persist throughout much of the premodern period, with some believing him 
to be able to bring good weather, while others saw him as the protector of the imperial family.293  
 We can perhaps find some indications as to why the Shimazu were so devoted to the 
worship of Tenjin from the diety’s history during the Muromachi period. Murayama Shūichi 
suggests that Tenjin might be considered as a guardian kami of the Ashikaga family, the shogun 
of the Muromachi bakufu.294  By 1416, Tenjin as a kami was thought to be able to relieve the 
worldly troubles of the people and as a result if this, the worship of Tenjin intensified. From this 
developmental trajectory of Tenjin’s divine powers, we can see how at the height of the Sengoku 
period the Shimazu would consider Tenjin as a pseudo-military kami. After all, if Tenjin was 
powerful enough to protect the Muromachi shogun, surely it would be beneficial for the Shimazu 
to worship Tenjin as well. This conception of Tenjin as a military kami can be seen through the 
passage above, where Kakuken interpreted his dream as a good omen coming from Tenjin due to 
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the diety’s association with plum fragrance, signifying success for their upcoming military 
campaign. 
 The significance of Tenjin worship cannot be overstated for the Shimazu. This can be 
seen most apparently in the Shimazu’s poetry gatherings. While the use of poetry for spiritual or 
religious purposes was fairly widespread, the Shimazu family and Kakuken were somewhat 
unique in this particular arena. It appears that the Shimazu chose to express their faith through 
the hosting of their poetry gatherings. We know that there existed an association between the 
hosting of poetry gatherings and the worship of Tenjin due to this kami’s association with 
learning and literary pursuits. This point was made explicit by Kakuken as well when he wrote 
about a gathering of a hundred rounds renga for their monthly prayers to Tenjin on the twenty-
fifth day of the leap eighth month, Tenshō 13 (1585).295  Beyond the somewhat random poetry 
gatherings hosted throughout the year however, what separated the Shimazu from their peers was 
the former’s scheduling of monthly poetry gatherings. Of the sixteen monthly poetry gatherings 
recorded by Kakuken, ten of them were held on the twenty-fifth of a given month.296  
 The twenty-fifth day was the day of prayer to Tenjin. This practice first began in the 
fourteenth century.297 During the Bunmei era (1469 – 1486), the dedication of poetry to Tenjin 
on the twenty-fifth of the second and sixth month of each year became standard practice within 
the imperial court itself.298 While Kakuken himself is known to be someone who equally 
worshipped all the various kami and Buddhist deities, the fact that he and the Shimazu family 
sought to schedule their monthly poetry gatherings on the twenty-fifth day of each month should 
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not be seen as coincidental.299 This is especially true when we consider the fact that, even when 
their monthly poetry gatherings were not held on the twenty-fifth, they still devoted time to 
praying and reciting sutra to Tenjin on the twenty-fifth day of the month.300 
 The Shimazu also seemed especially faithful in contrast to their contemporaries with 
regards to the worship of Tenjin. This is clear when we compare the scheduling of monthly 
poetic gatherings for the Shimazu with that of the Tokugawa through the accounts recorded in 
the diary of Matsudaira Ietada (1555 – 1600). This particular diary covers the period of 1577 to 
1594. Unlike the Uwai Kakuken nikki however, entries in the Ietada nikki (The Diary of Ietada) 
are mostly brief accounts of specific events that took place without going into much details.  
 The important thing to note for our current purposes however is the fact that the Ietada 
nikki also contains numerous records of monthly poetry gatherings. Within the span of the 
seventeen years recorded by Ietada, there were a total of sixty-three monthly poetry gatherings 
on record, of which only nine were held on the twenty-fifth of any given month.301 This stands in 
stark contrast to the percentage of monthly poetry gatherings held on the twenty-fifth of a given 
month in Kakuken’s diary. When tallied, 62.5% of all monthly poetry gatherings recorded in 
Kakuken’s diary was held on the twenty-fifth day of the month versus the 14.3% as recorded in 
Ietada’s diary. While one might argue that the much smaller sample size found within the Uwai 
Kakuken nikki somewhat weakens this comparison, this statistical difference does illustrate for us 
a couple of things. First, the scheduling of monthly poetry gatherings in general was a flexible 
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affair and that there were no rules that specifically stated that the monthly poetry gatherings need 
to be held on the twenty-fifth. All of this can be gleaned from Ietada’s diary.  
 Second, because poetry gatherings was a flexible affair, the Shimazu’s decision to 
schedule them on the twenty-fifth of the month was clearly a deliberate choice. This was after all 
the same day of the month dedicated to the worship of Tenjin. And since the composing of 
poetry could be conceived as an act of devotion towards Tenjin, it is not difficult to see the 
Shimazu’s scheduling of these poetry gatherings as an act of faith.  
 The Shimazu’s dedication to the act of worship can be further seen from their eagerness 
to seize further opportunities to compose poetry for Tenjin. On eleventh day of the twelfth 
month, Tenshō 12 (1584), Kakuken wrote,  
A senku302 was traditionally held every year on the sixteenth day of the first month, but in 
recent years, this was changed to be held on the twenty-fifth of the second month instead. 
As we were occupied with military campaigns in the past five to six years, we have 
stopped these gatherings. After some discussion, it was decided that a senku will be held 
on the twenty-fifth of first month next year.303 
 
What is significant here is that, as with the case of the monthly poetry gatherings, an effort was 
made to schedule yet another poetry event to be held on the twenty-fifth. Unlike their monthly 
gatherings which tend to be quite flexible in terms of scheduling, we can see from this entry that 
there was a set precedent for when the senku was held. When they were previously forced to 
reschedule their senku, they chose to move it to the twenty-fifth of the following month. Given 
the significance of this particular date, we can safely assume that this choice was a deliberate 
one. Perhaps more importantly however, when given the chance to revert back to the pre-
established norm of when to hold their senku gathering, the Shimazu decided to not follow 
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precedents. Instead, the Shimazu chose to find some sort of middle ground by choosing to hold 
their next senku on the first month of the year as before, but changing the date from the sixteenth 
to the twenty-fifth. The insistence on holding poetry events on the twenty-fifth day whenever 
possible underscores the spiritual and religious significance that defined the worldview of the 
Shimazu both in general, and specifically with regards to Tenjin.  
 This long foray into the scheduling of the monthly poetry gatherings serves to highlight 
just how important religious rituals and spirituality was for the Shimazu in general. Further 
evidence suggesting this can be found in the Shimazu military as well. For example, both the 
prayers to the Ikusa-gami, translating literally to “the god of war,” conducted prior to battle, 
along with the kuwazome, the ritualistic breaking of ground at the start of construction, being 
conducted when setting up military camps, suggest the fundamental religious nature of the 
Shimazu military as well.304 Furthermore, troop formations were also frequently changed based 
on their compatibility with the seasons and the auspiciousness of any given day.305 In 
conjunction to this, the practice of using “cursed” needles and arrows in combat was also 
something the Shimazu adopted.306 All of this further highlights for us the spiritual 
underpinnings of the Shimazu administration and military.307 
 From the above examples, we can see that the Shimazu administration and Yoshihisa in 
particular did not take the divine lightly. We have seen the Shimazu warriors sworn oaths based 
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upon the threat of divine retribution and interpret their dreams as revelations from a higher 
power. We have also seen Yoshihisa deceived by false information because he understood the 
timing of such information as a divine omen. We saw that the act of worship dictate the 
Shimazu’s administrative calendar and the way they ritualized many aspects of warfare. It is 
difficult then to see the daimyo of such an administration being comfortable in manipulating the 
results of a kuji when so much of the Shimazu’s lives were fundamentally defined by their 
worship of the divine. This is especially the case when there are no substantive evidence showing 
the manipulation of the kuji to be true. With the foundational importance of spirituality and 
religious worship of the Shimazu established, we will move on to look specifically at the 
instances of kuji recorded in the Uwai Kakuken nikki. Specifically, we will see whether there 
were any indications that the kuji was simply used as a tool and how the results of the kuji 
actually motivated Yoshihisa and the Shimazu administration in their decision-making process. 
  
III. The Kuji Divination in the Uwai Kakuken nikki 
 In order to see how spirituality and faith contributed to the Shimazu’s decision-making 
process, we will look at four specific examples of kuji in this section. These examples will 
illustrate how decisions were in fact made in accordance to the results of these kuji due to the 
underpinning religiosity of these results. The first example I wish to investigate in detail dates to 
the tenth month of Tenshō 11 (1583) and involved the Shimazu’s attack on Katashida. In this 
particular case, the Shimazu conducted the kuji in order to determine the proper course of action 
to take in their attack. This example shows how kuji were set up and how the results were 
extremely vague which in turn allowed it to be interpreted by the Shimazu without the resorting 





decisions through a network of shugendō practitioners and the information they garnered through 
surveillance, then the final decisions rendered should be much more concrete. The lack of 
ambiguity would limit the flexibility in interpreting the results. After all, if the kuji was just a 
façade of the daimyo’s decisions, it would not makes sense for it to be so vague. The ambiguity 
of the kuji suggests that it would be an inappropriate option for delivering a daimyo’s verdict.  
 In preparation for their attack on Katashida, the Shimazu passed the decision to conduct a 
kuji to determine their overall military strategy on the second of the tenth month of Tenshō 11 
(1583).308 The actual kuji was conducted two weeks later on the seventeenth of the tenth 
month.309 Uwai Kakuken recorded in detail all the possible results of the kuji:  
this morning, prayers were held at Kōriyama Temple (Isa district), and the kuji for what 
to do when we arrive at Katashida is determined. The results will be decided as such: if 
the result is ‘one’ we will set up camp, if the result is ‘two’ we will begin our attack, and 
if it is determined that we should further consider our course of actions, the kuji result 
would be blank. The kuji result was a blank.310  
 
We can see that all possible results were extremely vague. Considering all the possible outcomes 
to the kuji listed by Kakuken, it is difficult to see how the kuji would be a reliable political tool 
for Yoshihisa to deliver any kind of secret decision. Furthermore, if the kuji was such a political 
tool, the blank result would be ultimately inconclusive and unhelpful. If Yoshihisa wanted to halt 
their military campaign, he could easily hold off on conducting the kuji completely as they never 
determined an actual date for the kuji, stating only that “the kuji for Katashida on whether we 
should surround the area or attack immediately should be conducted soon.”311 The vagueness of 
their timing for the kuji meant that there was no real deadline by which they must conduct the 
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divination. If the kuji was in fact something that existed only to legitimize Yoshihisa’s decision, 
he could have delayed the kuji until he made up his mind instead of making a non-decision as 
suggested by the blank result. This would suggest then that the kuji was most certainly conducted 
to consult the will of the kami, as opposed to it being a tool of Yoshihisa used to spiritually 
legitimize himself. 
 The blank result of the kuji afforded the Shimazu the flexibility to basically do whatever 
they wanted when it came to their attack on Katashida. This by itself would render the kuji an 
unlikely candidate as something used for a secret political purpose. Ultimately, the Shimazu 
decided on the twenty-second that “regarding Katashida, because the kuji to surround the area 
was not granted to us, it was decided that we will attack Katashida in the next few days.”312 
Since they waited a few days, they have technically fulfilled the kami’s advice of waiting and 
reconsidering their course of actions, and were thus free to act in whichever way they thought 
best. The amount of room that the Shimazu had in interpreting and executing the kami’s will as 
expressed by the kuji undermines significantly the notion that the kuji were simply Yoshihisa’s 
instructions in disguise. In other words, the vagueness inherent within the kuji already provided 
the daimyo with enough freedom to force his own interpretation on to the results if he wished. 
The possibility for such sublte acts of manipulation lessen the daimyo’s need for explicit control 
through the staging of a fake divination just to get his way. 
 The second example that I wish to examine here represents one of the rarer instances 
where the Shimazu deliberated on whether or not to conduct a kuji on a matter not directly 
related to their military planning. The use of the kuji for non-military purposes by itself 
somewhat weakens the arguments made by Fukushima and Nagamatsu. As we can imagine, in 
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such non-military scenarios, the utility provided by the networks of the shugendō practitioners 
emphasized by both Fukushima and Nagamatsu was much less relevant. Another important 
insight that can be derived from the following example is the idea that when a decision could be 
made without recourse to the kami’s will divined through kuji, it was perhaps better for them not 
to consult the kami at all. This idea speaks to the sanctity of the kuji itself, suggesting that the 
results of the kuji affected the making of political decisions not because they were founded on 
some secretive network of information or subjected to behind-the-scene manipulation by the 
daimyo, but simply because the results of the kuji were the words of the kami. 
 This second example involves the Shimazu’s decision on what landholdings should be 
granted to Arima Harunobu (1567 – 1612) in the aftermath of the Shimazu’s rescue of the Arima 
in the fourth month of Tenshō 12 (1584). On the twenty-third of the month, Yoshihisa passed on 
this message to Uwai Kakuken and the other senior retainers: “with regards to this matter, there 
are a wide range of opinions. Should we give all the landholdings back to Arima [Harunobu] or 
should we only give two or three landholdings to him. As we have no memorandum of this, 
while Kawada [Yoshiaki] is here, he shall conduct a kuji to provide an answer to this issue.”313 
This kuji was fundamentally different from the kind that was conducted in the previous case 
regarding Katashida. While the kuji for Katashida could determine the Shimazu’s approach in 
their military campaign, the kuji Yoshihisa wanted for the Arima’s landholdings would 
determine the Arima’s financial and political future. Both these scenarios had a military impact, 
but the impact was much more abstract in the case of the latter. Similarly, the value of 
surveillance and the shugendō information network was much less significant in the case of the 
Arima as well. The decision to conduct a kuji for the situation surrounding the Arima thus 
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supports the idea that the kuji genuinely had spiritual and religious value for the Shimazu, and 
that the outcome of the kuji had a real impact on the political decision-making process. 
 Even more illuminating than Yoshihisa’s decision to conduct a kuji however is the 
subsequent discussion amongst Kakuken and his colleagues. On the same day this message 
arrived from Yoshihisa, Kakuken recorded in his diary the relative merits of consulting the kami 
on such matters. He wrote on the twenty-third, 
With regards to the management of the various castles, prior to the two mediators’ arrival 
and their message informing us of Ina-shin’s [Inatomi Shinsuke] delivery of the decision 
to hold a kuji and Yoshihisa’s decision on this matter, we had our own opinions on this 
issue. Even if a kuji is carried out, would it not be difficult to even grant them jurisdiction 
over two or three landholdings?  
 
Based on what we have heard, there is a lack of available landholdings in general. Is it 
not the case that whether it was the jitō-shiki or the actual possession of a particular 
landholding, we have no holdings left to assign? It is difficult for retainers petitioning to 
be relocated to serve a useful role [in this situation]. The state of affair is probably 
difficult even for those officially ordered to take over [various landholdings].  
 
The conducting of a kuji is an important matter. After thoroughly reconsidering the 
situation, we wonder if we should conduct a kuji at all.314  
 
This short evaluation by Kakuken and his colleagues regarding whether or not a kuji should be 
conducted illuminates for us the space the kuji occupied in the minds of the Shimazu retainers. 
According to this passage, the crux of the issue surrounded the ability of the Shimazu to actually 
carry out the result of the kuji, whatever that might be. Because they were already faced with a 
lack of sufficient landholdings to bestow upon their retainers, even if the kuji determined that 
only two or three holdings should be granted to the Arima, the Shimazu might not be able to 
follow through on the will of the kami. This implies that, for the retainers, the results of the kuji 
cannot be ignored or modified. In other words, in consulting the kami through kuji, the Shimazu 
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needed to make sure that they were able to execute on all the possible outcomes. This challenges 
the idea of the kuji simply being a way to grant spiritual legitimacy to a daimyo’s decision, as a 
daimyo’s decision could easily be changed and modified in accordance to the situation he was 
facing. While kuji results could be “creatively interpreted,” they could not be ignored, making it 
a highly inefficient tool for daimyo who wish to use it purely for the silencing of dissent within 
the ranks as it lacked flexibility in execution. 
 Of course, the immutability of the kuji results by itself does not prove the spirituality of 
the divination. There could be other reasons why ignoring the results of a kuji was impossible. 
However, since the daimyo had the authority to alter decisions made by himself or his 
administration, Kakuken’s worry in the above passage would be unfounded if the kuji was 
simply Yoshihisa’s tool. Further, if the kuji was used in such a manner, surely Kakuken and 
other senior retainers would know of this fact, thus rendering their above concerns moot.  
 For the kuji to be an effective means for delivering secret decisions by the daimyo, as 
suggested by Fukushima, the daimyo will need to hide the kuji’s secret function from his 
retainers. The idea that the daimyo could effectively hide the “true” purposes of a kuji is 
unconvincing. This is especially so when we consider the fact that the kuji were not spiritual acts 
conducted in secret, without the senior retainers’ prior knowledge. In this particular instance, 
Yoshihisa asked Kawada Yoshiaki, a military advisor to the Shimazu, to conduct the kuji.315 This 
meant that the knowledge of the kuji was likely not limited to just the senior retainers either, and 
that many within the Shimazu ranks probably knew of the kuji and its function. Given what we 
know of the communication structure of the Shimazu and the many layers of mediators involved, 
                                                           
315
 For Kawada Yoshiaki’s biographic information, see Honpan jinbutsu-shi, p. 85. Yoshiaki in particular was likely 






the possibility of keeping the real functions and motivations behind the kuji a secret was highly 
improbable. As such, if the kuji was used insincerely in a spiritual sense, then it would likely be 
an open secret, which in turn would significantly weaken its ability to function in this manner, 
rendering the entire matter contradictory to say the least. 
 For the next example, let us once again return to the case of the Nyūta and the failure of 
Kakuken and Iehisa to steer the Shimazu military into helping the Nyūta. We know that 
Kakuken’s plan to assist the Nyūta ended because of a sudden decision by Yoshihisa to redeploy 
their forces against the Tsukushi family instead. The decision came down the chain of command 
on the sixteenth of the sixth month, Tenshō 14 (1586), and was made in accordance to the results 
of a recent kuji. Kakuken wrote, 
While we have decided to launch our military campaign from both Higo and Hyūga 
after our meeting when I last visited Kagoshima, we have heard repeatedly from Iino 
that we should instead seek the will of the kami at Imamiya, and should continue to do 
so going forward…  
 
On top of this, recently Zenzai-bō (Omodaka Yoritoshi) returned from his journey to 
Chūgoku (Aki province, Mōri Terumoto). After hearing what he had to say, it was 
decided that Zenzai-bō and Yamakoshi would go to Kirishima (Aira district) as 
mediators and conduct a kuji. This kuji was conducted to see if we should set out 
towards Tsukushi, and it was determined that we should do just that.316 
 
This was enough for Yoshihisa to change his military plans completely. Official orders were 
issued to the various retainers participating on this campaign against the Ōtomo in order to stem 
the confusion within the ranks caused by this change.317 This confusion was part of the reason 
why Yoshihisa’s decision was likely not one guided by some secretive intelligence gathered 
through surveillance. If we also consider the amount of wasted resources this sudden change of 
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plans entailed, it becomes more and more likely that what changed Yoshihisa’s mind was his 
respect of the words of the kami divined through the kuji.  
 One possible interpretation of the kuji that I have not discussed thus far was the amount 
of leeway it afforded the daimyo during times of indecision. More specifically, the sudden 
change of plans seen above could be read as Yoshihisa unreasonably changing his mind for 
personal reasons, and thus used the kuji to justify his actions. This would fall in line with the 
arguments made by Fukushima and Nagamatsu. Furthermore, this decision to redirect their 
military efforts came after one of their retainers, Zenzai-bō, returned from Aki, which was 
already subjugated by Toyotomi Hideyoshi by this point. Though we cannot say for certain, this, 
along with the fact that Yoshihisa already received a letter from Hideyoshi specifically asking 
the Shimazu to seize all violence in Kyushu, suggest that it is possible that Yoshihisa had the 
potential full-scale invasion by Hideyoshi in mind when he decided to withdraw from attacking 
the Ōtomo.318 After all, the Ōtomo was the most prominent military presence in Kyushu besides 
the Shimazu, and an open declaration of war against them would only highlight the Shimazu’s 
non-compliance to Hideyoshi’s demands.  
 The actions taken by the Shimazu military prior to Yoshihisa’s decision to redirect their 
forces towards Tsukushi however tells a different story. Looking at the events of the days leading 
up to Yoshihisa changing his mind on the sixteenth, we see him repeatedly emphasizing the need 
to carry out their attack against the Ōtomo. On the seventh of the same month, Kakuken wrote,  
As Kamata Gyōbuzaemon-no-jō (Masahiro) came down to the provinces with word from 
Hashiba (Hideyoshi) and his plans to distribute control for the various provinces to his 
retainers, and many other difficult issues, we all agreed we should just proceed with our 
suppression of Bunshū as was previously determined by the will of the kami. Our lord 
(Yoshihisa) too issued the order as before: we should begin our march from both Higo 
and Hyūga as it was determined last spring. It is decided that Lord Taishu (Yoshihisa) 
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will begin his advance from Hyūga, and Lord Muko [Yoshihiro] will begin his advance 
from Hishū.319 
 
This passage alone suggests that Yoshihisa was not particularly threatened by Hideyoshi’s 
demands, as Yoshihisa’s response to them was simply to carry on with his plans as determined 
by the kami previously. Yoshihisa followed up on this decision by issuing an official order to all 
his retainers to begin their march on the ninth.320 Furthermore, following the bad weather and 
flooding that plagued the Shimazu between the eleventh and the thirteenth, Yoshihisa once again 
ordered his retainers to resume their attack on the fourteenth.321 The course of action taken by 
Yoshihisa does not portray a person who was racked with indecision prior to changing his mind. 
Instead, even a flood did not deter Yoshihisa’s will to follow the words of the kami. This 
suggests that whatever changed Yoshihisa mind was likely more important than simple 
indecision or even natural disasters. The presence of a new kuji updating the Shimazu on the will 
of the kami however, would be one of the few things that could change Yoshihisa’s mind. 
  The final example I wish to investigate further continues exploring the developing 
situation surrounding the Ōtomo. Namely, we will be looking at the actual indecision faced by 
the Shimazu upon receiving news of the looming invasion of Hideyoshi three months after 
Yoshihisa decided to not attack the Ōtomo. Unlike the previous situation faced by the Shimazu 
during the sixth month, Yoshihisa was faced with a true dilemma on the first of the ninth month 
when he received rumours of major military movements towards Kyushu. According to 
Kakuken, “they have crossed the seas from Chūgoku (Kuroda Yoshitaka, Mōri Terumoto, etc). 
Also, Bungo (Ōtomo Yoshimune) are moving towards Asu (Higo, Asu distric), while various 
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warships left Shikoku (Sengoku Hidehisa, Chōsokabe Motochika, etc) and are heading towards 
Hyūga. These rumours put us in a tough spot.”322 The Shimazu were caught in a bind as they 
were already in the midst of their military campaign against the Tsukushi by this time.323 In this 
way the Shimazu found themselves at a crossroad where their adherence to the divine was 
confronted with the military reality they were faced with. Their response to this dilemma will 
provide us with more evidence suggesting that it was the fundamentally spiritual nature of the 
kuji that motivated the decision-making process of Yoshihisa and the Shimazu administration at 
large.  
 It is telling that the first solution they considered in response to a possible invasion by 
Hideyoshi was to revisit the results of the kuji they previously conducted with regards to the 
invasion of Bungo. After their discussion, the senior retainers suggested this to Yoshihisa; 
In response to this situation, we should invade Bungo from Higo and Hyūga. If we sent 
our warships discreetly towards Bungo, we think we can succeed quite simply. Though 
we will be on the defensive, our forces here (Asu front) can pass through the southern 
districts (Bungo, Ōno district and Naoiri district), and our forces from Hyūga can move 
towards Ume (same, Minamiamabe district) and Mie (same, Ōno district), and cross the 
mountains there. If we do this, we should have nothing to worry about despite Bungo 
receiving support from Kyoto (Hashiba forces).324 
 
The immediate plan that came to the minds of the senior retainers was the one that was 
previously formulated in accordance to an earlier kuji. This detail was not missed by Yoshihisa, 
who responded by saying, “with regards to the Bungo front, as this is in accordance to the kuji, 
we should be able to do this quite easily.”325 The existence of this kuji was recognized by 
Yoshihisa and provided enough justification for him to carry out this plan of attack. 
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 The reference to this particular kuji as the foundation of the Shimazu’s military strategy 
disproves the theories forwarded by Fukushima and Nagamatsu. If Fukushima’s argument is 
correct, that the kuji served as a tool whose results were manipulated by the daimyo who sought 
spiritual authority for his actions, then it would not make any sense for both the senior retainers 
and Yoshihisa to strategize base upon an old kuji conducted on the twenty-second of the first 
month of Tenshō 14 (1586).326 With eight months having elapsed since the kuji was conducted, if 
the result of this kuji was a calculated decision made by Yoshihisa, making this same decision 
without further consideration for the potential invasion of Hideyoshi would be nonsensical. 
Similarly, if the kuji results were the crystallization of new military intelligence gathered through 
surveillance and the shugendō network, then making plans based on an eight-month old kuji 
seems like a foolish idea. After all, the lurking threat of Hideyoshi was what prompted the 
Shimazu to reconsider their plans toward Bungo in the first place. For the Shimazu to not update 
their military intelligence through another kuji before deciding on their course of action seem to 
undermine the very purpose of their reconsideration. 
 Following these events, it was Yoshihiro, Yoshihisa’s younger brother and shugo-dai, 
who expressed doubt with Yoshihisa’s decision. On the following day Yoshihiro responded to 
Yoshihisa’s decision by urging Yoshihisa to conduct a new kuji and act in accordance to the 
results.327 Yoshihisa however did not give Yoshihiro a definitive answer. On the sixth day, 
Kakuken wrote in his diary that, “our lord has not made up his mind. Should a kuji be 
conducted? We have doubts as to whether we should conduct the kuji so many times about 
Bungo, but if we do not follow through on our current affairs with the Tsukushi, we will invite 
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misfortune upon ourselves. As such we think it is best that another kuji be conducted.”328 Two 
particular things stand out in this passage. Both the reluctance towards conducting multiple kuji 
on the same issue, and the idea of inviting misfortune (akuji) should they not complete the 
mission given to them by a previous kuji point toward the religious importance of the kuji. From 
these two points we can see how the Shimazu at large saw this spiritual act as something of 
significance. This religious aspect of the kuji was fundamental to the Shimazu when they were 
considering whether or not it was appropriate for them to change their plans to better suit the 
military challenges they faced. It is also clear that the fear of divine retribution played a part in 
the Shimazu’s political decision-making process. Spirituality, in other words, was a fundamental 
factor of consideraton behind the decision-making process for the Shimazu and Yoshihisa. 
 
IV. Conclusion: the Truth of the Kami or Political Manipulations 
 In our exploration of some of the fundamental factors Yoshihisa and his administration 
considered in their decision-making process, it has become apparent that these warriors were 
likely concerned with securing their own benefits or protecting those important to them above 
their honor or their loyalty towards the administration in the abstract. In this chapter however, we 
have seen examples of another pillar of consideration for the warriors of the Shimazu. 
Specifically, Yoshihisa and his retainers were deeply concerned with the spiritual and religious 
implications of their daily choices. 
 With regards to the Shimazu, academic attention seemed to be focus on rationalizing the 
kuji as an extension of Yoshihisa’s political power rather than examining the kuji as the 
divination that it was designed to be. In particular, we have looked at the way Fukushima and 
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Nagamatsu analysed the function of the kuji as a political tool. On the one hand, Fukushima 
suggests that the kuji was used to quell any potential dissent amongst the Shimazu retainers by 
providing divine sanction to a daimyo’s decision. The focus here is on the pre-designated shrines 
that were allowed to conduct kuji and how the access to the secretive shugendō network 
theoretically allowed the daimyo to communicate his wishes to these shrine in order to 
manipulate the kuji. While we cannot dispute the fact that the kuji had an administrative 
dimension, the downplaying of the spiritual aspects of the divination keeps us from gaining a 
complete understanding of the effects spiritual acts like the kuji had on the decision-making 
process of the Shimazu. 
 On the other hand, Nagamatsu emphasized the role played by the people in charge of the 
kuji and their association with the practice of shugendō. These particular retainers, Nagamatsu 
argues, allowed the Shimazu to access the secret information network of the shugendō 
practitioners and to use this network for surveillance. The kuji was thus a crystallization of the 
information gathered through this network into political decisions and supplied the daimyo with 
the spiritual authority necessary to finalize his new and updated decisions. 
 Indeed, we have seen numerous examples from the Uwai Kakuken nikki that illuminate 
for us the importance of religion and spiritual practices to the Shimazu in general. For example, 
Iehisa, in his attempt to manipulate his brother into saving the Nyūta in the Bungo province, 
played into Yoshihisa’s beliefs in auspicious omens and almost succeeded as a result. Further 
evidence can be seen from Yoshitora and the way he emphasized his oath of loyalty to Yoshihisa 
by citing the possibility of divine retribution that he will face should he betray Yoshihisa. The 





 We also saw how composing poetry and scheduling poetry events doubled as a form of 
worship for the Shimazu. While any act of poetic composition could technically be seen as an act 
dedicated to Tenjin, the Shimazu took it to an extreme in contrast to other warrior houses. By 
comparing the records in Kakuken’s diary with the journal of Matsudaira Ietada, it is apparent 
that the Shimazu went out of their way to schedule their poetry related events on the twenty-fifth 
day of the month, the designated day of worship for Tenjin.  
 On top of all of this, spirituality was also part of the military routine of the Shimazu. 
From adhering to military formations that were compatible to the seasons and the auspiciousness 
of any given day, to the prayers to the god of war and the spiritual act of breaking ground in 
setting up camp, and even the attempts to curse their opponents with special arrows, it is 
impossible to separate the Shimazu’s military practices from their spiritual beliefs. All of this 
illustrates the impact and significance of spiritual practices had on the making of various 
administrative decisions for the Shimazu. 
 Having established the fundamental importance of spirituality and worship for the 
Shimazu, we moved on to explore the kuji in particular and address the arguments forwarded by 
Fukushima and Nagamatsu. To this end, we looked at four examples of kuji. In the first example, 
the kuji was conducted for the Shimazu’s attack on Katashida. Here, we saw how all the possible 
results of a given kuji were framed in a very vague manner. In this instance, there were only 
three possible results in total: surrounding the area, attacking immediately, and further 
consideration needed. None of these options provided enough details to realistically contain any 
secret commands from the daimyo beyond the most elementary of orders. The simplicity of these 
results also provided the Shimazu administration with a tremendous amount of freedom when it 





received the third option and were told to reconsider their plans. This only resulted in the 
Shimazu delaying their attack for a few days, after which they simply continued their military 
efforts as though nothing changed. Seeing the kuji as a tool for Yoshihisa’s secret decisions here 
simply does not make sense. 
 The deterministic nature of the kuji results was something that we explored from various 
different angles through the next few examples. On the one hand, when it came to the 
distribution of landholdings for the Arima, questions were raised as to whether or not consulting 
the kami through the kuji was a good idea at all when the Shimazu themselves were struggling 
with finding enough landholdings to be distributed in the first place. On the other hand, in terms 
of military movement and planning, no matter how determined and deeply invested the Shimazu 
were, their plans were ultimately driven by the will of the kami as divined through the kuji. We 
saw this happen twice. First, in their decisions to redirect their military forces towards the 
Tsukushi, the Shimazu disregarded the investment they had already made towards invading 
Bungo. Second, in their subsequent attempts to once again invade Bungo, the Shimazu did so 
while still being embroiled in military conflict with the Tsukushi. Furthermore, by not defeating 
the Tsukushi first, the Shimazu became fearful of divine retribution for not adhering to the 
previous kuji. Despite all this, the Shimazu acted in accordance with the newest kuji result 
whenever possible. It would appear that once the kuji had determined a course of action, the 
Shimazu must follow through with it until it was completed unless they attain permission from 
the kami to do otherwise.  
 Nothing about this suggests that the kuji was simply an administrative tool in a manner 
similar to the way that Fukushima and Nagamatsu argue. Given the stock the Shimazu placed on 





scenario where Yoshihisa would think that it was okay for him to fabricate a kuji in order to 
justify his own commands. Divine punishment was a real fear for the Shimazu as seen from the 
examples above. The risk inherent in falsifying the words of the kami thus likely would not have 
been worth it considering that the daimyo had other methods through which he can quell dissent 
and force the senior retainers to agree with his own decisions. Furthermore, even if Yoshihisa 
sought to manipulate the results of a kuji for his personal purposes, this would only work if he 
could keep it a secret from his retainers. After all, if the purpose was to silence dissent amongst 
senior retainers through the authority of the kami, then having these retainers know that the kuji 
was fake would certainly undermine this intended purpose. Given what we know of the 
communication system of the Shimazu and the many layers of mediators and retainers involved 
in its operation, the idea that the daimyo could have secret access to and complete control over 
an information network is simply unrealistic. This is especially the case when the kuji was only 
conducted by individuals with shugendō ties as Nagamatsu points out. The existence of the kuji 
therefore necessitates the participation of individuals outside of the daimyo and his immediate 
family. Within this context, it would be impossible for the daimyo to render the kuji into a secret 
affair conducted away from prying eyes. 
 The kuji was thus an important part of the considerations behind the political decision-
making process of the Shimazu and Yoshihisa. From the samurai’s perspective, the kuji results 
were a form of truth granted to them by the divine, not false information maniputated to force 
them into action. But the kuji is only an indicator of the larger significance of spirituality and 
religion in administering the Shimazu domain. We need to recognize the influence of the 
fundamental belief systems of the Shimazu in framing the way the daimyo and his court made 





and the way he operated, we must fight the urge to rationalize their belief system, and instead 






Being a Daimyo in the Sengoku Period 
 
 Through the examination of the Shimazu’s communication systems, instrumental in 
controlling the flow of information and military intelligence, the preceding chapters have 
investigated the decision-making process of the Shimazu administration, from its middle-ranking 
warriors to its daimyo Shimazu Yoshihisa. Yet this micro-analysis of minute interactions in one 
daimyo’s domain offers us much more than a look at the political processes at the local and 
personal level. They serve as a lens for an inquiry into a major historical question: what did the 
Sengoku period mean for the samurai living at that time? For daimyo like Yoshihisa, what did it 
mean to be a ruler in age of continual warfare, territorial rivalry, instability in officer corps, and 
insurmountable environmental conditions? Having examined one man’s voice for a decade 
through the Uwai Kakuken nikki, we are able to provide some answers to these questions. 
 A consistent theme that appears throughout the decision-making process of the warriors 
of the Shimazu administration is the weight they give to their personal interests. No matter their 
status or profession as a mediator, a ruler, or a filial son, the individual warrior’s goals often 
outweighed abstract notions of duty, morality, or loyalty they might have for the administrative 
system. Any concern the samurai had for these notions only mattered in so far as these notions 
could affect the samurai’s image or reputation. In spite of this, it would be wrong to see the 
warriors of Sengoku Japan as selfish. Given the constant instability of Sengoku society, the 





their own wellbeing.329 For many mediators like Uwai Kakuken and Shimazu Iehisa, their 
reputation was everything. Their failure to provide the promised help to the Nyūta significantly 
undermined their legitimacy as mediators and thus threaten their raison d’être within the 
Shimazu administration. In a world of innumerable risks and continuous military upheavals, a 
warrior can only survive by making sure he remains a relevant and useful resource to his daimyo, 
even if it meant temporarily testing his daimyo’s patience through conscious acts of 
disobedience. 
 Indeed, Sengoku Japan was not a place where notions of honor, morality, or loyalty could 
exist as ideals to be realized. While we might be tempted to recognize individual acts that 
occurred during the Sengoku period as exemplifying one or more of these abstract notions, it is 
unlikely that the samurai were acting to achieve such ideals but rather to create a façade 
consistent with such ideas. This was a reaction towards the way that samurai ideals were 
formulated during this time both in popular imagination and in the dominal law codes.330 For 
example, when Kakuken asked Yoshihiro for military assistance behind Yoshihisa’s back, 
Yoshihiro denied Kakuken’s request. This rejection should not be interpreted as an act of loyalty 
towards Yoshihisa. Similarly, when the Shimazu implemented failsafe measures to prevent 
mediators from manipulating the communication infrastructure to exploit their positions, it was 
not likely to protect the abstract sanctity of the administration, but to prevent the mediators from 
gaining power at the expense of the daimyo and the senior retainers. 
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 There were two major exceptions to this pattern. First, warriors with enough authority 
and military power would strive to consider the wellbeing of those important to them. We saw 
this most prominently in Yoshihisa’s efforts to protect his son-in-law, Shimazu Yoshitora, at the 
behest of Yoshihisa’s daughter Ohira. The overwhelming amount of political authority wielded 
by Yoshihisa meant that he could afford to think about his daughter’s wellbeing when faced with 
rumours of Yoshitora’s rebellion. Ohira could not afford to do the same however. While Ohira is 
not the perfect counter-example to Yoshihisa in this instance due to her gender prohibiting her 
from being a samurai, she nevertheless acted in a manner consistent with the other warriors of 
the Shimazu. Ultimately, Ohira’s intervention benefited Yoshitora and herself at the expense of 
Yoshihisa’s security.  
The ability for a samurai to consider the larger implications of his actions was therefore 
proportional to his authority and military power. This makes sense when we consider the general 
chaos of sixteenth century Japan. A samurai in Sengoku Japan needed to constantly juggle a set 
of ever-changing variables while balancing an extremely limited amount of resources. For a 
middle-ranking warrior like Uwai Kakuken, this meant maintaining his place in the 
administration amidst shifting alliances and rivalries, and at the same time supplying those 
around him with the right information and intelligence when needed. Kakuken’s position as a 
middle-ranking warrior limited the resources he had to protect himself with, and therefore 
Kakuken could not afford to think too far beyond his individual interests.  
For a daimyo like Yoshihisa however, the situation was quite different. Yoshihisa needed 
to be much more careful than his retainers because the Shimazu administration could only 
function through the delegation of Yoshihisa’s authority as a daimyo. In other words, while 





retainers on a daily basis. In this sense, political authority became a resource in and of itself. 
Yoshihisa’s need to secure his place within the administration was therefore bound to the 
management of his retainers. In this context, rumours of overly ambitious retainers became a real 
threat to Yoshihisa’s legitimacy. Rumours can be seen as an early indication of mismanagement 
by Yoshihisa as they implied the presence of dissatisfied retainers under his administration. For a 
sixteenth century daimyo, a dissatisfied retainer is a potential military threat if not handled 
properly. Luckily for Yoshihisa, he had the means to deal with these situations. 
Having a lot more resources than the average warrior, Yoshihisa could afford to extend 
his concerns to the interests of those around him. This included bolstering the interests of 
potentially rebellious retainers by redirecting Yoshihisa’s own resources towards them. We have 
seen Yoshihisa do this when he dealt with the Iriki-in rumours. By juggling the landholdings 
Yoshihisa had control over, he was able to reinforce his own legitimacy in the eyes of his 
retainers while also disarming any potential threat the Iriki-in might pose to the Shimazu in the 
future. That Yoshihisa was able to do this and allowed the Iriki-in to maintain control over the 
coastal regions speak to the amount of flexibility Yoshihisa had due to his vast resources. After 
all, maritime trade was a major source of income for the samurai, and granting the Iriki-in access 
to the coast meant allowing them access to this crucial revenue stream.  
The other critical factor the Shimazu daimyo considered in his decision-making process 
was that of his own spiritual worldview. We have seen many examples in Kakuken’s diary where 
major military decisions were made on the basis of the kuji. As the warriors of the Sengoku 
period did not have ready access to facts and information untainted by the agents labouring to 
gather that information, the divine power of the kami provided the samurai of the Sengoku 





the words of the kami spoke truth beyond the meddling of the mundane world. It gave the 
Shimazu a sense of certainty and stability within a world where chaos and individual agendas 
dominated the hearts and minds of many people. The kami’s will thus also served as a 
counterbalance against dubious information, providing the daimyo with facts he can safely trust 
in making his decisions.  
Beyond the consistent struggles to balance the constancy of change and limited resources 
of the Sengoku period, warriors were also encouraged by the administrative system itself to 
protect their own interests. After all, the Shimazu administration was a system designed only to 
serve those in power. Each level of the hierarchy utilized and managed those below as either a 
form of resource or a potential threat. From its use of mediators and the failsafe measures 
implemented by the daimyo, to the way that the central administration handled and invested in 
individual rumours, the government at large served to reinforce the authority, legitimacy, or 
reputation of the higher levels of the administration at the expense of the lower levels. In 
response to this, since the structure of power was designed to reinforce itself at every available 
opportunity, the retainers were implicitly encouraged to shore up their own position and 
reputation through whatever resource they had. As the system itself did not provide them with 
any sort of protection against abuses of power by their peers or even their lord, they were left to 
their own devices when it came to securing their positions within the administration. 
Ultimately, to be a daimyo in the Sengoku period is therefore to manage one’s position 
and authority in an unstable society plagued by warfare, rivalries, and betrayals. This means 
prioritizing one’s survival at the expense of other people’s wellbeing while also being careful not 
to antagonize potential enemies. A successful daimyo made use of the difficult environmental 





questionable loyalty, and managing natural disasters without hindering the military operations of 
his administration. He must also be effective in the ways he delegated his authority to his 
retainers while implementing countermeasures against retainers who might take advantage of 
their positions. Above all else, a successful daimyo revered the kami and the Buddhist deities, 
and followed their will whenever possible. He did not concern himself with the lives and 
wellbeing of the commoners, but only with his own survival and power. Uwai Kakuken has 
shown us these perhaps not unexpected features of the country-at-war through his detailed 
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